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Abstract 
 
The current study aims to investigate empirically the main incentives for mandatory and 
voluntary risk reporting (MRR and VRR) across the USA, the UK and Germany, each of  
which has a unique approach towards risk reporting. While the UK approach encourages 
more voluntary risk reporting above imposing risk rules, the German approach formally 
requires firms to provide risk information in a certain place in their annual report 
narratives. The US approach is a compromise between these two approaches; it obligates 
and encourages firms to provide more information about their risks mandatorily and/or 
voluntarily, respectively. Investigating the incentives for risk reporting in such set of  
countries answers the calls of  some prior research (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Dobler, 
2008; Dobler, Lajili and Zeghal, 2011) to deepen our understanding of  what motivates 
firms to disclose their risks. To this end, computerised content analysis and multilevel 
analysis (MLA) on a large scale (compared with previous work e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 
2005, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007) are utilised. The results are produced in four 
cumulative contexts through Chapters Six to Nine. These results are consistent with 
managers‟ incentives theories (discussed in Chapter Two) and prior risk reporting literature 
(discussed in Chapter Three and Chapter Four).   
 
Based on 15 firms in each country during 2007 and 2008, multivariate analysis of  variance 
(MANOVA) results reveal significant differences between a firm‟s risk levels and its risk 
disclosure levels across the USA, the UK and Germany. The correlation results indicate 
that these differences are statistically correlated, supporting the main argument of  the 
current study that differences in a firm‟s risk levels should be reflected in their risk 
reporting practices (Chapter Six). 
 
Based on 1160 firm-years of  non-financial firms of  the FTSE all share index over 2005-
2008, linear mixed model (LMM) results document that firms with higher levels of  
systematic and financing risks are likely to exhibit significantly higher levels of  aggregated 
and voluntary risk reporting, whereas firms with high variability of  stock returns or lower 
levels of  liquidity are likely to exhibit significantly lower levels of  aggregated and voluntary 
risk reporting. The current study also finds, however, that MRR is associated significantly 
and positively with firm size rather than with risk levels. The results also indicate that 
managers of  firms exhibiting greater compliance with UK risk reporting regulations have 
greater incentives to disclose voluntary risk information (Chapter Seven). 
 
When the study extends the scope to the other two countries, different patterns of  
relations are found. Based on 1270, 1410 and 1005 firm-year observations over 2005 to 
2009 in the USA, the UK and Germany, respectively, repeated measures multilevel analysis 
(RMMLA) results suggest that, in the USA, MRR is more sensitive to firm risk levels (total, 
systematic and liquidity risks) than is VRR, which is more correlated to other firm 
characteristics. The UK results suggest that VRR is more sensitive to firm risk levels 
(systematic and liquidity risks) than is MRR, which is dominated by firm size, among other 
firm characteristics. In Germany, however, both MRR and VRR are significantly related to 
risk levels (total, systematic, un-systematic, financing and liquidity risks) (Chapter Eight). 
 
Based on 3685 firm-year observations during the period between 2005 and 2009, and 
concerning both firm- and country-level analyses, repeated measures multilevel analysis 
(RMMLA) results support that variations in MRR can be attributed to differences in the 
legal systems (country characteristics) and in firm size (firm characteristics). The variations 
xii 
 
in VRR are more associated with firm characteristics, especially a firm‟s risk levels across 
the USA, the UK and Germany (Chapter Nine). 
   
These results have many implications and support the respective regulatory approach 
adopted within each country by interpreting the extent to which either MRR or VRR is 
more or less sensitive to underlying risks. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1. Overview 
 
The main aim of  accounting is to provide its users with relevant information in order to 
enable them to make decisions. These decisions are dynamic, subject to change according 
the surrounding environment. To increase the relevance of  accounting information by 
responding to the main requirements of  decision makers, accounting regulators might pay 
more attention to understanding these changes in circumstances that affect users‟ needs. 
 
In recent years, therefore, there has been an ongoing debate among both academic 
researchers (e.g., Amir and Lev, 1996; Lev and Zarowin, 1999; Francis and Schipper, 1999; 
Fraser, Tarbert and Tee, 2009) and professional bodies (e.g., in the UK, the Institute of  
Chartered Accountants of  Scotland (ICAS), 1989 and the Institute of  Chartered 
Accountants of  England and Wales (ICAEW), 1994; in the USA, the American Institute of  
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), 1994 and the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB), 2001) on the extent to which accounting provides relevant information to 
users. To improve business reporting, a number of professional studies have suggested 
disclosing more relevant risk information, among some other types of information, such as 
forward-looking information and information about tangible assets, in firms‟ annual report 
narratives (German Accounting Standards Board (GASB), 2000; ICAEW, 1997, 1999, 
2002, 2011). 
 
Although considerable attention has recently been paid to risk disclosure, understanding 
how and the extent to which a firm‟s risk levels motivate a firm to provide risk information 
in its narratives is still relatively unknown within and/or across countries. Within single-
2 
 
country research (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Beretta 
and Bozzolan, 2004), the main interest is in investigating how a firm‟s characteristics (e.g., a 
firm‟s size) and a firm‟s corporate governance (e.g., board characteristics) influence 
providing risk information in the firm‟s annual report narratives. While there is much 
research that investigates the impact of  country-level variables, such as cultural and legal 
systems, on general disclosure (e.g., Jaggi and Low, 2000; Hope, 2003; William, 2004), no 
cross-country research investigates how and the extent to which those variables may affect 
risk reporting. Dobler, Lajili and Zeghal (2011) is the only study, to the best of  the 
researcher's knowledge, that investigates risk reporting in more than one country. They do 
not examine, however, the impact of  such factors on providing risk information. Given the 
fact that the nature of  risk information is different from general disclosure, in a sense, risk 
information could be widely seen as unfavourable information (ICAWE, 1997, 2011). 
Difficulties of  measuring risk reporting across countries is another factor that should be 
considered in relation to comparing cross-country risk reporting research with prior 
general disclosure research that uses scores from the Centre for International Financial 
Analysis and Research (CIFAR).  
 
The rest of  this chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 highlights the main research 
gaps and the main reasons that motivate the current study to investigate the main 
incentives for risk reporting within and across countries. Section 1.3 introduces the 
research objectives, research questions and research hypotheses. Section 1.4 provides 
details about the research methodology, which includes the sample selection and variables 
measurements. Key findings and their theoretical and practical implications are presented 
in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 explains how the current study contributes to the body of  
knowledge. The structure of  the current study is discussed in Section 1.7.  
 
3 
 
1.2. Gaps and motivations  
 
Two major strands of  literature motivate this study. The first is prior risk reporting1 
research (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 2006; Dobler, 2008) that identifies some gaps (e.g., 
cross-country investigation of  the main determinants of  risk reporting, and the incentives 
for mandatory and voluntary risk reporting (MRR and VRR) either within or across 
countries).  
 
Dobler (2008) addresses the gap of  risk reporting incentives and their relationship with 
regulation. He concludes that under either oriented-mandatory (e.g., German approach) or 
voluntary (e.g., UK approach) disclosure approaches; there are still essential needs to 
explore incentives that stimulate firms to provide risk information mandatorily and 
voluntarily, respectively, in their annual report narratives. 
 
As a result, the current study is motivated to investigate the main incentives for both MRR 
and VRR, each of  which may have different drivers. Prior risk reporting research, 
nevertheless, does not differentiate VRR from MRR (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2006; 
Abraham and Cox, 2007); alternatively, such research uses an aggregated measure to proxy 
VRR and ignores MRR. The current study distinctively uses a direct measure for MRR and 
distinguishes clearly between both types of  risk reporting.  
 
Linsley and Shrives (2005, 2006) emphasise the importance of  studying risk reporting 
across countries to deepen our understanding of  how risk reporting incentives vary across 
countries. This motivates the current study to provide a unique and extensive investigation 
                                                 
 
1 Throughout the current study, the terms context risk disclosure and risk reporting can be used 
interchangeably to/in talk(ing) about providing risk information in annual report narratives mandatorily 
and/or voluntarily. 
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of  such incentives, not only for VRR but also for MRR, and their variations either within 
or between non-financial firms across the USA, the UK and Germany, each of  which has a 
unique approach to dealing with risk reporting.  
 
On the one hand, Germany and the USA are highly oriented towards MRR. Most 
particularly, Germany has the only formal accounting standard to deal comprehensively 
with risk reporting (Dobler, 2008). This standard explains how German firms can provide 
information about their risks (such as identifying, measuring and managing their risks) in a 
specific section of  their annual report narratives (Opportunities and Risks or Outlook). In 
the USA, however, the SEC published Financial Reporting Release (FRR) No. 48 on the 
market risk of  financial instruments in 1997, which mandates the presentation of  both 
qualitative and quantitative market risk information. The UK, on the other hand, has a 
different approach to dealing with risk reporting; it is highly oriented towards VRR, as 
argued by ICAEW (1997, 1999, 2011). These two approaches, therefore, have shaped two 
subsequent main streams of  risk reporting literature (a detailed review of  these streams is 
provided in Chapters Three and Four).  
 
The first stream concerns the main determinants of  VRR. Such research is mainly 
conducted in Europe, including Italy (e.g., Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004); The Netherlands 
(e.g., Deumes and Knechel, 2008); Belgium (e.g., Vandemaele, Vergauwen and Michels, 
2009); and the UK (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2000, 2005, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007). 
The second stream concerns the usefulness of  mandated risk reporting; such research 
represents the main focus of  American risk reporting research (e.g., Rajgopal, 1999; 
Hodder and McAnally, 2001; Jorion, 2002; Linsmeier, Thornton, Venkatachalam and 
Welker, 2002; Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter, 2003, 2008).  
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Prior risk reporting research with a focus on a single country, therefore, has been widely 
conducted (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2000, 2005, 2006; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; 
Abraham and Cox, 2007; Li, 2008). So has research that is heavily restricted to one type of  
risk reporting, such as foreign exchange rate disclosure (e.g., Marshall and Weetman, 2002, 
2007), usefulness of  mandatory risk reporting (e.g., Li, 2008) and aggregated risk disclosure 
(e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2000, 2005, 2006). Among this research, however, results of  the 
extent to which firm risk levels can influence firms to provide risk reporting mandatorily 
and/or voluntarily in their annual report narratives are mixed. Consequently, this motivates 
this research to investigate these associations in three different approaches to risk reporting 
in three different countries. More specifically, the question „do firms disclose their risk 
information as a function of  their risk levels?‟ has not been answered. The current study 
investigates whether risky firms disclose more or less risk information in their annual 
reports narratives. This study examines such associations after controlling for a firm‟s size, 
profitability, growth and dividends. 
 
MRR is distinguished from VRR to observe the pattern of  associations with exploratory 
variables (firm and country characteristic variables). Knowing the pattern of  how the US, 
UK and German firms respond to their risk levels can help in identifying to which type of  
risks these firms are more sensitive, expressed by disclosing either more or less risk 
information mandatorily and/or voluntarily. Considered simultaneously, these send some 
signals that either support or warn regulators of  each approach by associating the observed 
trend of  firms‟ MRR and VRR to their underlying risks. 
 
The current study assumes, based on theory (managers‟ incentives theories) and relevant 
prior research (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2000, 2005, 2006), that UK firms disclose more 
risk information voluntarily than they do mandatorily, relative to their underlying risks. US 
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and German firms, in contrast, are likely to disclose more risk information mandatorily 
than they do voluntarily relative to their underlying risks. Obtaining empirical evidence that 
is consistent with previous arguments supports either UK regulators, on the one hand, or 
US and German regulators, on the other hand. 
 
In a recent, related work, based on 40 manufacturing firms in 2005 from each of  these 
countries, Dobler et al. (2011) investigate the extent to which firms disclose risk 
information subject to their risk levels. Dobler et al. (2011) do not distinguish between 
mandatory and voluntary risk reporting, although the USA and Germany are more highly 
regulated towards risk reporting than the UK, suggesting greater mandatory disclosure in 
the former two countries. They proxied firms‟ risk levels by considering just financing, 
systematic and nonfinancial risks. There is a lack of  a clear justification of  why they only 
chose those three risks. Similarly, it is not clear how they distinguished between market and 
accounting proxies for risk. In their OLS regressions, there is no attempt to control for any 
other effects (e.g. firm profitability), with the exception of  firm size. Nevertheless, when 
they aggregate risk disclosure across these countries, their model ignores country factors, 
such as legal systems and cultural values, which could influence providing risk disclosures. 
 
The current study distinguishes between mandatory and voluntary risk reporting, 
associates these disclosures to market and accounting risk measures over a five-year period, 
controls for profitability, growth and dividends in the firm-level analysis and controls for 
legal system and cultural values in the country-level analysis. 
 
None of  the previous work examines how country-level characteristics influence the 
provision of  MRR and VRR, nor the extent to which such characteristics can explain the 
variability of  risk reporting. The current study principally investigates how a country‟s legal 
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system and its cultural dimensions explain explicitly why MRR and VRR vary among firms 
across the USA, the UK and Germany.  
 
The second strand motivating the current study comes from the literature that reviews and 
evaluates methods frequently used in accounting research to correct the dependency of  
cross-sectional or time series problems.2 Bernard (1987) explains that much research in 
market-based accounting research (MBAR) has adopted ordinary least squares (OLS). 
Ignoring the problem of  cross-sectional dependency stemming from the root of  
conducting statistical procedures that address this problem (e.g., two-stage generalised least 
squares (GLS) techniques; cross-sectional aggregation of  the data; and use of  a multi-index 
version of  the market model) may cause some other serious applicable difficulties to arise.  
  
Bernard (1987) identifies contexts in which ignoring cross-sectional dependence can lead 
to incorrect inference, and finds that when at least some of  the returns are sampled from 
common time periods, cross-sectional dependency is more likely to exist. Specifically, his 
evidence shows that when the returns interval is long, incorrect inference is more likely to 
happen, caused by a bias of  standard errors that arises from cross-sectional dependency. 
Bernard (1987) concludes, therefore, that all stock market reaction studies of  accounting 
data on stock prices (e.g., Ball and Brown, 1968; Beaver, Clarke and Wright, 1979; Biddle 
and Lindahl, 1982) lead to biased estimations of  standard error. 
 
More recently, Gow, Ormazabal and Taylor (2010) comprehensively review and evaluate 
methods that are frequently used in accounting literature to correct not only cross-sectional 
                                                 
 
2
 The dependency of  cross-sectional and/or time series problems stems from the underlying assumption of  
the independency of  observation. This assumption, therefore, ignores the fact that observations from the 
same group (e.g., sector or country) or observations over time (longitudinal data) are more likely to be similar 
than those from other groups or non-longitudinal data (e.g., Hox, 2010). 
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dependence but also time-series dependence for a broad stream of  accounting literature 
(121 studies), using panel data in their regression analyses. They reveal that while 25 
percent (30) of  these studies do not appear to address such dependence, 75 percent (91) of  
these studies attempt to address cross-sectional and time-series dependence using a variety 
of  approaches. A major problem with these approaches is that while correcting the 
dependency in one direction, they assume independency in the other direction (e.g., Fama-
MacBeth's regression). Gow et al. (2010) explain that prior research either ignores one or 
both forms of  dependence, or even relies on methods developed within the accounting 
literature that have not been formally evaluated (e.g., aggregating firm- or industry-specific 
coefficients, Z2 statistic and Newey-West).  
 
Steele (2008b) argues that ignoring data structure might make the standard errors of  a 
regression‟s coefficients too small or underestimated. Thus, the confidence intervals will be 
too narrow and the p-values will be too small, which may lead researchers to accept a 
predictor that has no real impact on the dependent variable, when in fact the effect could 
be attributed to chance or to any other predictor (type II error). 
 
Consistent with Steele (2008b), Heck and Thomas (2000, 2009) explain that failure to 
account for similarities among firms because of  ignoring data structure results in biased 
estimates of  model parameters and therefore incorrect conclusions about the effects of  
some predictors in the model. 
 
Multilevel analysis (MLA), which was originally, and remains widely, used within 
educational and medical research, assumes dependency between observations; specifically, 
observations from the same group (e.g., sector, such as telecommunications, or country, 
such as the UK) tend to be more similar than those from different groups (other sectors, 
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such as services, or other countries, such as the USA). Furthermore, within the same 
group, it assumes any successive observations to be correlated during a time series (Heck, 
Thomas and Tabata, 2010).  
 
Steele (2008a) explains that the underestimations of  the coefficient are closely related to 
the group (sectors or countries) variables. Consequently, the correct standard error will be 
estimated only if  variation among groups is allowed for in the analysis, which is accurately 
provided by using multilevel modelling. She explains that MLA enables researchers to 
investigate the nature of  between-group variability and the effects of  group-level 
characteristics on individual outcomes.  
 
Essentially, the current study relies on MLA as a new technique to overcome drawbacks 
arising from using the most common techniques (OLS) or their modified forms (e.g., fixed 
effect model). Furthermore, residual dependency problems are accounted for by a 
complete consideration of  the study‟s data structure, which expresses firms nested within 
countries over time.  
1.3. Research objectives, research questions and research hypotheses 
 
1.3.1. Research objectives 
The current study seeks to address four principal objectives. First, it aims to identify the 
extent to which a firm‟s risk levels and a firm‟s risk reporting levels are significantly 
different between firms across these countries, and to what extent these differences are 
correlated (this aim is achieved in Chapter Six). Second, the current study aims to identify 
risk reporting incentives within the UK context using LMM in comparison to OLS and 
FEM (this aim is achieved in Chapter Seven). Third, identifying to what extent variations in 
MRR and/or VRR within and between firms over 2005 to 2009 can be attributed to those 
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variations in a firm‟s risk levels in each country is the main aim investigated by the current 
study in Chapter Eight. Fourth, exploring how and the extent to which firm-level and 
country-level characteristics interpret variations in MRR and/or VRR within and between 
firms over 2005 to 2009 across the USA, the UK and Germany is achieved in Chapter 
Nine.  
1.3.2. Research questions and research hypotheses 
The main research questions that are addressed by the current study are classified 
according to whether they concern firm-level or country-level analysis. Using the same 
distinction, the research hypotheses are formulated (a detailed discussion of  these research 
questions and research hypotheses is provided in Chapter Four).  
Research questions 
 
The following summarises the research questions addressed by the current study. 
 Are there any significant differences between firms across the USA, the UK and 
Germany in either their risk or risk disclosure levels? Are these differences 
correlated? 
 Do a firm‟s risk levels (captured by market- and accounting-risk measures) 
motivate firms to provide their risk disclosure mandatorily and/or voluntarily 
(MMR and/or VRR) in their annual report narratives?  
 Do MRR and VRR vary within and between firms across the USA, the UK and 
Germany between 2005 and 2009? 
 Can MRR and VRR variations be attributed to firm characteristics (risk levels) 
and/or country-level characteristics (legal systems and cultural values)? 
 Which variables of both firm- and country-level characteristics are significantly 
associated with variability of MRR and VVR?  
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Research hypotheses 
 
To formulate the research hypotheses, two main levels are introduced. While the first 
investigates factors that significantly influence firms to disclose information about their 
risks within each country (these factors are known as firm-level characteristics), the second 
involves country-level characteristics; this level investigates how a country‟s characteristics 
explain variations in risk reporting across countries. The following formulates each level‟s 
hypotheses. 
Firm-level analysis 
 
In this level, the associations between a firm‟s risk levels (captured by both market- and 
accounting-risk measures) and its risk reporting levels (captured by both MRR and VRR) 
are formulated based on managers‟ incentives theories and prior risk reporting literature, as 
will be explained in detail in Chapter Four. Additionally, other firm characteristics (e.g., 
firm size) and corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., board characteristics) are also 
accounted for as control variables. The following six hypotheses, therefore, represent this 
level‟s concerns, which will be examined in the context of  three main empirical chapters: 
Chapter Seven (the UK), Chapter Eight (within the USA, the UK and Germany, 
individually) and Chapter Nine (across the USA, the UK and Germany). 
 
H1: Firms‟ market volatility (as a proxy of  firms‟ total risk) is likely to be significantly and 
positively correlated to MRR and VRR. 
H2: Firms‟ market beta (as a proxy of  firms‟ systematic risk) is likely to be significantly and 
positively correlated to MRR and VRR. 
H3: Firms‟ market volatility of  the standard error of  CAPM (as a proxy of  firms‟ un-
systematic risk) is likely to be significantly and positively correlated to MRR and VRR. 
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H4: Firms‟ Sharp ratio (as a proxy of  firms‟ risk-adjusted return) is likely to be significantly 
and positively correlated to MRR and VRR. 
H5: Firms‟ leverage (as a proxy of  firms‟ financing risk) is likely to be significantly and 
positively correlated to MRR and VRR. 
H6: Firms‟ current ratio (as a proxy of  firms‟ liquidity risk) is likely to be significantly and 
positively correlated to MRR and VRR. 
Country-level analysis 
 
At this level, the impact of  country characteristics on risk reporting is essentially 
considered. Additionally, this level explores the interactive impact of  firm- and country-
level variables on interpreting variations in MRR and VRR. The following hypotheses 
represent these concerns, which also are discussed in more detail in Chapter Four. 
H7: Both a country‟s legal system and its cultural values are more likely to be complements 
than substitutes in explaining variations on MRR and VRR. 
H8: The explanatory power of  country characteristics (legal systems and cultural values) to 
explain the observed MRR variability between firms is higher than those explaining VRR 
variations. 
 
1.4. Research methods  
 
 
Thomson One Banker is used to obtain a list of  NASDAQ, FTSE and Frankfurt (CDAX) 
all share firms in the USA, the UK and Germany, respectively. Excluding all financial firms, 
cross-listing firms and any firm without a complete series, these criteria yield a final list of  
1270, 1410 and 1005 firm-years for the USA, the UK and Germany, respectively. More 
discussions about these issues are provided in Chapter Five. 
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Relying on a growing body of  accounting and finance literature, firms‟ disclosure levels are 
captured using automated content analysis (e.g., Hussainey, Schleicher and Walker, 2003; 
Kothari et al., 2009; Muslu, Radhakrishnan, Subramanyam and Lim, 2010; Li, 2010; 
Gruning, 2011). Both MRR and VRR, therefore, are measured in these three countries by 
using Nudist 6 to count the number of  risk-indicator statements in annual reports 
narratives. 
 
Relying on extensive accounting literature that mainly examines the associations between 
accounting- and market-risk measures (e.g., Beaver, Kettler and Scholes, 1970; Lev and 
Kunitzky, 1974; Beaver and Manegold, 1975; Almisher and Kish, 2000; Giner and Reverte, 
2006; Brimble and Hodgson, 2007), a firm‟s risk levels are captured. In this context, six 
main measures to comprehensively capture firm risk levels are utilised: volatility, beta and 
volatility of  standard error of  Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) as market measures of  
total, systematic and unsystematic risk. Leverage and current ratio are used as accounting 
measures for financing and liquidity risks, respectively. To investigate the impact of  
country-level variables on both MRR and VRR, a country‟s cultural values are measured 
based on Hofstede‟s values (1980, 1991), which are widely used in prior general disclosure 
research (e.g., Chanchani and MacGregor, 1999; Doupnik and Tsakumis, 2004).  
 
Three methods are utilised to examine the association between the main variables: ordinary 
least squares (OLS), fixed effect model (FEM) and multilevel analysis (MLA), through 
applying linear mixed model (LMM) and repeated measures multilevel analysis (RMMLA). 
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1.5. Empirical results and theoretical and practical implications  
 
1.5.1. Empirical results  
Empirical results appear in four chapters, commencing with a pilot study and then moving 
to UK evidence, empirical results for the USA, the UK and Germany, and then the pooled 
results for these countries. 
 
Using a multivariate analysis of  variance (MANOVA) of  15 randomly selected firms in 
each country during 2007 and 2008, the results report that there are significant differences 
between these firms in their levels of  risk and risk disclosure. To discover the extent to 
which differences in risk disclosure can be attributed to underlying differences in risk 
levels, the current study uses correlation analysis, which reports significant associations 
between these two variables. 
 
Expanding the analysis to include FTSE all share over 2005 to 2008 and implementing 
ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effect model (FEM) and linear mixed model (LMM) 
methods, the results report that observed trends of  aggregated risk reporting are identical 
to voluntary risk reporting, but differ from the observed trends of  mandatory risk 
reporting. The results show that managers are more motivated to voluntarily disclose 
significantly more risk information in their annual report narratives relative to their risk 
levels than they do mandatorily. Managers who exhibit greater compliance with UK risk 
disclosure regulations have greater incentives to disclose risk information voluntarily. The 
study finds that high-risk firms appear to be more sensitive to underlying risk levels, 
resulting in disclosing more voluntary and mandatory risk information than low-risk firms. 
 
Expanding the previous analysis to include American and German firms between 2005 and 
2009, and implementing RMML, the study finds that a firm‟s risk levels have different 
15 
 
influences on mandatory and voluntary risk reporting (MRR and VRR) within each 
country. The results show that within the UK, risk levels are more correlated with 
voluntary risk reporting than mandatory risk reporting. Conversely, within the USA, the 
results report that a firm‟s risk levels are more likely to significantly affect mandatory rather 
than voluntary risk reporting. Within a German context, the results report that both 
mandatory and voluntary risk reporting are sensitive to risk levels.  
 
Based on the same statistics, the results document significant variations of  both mandatory 
and voluntary risk reporting within and between firms over the period of  study across the 
USA, the UK and Germany. The study finds that a country‟s legal system and its cultural 
values have significantly higher abilities to explain MRR diversification than VRR 
diversification, which is more likely to be statistically correlated with firm characteristics 
that are derived hypothetically, based on the mangers‟ incentives theories (e.g., agency 
theory, signalling theory and capital needs theory). The study finds that a country‟s legal 
system and its cultural values are more likely to react with a firm‟s characteristics as 
complements rather than substitutes to explain MRR variation.  
 
1.5.2. Theoretical and practical implications 
The results have several theoretical and practical implications. The main theoretical 
implications are: distinction between mandatory and voluntary risk reporting, risk 
reporting incentives in highly regulated countries such as the USA and Germany, utilising a 
new technique to incorporate both firm- and country-level effects and where future 
research could be usefully carried out. Appraising each country‟s approach, by identifying 
how and the extent to which firms in each country respond to their underlying risk by 
disclosing more or less risk information either mandatorily or voluntarily, gives indicators 
for regulators in each country. All these implications are discussed as follows.  
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Theoretical implications 
 
Previous results have some distinctive theoretical implications. First, it is suggested that 
distinguishing between the observed trend of  mandatory and voluntary risk reporting is 
essential, emphasising that each risk disclosure type has its own drivers. This result, 
therefore, does not support those studies that do not distinguish voluntary from 
mandatory risk reporting (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2000, 2005, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 
2007) when studying the incentives for risk reporting. Different conjectures between the 
observed trend of  MRR and firm risk levels, compared to the observed trend of  VRR, 
therefore, can be performed.  
 
Second, previous results support Dobler‟s (2008) theoretical argument that studying risk 
reporting incentives is crucial even within highly regulated countries like the USA and 
Germany. The results suggest that even within these mandated requirements; managers still 
have incentives to voluntarily disclose information above these requirements. This could 
significantly add to compliance disclosure literature (e.g., Bamber and McMeeKing, 2010) 
by emphasising the importance of  widening this research scope to pay more attention to 
variations above the mandated requirements (e.g., IFRS adoption), which provide a 
minimum of  information to investors, as argued through regulatory theory (e.g., Leftwich, 
1980; Cooper and Keim, 1983; Fields, Lys and Vincent, 2001; Ogus, 2001).  
 
The third theoretical implication is utilising a new empirical model (MLA) that will be 
introduced through either LMM, shown in Chapter Seven, or using RMMLA, shown in 
Chapters Eight and Nine, concerning how to interact both the cross-sectional and time 
series effects simultaneously with correcting for the residual dependency. 
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Fourth, the significant variations of  MRR and VRR within and between firms either in or 
across the USA, the UK and Germany over 2005 to 2009 express that there are other 
chances to expand the current design either at firm or country level of  analysis by 
involving other explanatory variables to reduce the unexplained variations in risk reporting. 
Hence, all explanatory variables used by the current study significantly improved the 
interpretations of  the observed variations between firms, known as level 2 variations, more 
than those occurring within firms, known as level 1 variations. In this regard, the current 
study suggests that more attention should be paid to those variables that may express 
variations in MRR and/or VRR within firms over 2005 to 2009. All these expansions will 
be discussed in the section on limitations and suggestions for future research. 
 
Practical implications  
 
These previous results have some distinctive implications for regulators in the USA, the 
UK and Germany. First, the results support the regulatory trend within the USA; hence, 
the results indicate that firms providing more risk information either mandatorily and/or 
voluntarily are subject to significant underlying risks. This result could be interpreted as US 
firms trusting the market‟s ability to correct any overestimations of  these firms‟ 
uncertainties by disclosing more risk information. The theoretical expansion for this 
argument is the extent to which investors can understand risk information in annual report 
narratives, as was addressed within the US market by Li (2008), who used a text search for 
the words risk and uncertainty in 10-K annual filings as a direct measure of  risk information 
content. Li‟s (2008) findings support investors becoming more familiar with risk 
information as time passes (within one year ahead).  
 
Second, within the UK context, the practical implications stem from supporting the 
current trend of  UK regulation, which encourages firms to voluntarily disclose 
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information about their risks rather than making such disclosure compulsory. In general 
terms, the results reinforce support for encouraging (by means of  non-mandatory 
initiatives, such as those of  the ICAEW) UK firms to provide risk information voluntarily 
rather than mandatorily. The evidence, however, also signals that firms may provide less 
risk information than what would constitute an appropriate response to their underlying 
risk levels.  
 
Third, consistent with discussion within the US context, the study evidence also supports 
German regulators‟ approach towards risk reporting; the results indicate that organising 
risk practices by officially issuing formal accounting standards results in motivating 
German firms to provide higher levels of  risk information, either mandatorily or 
voluntarily, as a response to their risk levels. At the same time, there are some situations 
where firms significantly disclose less risk information relative to their significant exposure 
to risk. This behaviour could be explained on the basis that those firms could see that 
disclosing more risk information could be costly, especially for those who were not aware 
of  the firms‟ risks.   
 
Fourth, considering each country‟s legal system and its cultural values is essential to 
minimise variations in the mandatory efforts, which result in enhancing current 
international convergence efforts. In other words, because considering these factors 
explains a significant proportion of  variations in MRR across the USA, the UK and 
Germany, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) should pay much 
attention to legal systems and cultural values across the countries in order to minimise 
variations in risk reporting.  
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1.6. Contribution to knowledge 
 
The current study contributes to the existing literature in the following three distinct 
respects. 
 
First, the present study explores, using firm-level analysis, the impact of  risk levels on three 
different risk disclosure types (aggregated, voluntary and mandatory), controlling for four 
other firm characteristics (firm size, profitability, growth and dividends). While prior risk 
reporting literature provides mixed empirical evidence on firm size, no previous work has 
examined the other three effects. Prior disclosure research, therefore, is advanced by 
considering whether or not there are any associations between firm risk levels and risk 
reporting, rather than investigating associations between risk levels and corporate 
disclosure generally (e.g., Firth, 1984; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Ahmed and Courtis, 
1999; Chavent, Ding, Stolowy and Wang, 2006; Hassan, 2011). Furthermore, the current 
study advances literature on the association between market- and accounting-risk measures 
(e.g., Beaver et al., 1970; Lev and Kunitzky, 1974; Beaver and Manegold, 1975; Almisher 
and Kish, 2000; Giner and Reverte, 2006; Brimble and Hodgson, 2007; Ecker, Francis, 
Olsson and Schipper, 2009) by investigating how these measures can explain variations in 
MRR and VRR within and between firms in the USA, the UK and Germany.  
 
 The current study further examines, using country-level analysis, how and to what extent a 
country‟s legal system and its cultural values can influence variations in both mandatory 
and voluntary risk reporting. 
 
Second, previous work has applied manual content analysis to a one-year period within one 
country to examine the impact of  firm sector and size on issues such as quantity and 
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quality of  risk reporting (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004); the association between aggregated 
risk disclosure and firm size, firm risk and risk sentence characteristics, such as good, bad, 
past and future risk disclosures (Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 2006); and the association 
between corporate governance characteristics and business, financial and internal risk 
reporting (Abraham and Cox, 2007). The current study investigates risk disclosure as a 
function of  risk levels across the USA, the UK and Germany by text-searching a large-
scale sample of  annual reports over a five-year period (2005 to 2009).  
 
The current study is the first to use automated content analysis within risk disclosure 
studies in such a large scale across these three countries (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2000, 
2005, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007). 
 
Third, three methods are utilised to examine the association between the main variables: 
ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effect model (FEM) and multilevel analysis (MLA), 
through applying linear mixed model (LMM) and repeated measures multilevel analysis 
(RMMLA). The first two approaches have been used frequently in prior research. To 
mitigate problems caused by cross-sectional data (heteroskedasticity) and/or time series 
data (auto-correlation), however, the study uses MA, which accounts for the problem of  
residual dependency that is frequently neglected in market-based accounting research (see 
Bernard, 1987; Gow et al., 2010). 
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1.7. Structure of  the thesis 
 
This section outlines the structure of  the thesis, which contains ten chapters, as shown in 
Figure 1.1. Chapter Two provides the theoretical framework of  risk reporting, introducing 
the concept of  risk by identifying how this concept has emerged in business usage, and 
then reviewing academic and professional efforts to define risk. Based on these efforts, the 
study further reviews risk categories. The chapter also produces both regulatory and 
managers‟ incentive theories to understand the underpinning reasons for providing risk 
information mandatorily and/or voluntarily, respectively, utilising firm-level analysis. 
Expanding such level of  analysis to country-level, the current study utilises Hofstede's 
cultural values and the legal systems of  the USA, the UK and Germany to interpret firms‟ 
levels of  mandatory and voluntary risk reporting (MRR and VRR) across those countries. 
 
Chapter Three reviews and appraises prior research in two areas, risk measurement and risk 
reporting, followed by another review of  prior professional efforts. Relying on these 
efforts, the current study identifies the gaps in this prior research. 
 
Chapter Four presents the research questions and develops the research hypotheses, 
distinguishing between firm-level and country-level characteristics in generating the 
research hypotheses, which are derived theoretically from underpinning theories discussed 
in Chapter Two, and empirically from prior research reviewed in Chapter Three. 
 
To examine the developed hypotheses, Chapter Five describes the research methodology, 
which contains data collection and the sample selection, the proposed automated content 
analysis and the study variables. 
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Chapter Six conducts, introduces and interprets a pilot study that examines the extent to 
which there are significant differences among and between firms in these three countries in 
terms of  their risk levels and risk reporting, and the extent to which these two variables are 
correlated. 
 
Chapter Seven introduces the empirical evidence of  the extent to which firm risk levels can 
motivate firms to provide more or less risk information in their annual report narratives 
within a UK context, comparing OLS and FEM results with LMM results. 
 
Chapter Eight expands the analysis in the previous chapter by including the other two 
countries and implementing RMMLA. The results reflect a different pattern of  
associations between a firm‟s risk levels and its mandatory and voluntary risk reporting. 
 
Chapter Nine expands the analysis in the previous chapter to examine the extent to which 
firm- and country-level characteristics can express mandatory and voluntary variations 
within and between firms across the USA, the UK and Germany. 
 
Chapter Ten provides a summary of  the study, main conclusions, limitations and 
suggestions for future research. 
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Figure 1.1: The structure of the thesis  
Chapter Two: A conceptual 
framework of  risk reporting 
Provides risk concepts, risk categories 
and theories of  MRR and VRR.  
Chapter Three: Risk measurement 
and risk disclosure: A review 
Chapter Eight: Empirical evidence 
(2): Within-country evidence  
Chapter Five: Research methodology 
Chapter Seven: Empirical 
evidence (1): The case of  the UK 
Chapter Six: A pilot study 
Examines the significance of  either a 
firm‟s risk levels or its risk reporting 
levels. 
Provides the research questions at either 
firm or country level, and formulates 
research hypotheses for these two levels. 
Explains how the current study collects 
and measures its variables. 
Reviews prior academic and professional 
literature in risk measurement and risk 
reporting.  
Chapter Four: Research questions 
and hypotheses development 
Chapter Ten: Summary, main 
results and implications, limitations 
and future research 
Chapter Nine: Empirical evidence 
(3): Cross-country evidence 
Examines risk incentives using LMM 
compared to OLS and FEM within a UK 
context. 
Associates variations in MRR and/or 
VRR within or between firms to 
variations in these firms‟ risk levels in the 
USA, the UK and Germany. 
Chapter One: Introduction  
 
Examines the impacts of  firm-level and 
country-level variables on variations in 
MRR and/or VRR within and between 
firms across these countries. 
Provides an overview of  the current 
study. 
Summarises main findings, discusses 
limitations and suggests potential areas 
for future research.   
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Chapter Two: A conceptual framework for risk reporting 
 
2.1. Overview  
 
 
Identifying a distinguished conceptual framework of  risk reporting is the main aim of  this 
chapter. To this end, the concepts of  risk, risk categories, mandatory and voluntary risk 
reporting (MRR and VRR) theories and theories of  variations in MRR and VRR are 
explained.   
 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 discusses concepts of  risk. Section 2.3 
addresses two main questions. Firstly, how can firms identify their risk? Secondly, how can 
firms categorise their risk? Section 2.4 explains the theory behind providing risk 
information mandatorily and/or voluntarily. Section 2.5 introduces theory explaining 
variations in such disclosures. The background of  the main characteristics of  accounting in 
the USA, the UK and Germany are discussed in Section 2.6. The concluding remarks are 
provided in Section 2.7. 
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2.2. The concept of  risk 
 
2.2.1. Background 
The origin of  the word risk is thought to be the Arabic word risq, which means anything 
that has been given to you by God and from which you can make profit, or the Latin word 
risicum, which originally referred to the challenges faced by sailors (Wharton, 1992). 
 
In this context, Luhmann (1996) argues that the Latin word was used before the 16th 
century in sea trade, to describe legal problems in cases of  loss and damage, whereas the 
Arabic word was used widely in the 16th century. He also explains that the term risk in the 
English language appears only in the 17th century, and has since been widely used and 
accepted as a principle term that replaced older notions of  good and bad fortune. Thus, 
the term risk is used to attribute possible future successes and damages to external events, 
which, in turn, reflect the unpredictability or unforeseeability of  these events, which could 
cause either good or bad outcomes.   
 
Over time, these external events have been expanded to include internal events as a 
potential source of  risk. While the former source can be attributed to fortune, the latter 
source can be attributed to anticipated circumstances. By the end of  the 18th century, some 
other words were invented to express these two sources of  risk under uncertain conditions, 
such as hazard and its synonyms (e.g., danger and threat). In general, these terms are 
considered synonymous in current practice (Luhmann, 1996). From the same perspective, 
Akintoye and MacLeod (1997) and Heggum (2004) argue that hazard can describe an event 
that has an adverse effect.  
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In terms of  the English language, two definitions can be found. The first concentrates on 
the future and the probability of  negative outcomes of  an event, and is found in the 
Cambridge Dictionary (2004), which defines risk as the possibility of  something bad 
happening. The second, however, concentrates on negative effects using some other terms, 
such as danger and hazard, and is found in the Concise Oxford Dictionary (2009), which 
defines risk as the chance of  hazard, bad consequences, loss or exposure to danger.  
 
The German definition is consistent with the latter one. Based on the Duden dictionary3, 
risk is defined as a possible negative outcome for a company, which is associated with 
disadvantages, losses and damages; it can also apply to a project, a firm or an affiliated 
venture.  
 
Before the 16th century, there was no real understanding of  risk or the probability that is 
required to express how people could make decisions especially relative to the chance of  
dice gambling games (Bernstein, 1996). Therefore, chance was attributed to God(s). Even 
how to divide the points of  an incomplete game between two players was a major problem; 
this was highlighted by Luca Paccioli, who in 1494 provided the double-entry method for 
bookkeeping systems, which is still used today. In 1654, Pascal and Fermat answered the 
previous question through their formation of  the probability theory. This theory links the 
potential alternatives of  a future event with the potential probability of  each alternative; it 
is particularly useful in describing/predicting gambling (Sheynin, 2009). People at that time 
therefore become more able to deal with and forecast the future than before.  
 
                                                 
 
3 German definition, as stated in Duden dictionary (2010), is ''Risiko: möglicher negativer Ausgang bei einer 
Unternehmung, mit dem Nachteile, Verlust, Schäden verbunden sind; mit einem Vorhaben, Unternehmen 
o.Ä. verbundenes Wagnis''.   
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Pascal and Fermat's analysis was expanded by the efforts of  Jacob Bernoulli, who provided 
the basis for large number sampling in 1703. Consequently, through time, the usage of  
probability theory was extended from gambling and dice into a powerful instrument for 
organising, interpreting and applying information (Bernstein, 1996). 
 
Expanding the efforts of  Jacob Bernoulli, Abraham de Moivre introduced normal 
distribution in 1730, enabling users to accurately identify uncertainty within in smaller 
samples. Furthermore, de Moivre provided standard deviation as a measure of  the 
dispersion of  a set of  data from its mean. These two concepts, standard deviation and 
normal distribution, are essential components of  modern techniques used to quantify risk 
(Bernstein, 1996). 
 
In the same context, in 1738, Daniel Bernoulli provided a basis to explain how people 
make choices relying on utility, rather than price, as the main determent of value. 
Depending on this utility, the value of risk can be measured (Bernoulli, 1738, translated by 
Sommer, 1954). 
 
In 1850, Bayes concentrated on the importance of combining past and future data in order 
to enhance the calculation of the probability of various alternatives. Thus, he considers 
how frequently things happened in the past in order to draw conclusions about the present 
in order to predict potential future impacts.   
 
A hundred years later, Harry Markowitz (1952) proposed the portfolio theory in a 
remarkable work, „the Portfolio Selection‟ (e.g., Markowitz, 1952; Goetzmann, 2007). To 
optimise the reward for a given level of  risk, portfolio theory describes how investors 
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balance the risk and the return of an investment in a portfolio. Using variance as a proxy of 
risk, he explains that investors should select an investment according to its returns, or the 
desirable outcome, compared with the variance of those returns, or the undesirable 
outcome.  
 
William Sharp (1964) extends Markowitz‟s work through providing the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM). This model treats the expected returns of an asset as a function of 
risk-free rate and risk premium, which is the difference between the risk-free rate and the 
expected returns. This risk premium should be, in turn, weighted by the variability of 
expected returns from actual returns. This weight is the market beta. Many other 
researchers have contributed to formation of this model, including Linter (1965) and 
Mossin (1966). 
  
Based on Markowitz (1952), Sharp (1964), Linter (1965) and Mossin (1966), other prior 
research concerns the extent to which accounting information can surrogate market risk 
(e.g., Ball and Brown, 1968, 1969; Beaver et al., 1970; Beaver and Manaegold, 1975; 
Bowman, 1979; Almisher and Kish, 2000; Brimbl and Hodgson, 2007; Giner and Reverte, 
2006). These studies will be discussed in the following chapter. 
 
Based on portfolio theory, the concept of value at risk (VaR) appeared which describes the 
maximum losses expected in a specific period under a suitable level of confidence. It has 
been argued that VaR is not used in academic literature until the early 1990s (e.g., Holton, 
2002 and 2003). During the end of the 1980s, Morgan (1996) developed a wide firm VaR 
system, which was provided as a technical document for risk metrics. This measure is 
broadly used and accepted in financial firms because of employing daily data, which is 
essential to calculate VaR. 
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VaR calculations can be achieved through many models; for instance, the simulation 
model, which relies on historical data (the historical simulation model) or future data 
(Monte Carlo simulation) (more details about the different methods of calculating VaR are 
provided in the following chapter, see note 6). The following table summarises these 
efforts and distinguishes the developments of the term risk, and how it has emerged in 
academic and business usage since the 15th century. 
 
Table 2.1: Summary of development of risk concepts and their usage since the 15th century 
Time period  Development of the term risk over 
time 
Year How risk has emerged in academic 
and business usage 
 
The 15th  
century  
 
The Latin word risicum is widely 
used to express legal problems in 
the sea trade, especially in cases of 
loss and damage.  
 
1494 
 
The problem of how to distribute the 
total points in an incomplete game 
between two players is highlighted by 
Luca Paccioli. 
 
The 16th  
century 
 
The Arabic word risq is used to 
express anything that has been given 
by God. Consequently, this concept 
includes either good things (gains) 
or bad things (losses). 
 
The 17th  
century 
 
From the previous two words, the 
English word risk appears, replacing 
the notion of good and bad fortune. 
Thus, risk is used to attribute 
successes or damages to external 
(fortune) or internal events 
(anticipated). 
 
1654 
 
Pascal and Fermat answer the 
previous question using probability 
theory. This theory links potential 
alternatives and their potential 
probability. Thus, this theory helped 
people to articulate their forecasting. 
 
The 18th  
century 
 
To explain external and internal 
sources of risk, some other terms 
are introduced, such as hazard, 
damage and threat, each of which 
suggests adverse effects. 
 
1703 
 
The probability theory provided by 
Pascal and Fermat (1654) is restricted 
by using a small number of 
alternatives. An extension to this 
restriction is provided by Jacob 
Bernoulli, who introduces large 
number sampling, or the case of 
indefinite population.  
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1730 
 
 
Relying on large number sampling, 
normal distribution and standard 
deviation are provided by de Moivre, 
making quantifying risk possible. 
 
1738 
 
Daniel Bernoulli provides a new 
methodology to measure risk and 
uncertainty by adopting the concept 
of utility. Since then, value has been 
identified as a function of its utility 
rather than its price. Bernoulli‟s works 
make it possible to express people‟s 
choices. 
 
The 19th  
century 
  
1850 
 
Bayes explains the importance of 
combining historical and future data 
by providing the concept of 
frequencies, which enable users to 
generate the potential impacts of a 
future event.   
 
The 20th  
century 
  
1952 
 
Markowitz provides the portfolio 
theory, which explains how investors 
should select stocks to form their 
portfolio. To achieve that, and based 
on variance or standard deviation as 
proxies for risk, Markowitz shows 
how to balance between returns and 
risk.  
 
1964, 1965, 
1966 
 
Sharp (1964) extends Markowitz‟s 
(1952) work by providing the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), 
measuring systematic risk (risks that 
affect all firms) through beta, which, 
in turn, expresses the variability of the 
actual returns around the expected 
returns. Many significant elements are 
added to CAPM by Linter (1965) and 
Mossin (1966). 
  
1970 
 
To answer the question of how 
accounting data surrogates market 
risk, Beaver, Kettler and Scholes 
associate accounting variables or ratio 
analysis with market beta.  
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2.2.2. Risk definitions 
Based on whether or not the risk scope includes gains, three main trends are found in prior 
literature. The first trend concentrates on the negative effects of  risk, including potential 
losses, damages or threats (e.g., Kaplan and Garrick, 1981; Akintoye and MacLeod, 1997; 
Adams, 2009). The second trend concentrates on a combination of  the upside, the 
opportunities or potential gains of  good risks, and the downside, the potential losses from 
bad risks (e.g., Schrand and Elliott, 1998; Elmiger and Kim, 2003; Damodaran, 2008). The 
third trend concentrates on a statistical perspective by relying on the probabilities of  events 
that relate to either losses or gains (e.g., Lopes, 1987; Ansell and Wharton, 1992; 
Stonebumer, Goguen and Feringa, 2002). 
 
Similar to the prior academic literature, prior professional efforts adopt various 
perspectives. Specifically, the Institute of  Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
(ICAEW) (1997) explains that risk equals uncertainty and, in both terms, should include 
potential gains and losses. Consistent with that, the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) 
 
1996 
 
Morgan introduces VaR, which means 
that losses will not exceed a target 
value within a specific period and a 
specific confidence level, as a measure 
for a firm‟s market risk.  
 
The 21st  
century 
  
2000-– 
present  
 
VaR has been widely used to measure 
market risk, especially within financial 
firms, owing to the availability of 
market data. VaR calculations can be 
achieved through many models; for 
instance, the simulation model, which 
relies on historical data (the historical 
simulation model) or future data 
(Monte Carlo simulation).  
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adopts the same trend in its accounting standards (e.g., Financial Reporting Standards 
(FRS) Number 5: Reporting the Substance of  Transaction, 1994). 
 
Likewise, in the literature (e.g., Rust, 1999) that distinguishes between risk and uncertainty 
by identifying whether the probability distribution is known (risk) or not (uncertainty), the 
AICPA and the Canadian Institute of   Chartered Accountants (CICA) (2000) point out 
that uncertainty could be defined as a condition where the outcome can only be estimated. 
Furthermore, they explain that articulations of  risk should include two angles, the 
opportunity or the upside (potential gains) and the threat, danger or downside (losses). 
  
Nonetheless, the Securities and Exchanges Commission (SEC) explains that risk contains 
only potential losses (Financial Reporting Release (FRR) No. 48, 1997). Similarly, in many 
contexts of  its accounting standards the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
adopts an interspersion of  risk as the exposure of  potential losses and potential gains 
which may be caused by movements in price, exchange rate or interest rate (e.g., Financial 
Accounting Standard (FAS) 133, 136, 137 and 161). 
 
The German Accounting Standards Board (GASB) provides an accounting standard (GAS: 
5) to deal with how German firms can provide risk information in their annual reports. 
According to this standard, risk is defined as the possibility of  future negative impact on 
the economic position of  a firm. In the same context, GAS 5 explains that opportunity is 
the possibility of  a future positive impact on the economic position of  a firm. GAS 5 
adopts, therefore, a narrow perspective that concentrates on potential losses. At the same 
time, GAS 5 emphasises that firms should provide suitable information about their 
potential opportunities in their financial reporting. 
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Consistent with what is mentioned above, the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), formerly the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), explains in 
many sections of  its accounting standards that risk includes losses as well as gains (e.g., IAS 
32 and 39; IFRS 7). Table 2.2 summarises previous accounting professional efforts 
regarding the concept of  risk. 
 
 
Table 2.2: Summary of professional efforts on the concept of risk  
Components of  risk 
                  
  
           Professional body/ country 
 Potential losses Potential losses and 
potential gains 
 
ICAEW          UK 
  
X 
 
ASB UK 
  
X 
 
SEC               USA 
 
X 
 
 
AICPA           USA 
  
X 
 
FASB             USA 
  
X 
 
GASB            Germany 
 
X 
 
 
IASB              International 
  
X 
 
To sum up, the current study introduces the concept of  risk through outlining a 
fundamental background about risk relative to its language, the development of  its usage, 
and prior academic and professional efforts. The current study concludes that including or 
excluding potential gains from the concept of  risk is the main conflict among prior 
research (e.g., Damodaran, 2008; Adams, 2009) and prior professional efforts (e.g., ICAEW, 
1997; GASB, 2000). 
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It is worth mentioning that previous professional efforts, which rely on recommendations 
(ICAEW and AICPA), define risk as involving both potential gains and potential losses. 
Once, these professional bodies make up regulations, they adopt a narrow perspective 
through considering only potential losses rather than potential gains (SEC and GASB), 
although the IASB‟s and ASB‟s efforts are exceptions in terms of  adopting a wide 
perspective in defining risk. One explanation, for the approaches of  the SEC and GASB, 
could be the adoption of  the discretionary approach with the former (e.g., Jorgensen and 
Kirschenheiter, 2008) and the prudence approach with the latter (e.g., Evans, Eierle and 
Haller, 2002). The trends of  the ASB and IASB can be interpreted in light of  the flexibility 
of  the principle-based approach that is adopted by those professional bodies.  
 
 To respond to such conflict, risk can be defined as the variations or fluctuations around a 
target value at a specific time horizon. The content of  this section, however, should be 
expanded to cover the risk categories, which will be discussed in the following section. 
 
2.3. Risk categories 
 
 
This section addresses two questions: how can firms identify their risk? And, what are the 
different categories of  risk? Based on academic and professional prior research, these two 
questions will be addressed in the following subsections. 
2.3.1. Identifying risk  
Identifying each firm‟s risks is essential, because it can be argued that without an accurate 
identification of  these risks, all subsequent efforts to categorise, measure or disclose risk 
will not be accurate. Each firm, therefore, seeks to rely on tools or techniques to generate 
its risks and then categorise them. Therefore, it is difficult to find a general list of  risks 
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suitable for all firms, owing to the fact that each firm has its own circumstances; these may 
differ even within the same firm over time (e.g., Schrand and Elliott, 1998).  
 
AICPA and CICA (2000) illustrate some tools or techniques that firms may rely on to 
identify their risks. They suggest relying on interviews, questionnaires and checklists to 
derive each firm‟s risks. These kinds of  tools are useful in identifying each firm‟s risk 
categories, which differ from one firm to another.  
 
2.3.2. Risk categories  
Depending on one or more of  the previous techniques, each firm might categorise its own 
risks to deal with them effectively. This can be considered an essential step because 
incorrectly identifying or listing risks can make conducting risk measurement and risk 
disclosure inaccurate. It is emphasised that the more accurate this list is, the more effective 
the measurement and disclosure of  these risks will be.  
 
Prior risk reporting literature (e.g., Jorion, 1997; Hodder and McAnally, 2000; Linsmeier et 
al., 2002; Cabedo and Tirado, 2003; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007) 
discusses different types of  risk. Jorion (1997) explains three major types of  risk: business, 
strategic and financial risk. Business risks are those related to a company‟s competition 
situation. Strategic risks are related to basic changes in the economy and the political 
environment surrounding a firm. Financial risks are those related to the possibility of  
market losses. 
 
Treating derivatives as balance sheet activities rather than off-balance sheet activities draws 
regulators‟ attention to market risk, in which all risks arise from changes in market rates 
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and prices, such as interest rates, foreign currency rates, commodity prices and other 
relevant market or price changes (e.g., Hodder and McAnally, 2001; Linsmeier et al., 2002). 
 
Cabedo and Tirado (2003) illustrate that firms are essentially exposed to two types of  risk: 
non-financial risk and financial risk. The former does not have a direct effect on the firm's 
assets and liabilities; the latter, however, has a direct effect on the firm's assets and 
liabilities. Non-financial risk includes business risk and strategic risk. While business risk 
refers to the possible losses that arise from the competitive skills that a company has, 
strategic risk is related to changes in the economy. 
 
Financial risk, on the other hand, contains market risk, credit risk and operational risk. 
Market risk usually arises from variations in exchange rates, interest rates, changes in stock 
prices and changes in commodity prices. Credit risk arises from the deterioration of  a 
firm‟s client value. Operational risk arises from internal and external factors; consequently, 
operational risk may have negative effects on a firm‟s assets or liabilities.   
 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) provide two main categories of  risk to analyse the determinants 
of  risk disclosure: financial and non-financial risk. The latter category contains five types 
of  risk: operational, empowerment, technology, integrity and strategic risk. In the same 
context, Abraham and Cox (2007) concentrate on two types of  risk: financial and business 
risk. 
 
Damodaran (2008) summarises reasons that might make expected returns differ from 
actual returns into firm-specific risk, or project risk and market risk. The former stems 
from factors that differ from one firm to another, so it may be known as unsystematic risk. 
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Accordingly, firms can avoid project risks through a diversification policy. The latter, 
however, affects all firms, which trade on the market, so it may be known as systematic 
risk. Firms, therefore, cannot avoid market risks through a diversification policy. 
 
In drawing connections between accounting and finance literature, it is essential to 
concentrate on systematic risk versus total risk. Ryan (1997) explains that the majority of  
finance and accounting research concentrates on systematic risk rather than total risk, 
owing to the increased usage of  CAPM (more discussion about this point can be found in 
the following chapter).  
 
In line with prior academic literature, the attention given to risk type by professional bodies 
has increased over the last three decades (e.g., ICAEW, 1997; AICPA & CICA, 2000; 
GASB, 2000; IASB, 2008). ICAEW (1997) argues that risks are usually derived from two 
factors: external factors, which provide external risks or environment risks, and internal 
factors, which provide internal risks or process risks. Internal risks are more controllable 
than external risks; consequently, providing information about external risks may not be 
useful, owing to these risks being a function of  uncontrollable conditions and actions. 
ICAEW (1997), therefore, concentrates on internal risks, especially financial and non-
financial risks. Financial risk can be categorised into price, liquidity and credit risks. Non-
financial risk contains the other internal risks (e.g., operational and decision-making risks). 
Two other terms are used to refer to these two risk types: direct and indirect risks. Direct, 
or financial, risks have a direct effect on a firm‟s assets and liabilities. Indirect, or non-
financial, risks do not have a direct effect on a firm‟s assets and liabilities. 
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From the same perspective, and relying on the sources of  risk to generate firms‟ risks, 
AICPA and CICA (2000) categorise risk into four principal types: environmental, strategic, 
operational and informational risks.  
 
GAS 5 (2000) points out that firms should categorise their risks from an organisational and 
functional point of  view. It provides seven categories of  risk: business environment and 
industry; strategic business; performance; personnel; information technology; financial; and 
other risks. Furthermore, the standard provides examples for each main category rather 
than setting out any mandatory categorisation, since each firm will face different types of  
risks and these risks will change over time. 
 
The IASB (2008) illustrates that risk categories related to financial instruments (IFAS: No. 
7) are: credit risk, which arises from failing to discharge an obligation; liquidity risk, which 
usually arises from difficulties in meeting a firm‟s financial obligations; and market risk, 
which can be derived when the fair value or future cash flows of  the financial instruments 
fluctuate, which is caused by changing market prices, interest and currency rates.    
Previous efforts could be synthesised in Figure 2.1 as follows: 
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Figure 2.1: Summary of  risk categories 
 This figure summarises the most common methods of  classifying a firm‟s risks. 
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In summary, two main questions are addressed: how can a firm identify its risks? And, 
what risk categories do firms face? The first question is neglected in prior academic 
literature; nevertheless, some professional efforts (e.g., AICPA and CICA, 2000) suggest 
relying on interviews, questionnaires and checklists to identify a firm‟s risks. The main 
conclusion relative to the second question is that two main methods are widely used to 
classify a firm‟s risks. While the first is the sources of  risk that can be derived from either 
internal or external factors, the second is the organisational and functional method, in 
which a firm‟s risk might be classified.  
 
2.4. Theories of  mandatory and voluntary risk reporting: Firm-level analysis 
 
This section addresses why firms could disclose risk information in their annual report 
narratives either mandatorily and/or voluntarily. Regulatory theory is essential to justify 
some contexts in which regulators require firms to provide risk information according to 
specific rules. These contexts are likely to be related to macro circumstances, such as 
financial crises, financial scandals or, more generally, when the market fails to provide 
sufficient information by which the stock market could protect its investors. Managers‟ 
incentives theories are essential to understand why firms disclose information about their 
risks voluntarily. Managers may have some incentives, such as reducing agency cost 
between agency parties (agency theory), signalling the quality of  their performance 
(signalling theory) or reducing uncertainty related to their future cash flows (capital needs 
theory) to voluntarily disclose information about their risks. These theories are discussed in 
the following two subsections by giving background information about each theory and 
describing how prior research relies on these theories to justify why firms mandatorily 
and/or voluntarily disclose financial disclosure generally, and risk information particularly.   
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2.4.1. Regulatory theory 
Prior research (e.g., Leftwich, 1980; Cooper and Keim, 1983; Fields et al., 2001; Ogus, 
2001) argues that an imperfect stock market and market failure are two main situations that 
require mandated disclosure (regulatory theory) to identify the minimum requirements of  
disclosure that should be provided to protect investors. Most importantly, these regulations 
might reduce the information gap between informed individuals (managers and/or 
sophisticated investors) and uninformed individuals (unsophisticated investors) in order to 
redistribute the wealth between them, as explained by Healy and Palepu (2001). Unverified 
information and the threat of  economic disadvantages gives rise to a lack of  motivation to 
disclose voluntarily; consequently, mandating risk disclosure by regulation stems from a 
regulator‟s need to provide the essential requirements of  risk disclosure to inform investors 
(Dobler, 2008). While empirically studying the impact of  risk regulations on the stock 
market is the main focus of  US research in such a highly-regulated market (e.g., Rajgopal, 
1999; Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter, 2003, 2008), some research within the UK context, as 
a low-regulated market (Marshall and Weetman, 2002; Abraham and Cox, 2007), studies 
the impact of  risk regulations on risk disclosure.  
2.4.2. Managers’ incentives theories 
Core (2001) suggests that further research is required on the association between voluntary 
disclosure and managerial incentives. Based on agency, signalling and capital needs theories, 
these managerial incentives can interpret voluntary risk disclosure. 
 
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest agency theory, which posits complete separation 
between owners or shareholders (principals) and control or management (agents). This 
suggests that separation causes conflict between these agency parties, and then reduces 
shareholders‟ confidence. Managers, therefore, can voluntarily provide risk information to 
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reduce their agency cost (e.g., bonding cost, which occurs from the agent‟s activities) and 
the principals‟ mentoring cost such as measuring, observing and controlling agent 
behaviour, which in turn results in reducing risk information asymmetry. Empirically, some 
risk disclosure research (e.g., Abraham and Cox, 2007; Vandemaele et al., 2009) has used 
agency theory to explain why firms voluntarily disclose risk information.  
 
Another motive for managers (insiders) to disclose risk information voluntarily, based on 
signalling theory, which was proposed by Akerlof  (1970), developed by Spence (1973), and 
used by some prior general disclosure research (e.g., Lev and Penman, 1990; Aboody and 
Lev, 2000; Watson, Shrives and Marston, 2002), is to signal to the market (outsiders) their 
ability to identify, measure and manage their risks, distinguishing themselves from other 
firms‟ managers who respond poorly to risks. 
  
Based on capital needs theory, as referred to by Meek and Gray (1989), or capital market 
transaction, as referred to by Healy and Palepu (2001), one last incentive for managers to 
voluntarily disclose risk is the consequences for cost of  capital. If  a firm has an 
information asymmetry gap with its investors, that leads to increased investor uncertainty, 
which in turn raises their desired rate of  returns (discount rate or risk premium), which 
causes an increase in their cost of  capital. These firms, however, can reduce their 
information asymmetry by increasing their risk information voluntarily so as to increase 
investors‟ certainty, which might reduce the desired rate on their investments, which in turn 
will result in reducing the cost of  capital. Empirically, this theory is examined by prior 
general disclosure research (Botosan, 1997; Botosan and Harris, 2000; Botosan and 
Plumlee, 2002; Francis et al., 2005) and is recommended in risk disclosure by ICAEW 
(1997, 1999, 2002a).  
 
43 
 
In summary, providing risk information mandatorily and/or voluntarily aims toward 
reducing information asymmetry through requiring a minimum of  risk disclosure by 
mandating disclosure through regulations and/or having managerial incentives for: (1) 
reducing conflicts between agency parties; (2) signalling their quality; and (3) reducing 
investors‟ uncertainties about the amount and time of  their future cash flow. 
 
 It is noteworthy that in terms of  the association between mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures, Verrecchia (2001) explains that both types of  disclosure can reduce 
information asymmetry, resulting in integrating the efficiency of  disclosure choices, 
increasing the incentives for disclosure and enhancing the reaction of  different parties in 
the stock market. Dye‟s work (1986, 1990) is inconclusive, finding both positive (1986) and 
negative (1990) relations between mandatory disclosure and managers‟ incentives for 
voluntary disclosure. Gigler and Hemmer (1998), Marshall and Weetman (2002) and 
Deumes and Knechel (2008), however, support Dye‟s earlier work.   
 
 
2.5. Theories of  variations in mandatory and voluntary risk reporting: Country-level 
analysis  
 
 
Previous discussions suggest three main countries that exhibit three unique approaches 
towards risk disclosure. These countries are the USA, the UK and Germany. Within the US 
context, there is a preference towards organising risk disclosure either by imposing specific 
requirements (e.g., FRR 48, 1997) or by encouraging US firms to provide more risk 
information. Within the German context, there is a preference to obligate firms to provide 
specific risk disclosure requirements through a formal accounting standard. In contrast, the 
UK approach prefers voluntary risk disclosure. These approaches have significantly 
influenced the main trends of  prior risk reporting literature. Specifically, the US trend, 
which considers mandatory disclosure and its impact on the usefulness of  accounting 
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information, the UK trend, which considers the main determinants of  voluntary risk 
reporting, and the German trend, which analyses the expected impact of  GAS 5 on other 
countries (as will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.3). After introducing the reasons 
that may explain variations in risk disclosure across these three countries, a brief  
description of  the main characteristics of  accounting in these three countries (the 
regulatory regime, cultural values, legal systems and other factor) is discussed in the 
following paragraphs.   
 
Cross-country differences in accounting practices have received considerable attention 
from prior literature (e.g., Muller, 1967, 1968; Nobes, 1983, 1984; Frank, 1979; Nair and 
Frank, 1980). Gray (1988) distinguishes two main approaches in prior research on cross-
country differences in accounting practices. The first is deductive, seeking to identify 
environmental factors, link them to the national accounting system and then classify these 
factors by country (e.g., Muller, 1967; Nobes, 1983). The second approach is inductive, 
seeking to identify differences in accounting practices and attribute such differences to 
some predictive patterns or factors (e.g., Frank, 1979; Nair and Frank, 1980). Such prior 
research, however, includes culture as an exploratory variable in order to examine the 
extent to which culture influences accounting practices. Hofstede (1980) defines culture as 
"the collective programming of  the mind which distinguishes the members of  one human group from 
another''. Such differences are explained by Gray (1988), who builds his theory on 
Hofstede‟s (1980) four dimensions of  cultural values. Hofstede (1991) extends these four 
dimensions by providing his fifth dimension. 
  
The first dimension, power distance (PD), is the extent to which power is distributed 
equally within a society and the degree to which the society accepts this distribution, from 
relatively equal to extremely unequal. Second, uncertainty avoidance (UA) is the degree to 
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which individuals in a society prefer structured over unstructured situations, and cope with 
risk and innovation, from relatively flexible to extremely rigid; a low uncertainty culture 
emphasises a higher level of  standardisation and greater job security. Third, individualism 
(IND) is the degree to which individuals base their actions on self-interest versus the 
interests of  the group. Fourth, masculinity (MAS) is a measure of  a society's goal 
orientation: a masculine culture emphasises status derived from wages and position; a 
feminine culture emphasises human relations and quality of  life. Fifth, long-term 
orientation (LTO) is the extent to which a society respects traditional, forward thinking. 
 
Based on the first four dimensions, Gray (1988) suggests four accounting dimensions to 
express accounting values explicitly. First, professionalism is a preference for the exercise 
of  individual professional judgment and the maintenance of  professional self-regulation 
versus compliance with prescriptive legal requirements and statutory control. Second, 
uniformity is a preference for the enforcement of  uniform accounting practices between 
companies and the consistent use of  such practices over time, as opposed to flexibility in 
accordance with perceived circumstances of  individual companies. Third, conservatism is a 
preference for a cautious approach to measurement to cope with the uncertainty of  future 
events, versus a more optimistic, risk-taking approach. Fourth, secrecy is a preference for 
confidentiality and the restriction of  information disclosed about the business to only 
those individuals who are closely involved with its management and financing, as opposed 
to a more transparent, open and publicly accountable approach. 
 
Gray (1988) provides four hypotheses without testing them empirically. These four 
hypotheses are derived from identifying the potential impact of  the cultural dimensions on 
the four accounting dimensions, which, in turn, identify the characteristics of  either the 
accounting systems or the accounting practices.  
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Beginning with the cultural dimensions: Gray (1988) tries to derive the potential impact on 
the accounting dimensions. Four possible causes and four potential impacts are provided. 
First, countries which have a high score4 in individualism (cultural dimension) and lower 
scores in uncertainty avoidance (cultural dimension) and power distance (cultural 
dimension) are highly expected to have a high score in professionalism (accounting 
dimension). Second, countries, which have high scores in uncertainty avoidance (cultural 
dimension) and power distance (cultural dimension), and a lower score in individualism 
(cultural dimension) are highly expected to have a lower score in uniformity (accounting 
dimension). 
 
The previous two impacts of  the cultural dimensions on the accounting dimensions are 
more related to determining the accounting system in terms of  the nature of  the 
accounting authority. As a result, accounting can be organised through professional bodies 
(e.g., FASB and AICPA in the USA; ASB in the UK) or by rules like commercial law (e.g., 
Germany). In the same context of  identifying the potential impact on accounting practices, 
the latter two accounting dimensions are explained in the following paragraphs. 
 
Countries that have a high score in uncertainty avoidance (cultural dimension) and a lower 
score in individualism (cultural dimension) are more likely to score high in conservatism 
(accounting dimension) (e.g., Germany). Fourth, countries which have high scores in 
uncertainty avoidance (cultural dimension) and power distance (cultural dimension), and 
lower scores in individualism and masculinity (cultural dimensions), are highly expected to 
                                                 
 
4  Based on collected questionnaire responses from more than 116,000 IBM employees in over fifty countries, 
Hofstede calculates these scores, which are considered a benchmark for cultural values (e.g., Doupnik and 
Tsakumis, 2004). 
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have a high rank in secrecy (accounting dimension) (e.g., France). The interactions between 
these dimensions are explained in Figure 2.2 
 
Figure 2.2: The interactions between cultural and accounting dimensions 
 
Hofstede (1980)'s cultural 
dimensions 
 Gray (1988)'s 
accounting dimensions 
 The characteristics of  accounting systems 
and accounting practices. 
Conditions Impacts Impacts 
Individualism  + Or 
(-) 
Professionalism 
 
+ Or 
(-) 
The characteristics of  accounting systems 
Nature of  
accounting  
authority  
 
 
 
Formal accounting 
professional bodies 
Or 
(rules or law) 
Uncertainty avoidance 
 
- Or 
(+) Uniformity -  Or  
(+) Power distance - Or 
(+) 
Individualism - Or 
(+) 
 
Conservatism  
 
+ Or  
(-) 
  
 
The characteristics of  accounting practices  
Measurement 
 
Conservative 
measurement Or 
(more alternative) 
Uncertainty avoidance 
 
 
+ Or 
(-) Secrecy  + Or 
(-) 
Power distance +  Or 
(-) 
Disclosure 
 
Less details Or (more 
details) 
This figure is adapted by the current study from Gray (1988) 
 
 
The accounting dimensions (accounting values) are therefore generated from cultural 
dimensions (societal values). The former two accounting dimensions, professionalism 
versus control and uniformity versus flexibility, are likely to identify the nature of  the 
accounting system in a country. The latter two accounting dimensions, conservatism versus 
optimism and secrecy versus transparency, are likely to identify the nature of  measurement 
and disclosure practices, respectively. These distinctions are used by some subsequent 
research (e.g., Perera, 1989; Perera and Mathews, 1990; Radebaugh and Gray, 1993).  
 
The Hofestede-Gray framework has been considerably investigated theoretically and 
empirically (for a comprehensive review see Chanchani and MacGregor, 1999; Doupnik 
and Tsakumis, 2004) using different units of  analysis (country, firm and individual). This 
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has resulted in theoretical improvements to the framework, e.g., Perera (1989) and Perera 
and Mathews (1990) suggest that societal values may affect both accounting systems and 
practices through accounting values that are consistent with Radebaugh and Gray (1993).  
 
It is noteworthy that although using Hofstede‟s framework is widely accepted in prior 
research, as is comprehensively reviewed and appraised by Doupnik and Tsakumis (2004), 
there are some other arguments for rejecting such usage in anthropology and sociology 
research, as argued by Baskerville (2003). She explains possible reasons for such rejection, 
including assumptions of  equating nations with cultures, and the caveat of  using numeric 
values to interpret culture. As a response to such limitations, Linsley and Shrives (2008) 
analytically analyse Mary Douglas‟s usage of  culture to interpret risk management in light 
of  some recent failures (e.g., Enron and WorldCom). For more details see, e.g., Harrison, 
McKinnon, Panchapakesan and Leung, 1994; Hussein, 1996; House, Hange, Javidan, 
Dorfman and Gupta, 2004. 
 
Consistent with previous critiques, other research (e.g., Fechner and Kilgore, 1994; 
Baydoun and Willett, 1995), however, criticises Hofstede-Gray‟s framework and suggests 
other factors which may help to understand differences within and between countries. 
Some other empirical studies respond to such suggestions by investigating the impact of  
legal systems, inflation and exchange rate along with cultural values on expressing 
variations in disclosure (e.g., Jaggi and Low, 2000; Hope, 2003; Williams, 2004). In the 
following paragraphs, the current study discusses the background of  the legal systems. 
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Legal systems  
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) explain that common law, which is 
English in origin, and civil law, which derives from Roman law, are the main sources of  
commercial laws. They further explain that modern commercial law originates from three 
major families: French, German and Scandinavian. They state that French and German 
civil traditions, in addition to the common law tradition, have spread around the world. La 
Porta et al. (1998) explain that laws across countries vary because of  their different origins. 
They find that the highest level of  protection for shareholder and creditors is in common 
law countries, followed by German civil law countries. They find the quality of  
enforcement is very strong in German civil law countries, followed by common law 
countries. La Porta et al. (1998) document that legal rules protecting investors vary 
systematically among legal traditions or origins; for more details see e.g., La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000). In another recent study, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer (2008) find that common law is associated with better investor protection, 
which is subset to better access to finance and higher ownership dispersion, lighter 
government ownership and regulation. 
 
Other factors   
Prior research (Nobes and Barker, 2010) states many other factors (political effect e.g., 
Riahi-Belkaoui, 2002; economic effect e.g., Archambault and Archambault, 2003; financial 
system e.g., Nobes, 1998) that could explain differences in accounting practices across 
countries. Archambault and Archambault (2003) argue that economic factors (e.g., stage of  
economic development, inflation level) affect the level of  disclosure. Countries with 
different levels of  economic development are likely to have different levels of  accounting 
practices generally and disclosure particularly.   
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Nobes (1998) suggests the importance of  financial systems in classifying accounting 
systems and interpreting differences in accounting around the world. He distinguishes 
between insider and outsider financial systems as a response to the extent to which the 
source of  finance is creditors (e.g., banks) or equity (e.g., investors), respectively. Nobes 
(1998) argues that the pressure to provide more information in the first market (outsider) is 
stronger than it is in the second market (insider). 
 
2.6. Theoretical background of  the main characteristics of  accounting in the USA, 
the UK and Germany 
 
In this section, the current study discusses the main characteristics of  accounting in these 
three countries. These characteristics include the regulatory regime, cultural values, legal 
systems and other factors.    
 
2.6.1. Regulatory regimes  
 
The regulatory regime is essential to consider in this set of  countries because it gives many 
useful insights in explaining how the accounting systems are involved.  
USA 
The USA has some specific laws that organise dealing with securities, which are enforced at 
the federal level, such as the Securities Act of  1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of  
1934, each of  which has many aspects relating to financial reporting. By these Acts, the 
SEC was established in 1934, aiming at providing for (existing and/or potential) investors‟ 
financial and non-financial information needs in order to improve their ability to make 
decisions. It is essential to note that SEC registered firms are obligated to follow the SEC‟s 
main requirements (e.g., published financial statements, filing forms such as 10-K and 
having Certificate Public Accountants (CPA) audits); other firms, however, do not have any 
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obligations to publish their financial reporting. In 2007, AICPA and FASB established a 
committee concerned with issues related to private companies.  
 
The SEC has issued many statements related to registration matters. These statements are 
currently known as Financial Reporting Releases and were earlier known as Accounting 
Series Releases. These releases broadly describe several issues (e.g., rules of  preparing 
financial reporting; different forms, such 10-K for domestic firms and 20-F for foreign 
firms). 
 
In terms of  accounting professional bodies, within the USA, the FASB was established in 
1973 following two prior committees. The first covered the period of  1936 to 1959 and 
was known as the Committee of  Accounting Procedure (CAP), followed by the 
Accounting Principle Board (APB) between 1959 to 1973. Three main types of  
publications are usually provided by the FASB (Nobes and Parker, 2010). These are the 
Statement of  Financial Accounting Statements (SFASs), the Statement of  Financial 
Accounting Concepts, and Interpretations. The Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) 
observes any new issues in practice; this body contains a number of  accountants from 
large firms in addition to members from AICPA and SEC as observers. After the largest 
collapses in recent American history by Enron and WorldCom in 2001, the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) established the Public Accounting Oversight Board (PAOB), which effectively 
has a wider role in issuing auditing standards than it does with accounting standards.      
UK 
In the UK, the Companies Act plays an essential role in creating the distinctive features of  
the regulatory system (e.g., Alexander, 1999). The Companies Act 1947 can be considered a 
big step in organising financial reporting (e.g., group financial statements, reserves and 
provision); many of  these concepts were established in 1942 as a response to 
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recommendations on accounting principles from ICAEW system (Alexander, 1999). In 
1985, a consolidated version of  previous Acts was provided, which collected all previous 
efforts in one document. The latest Companies Act was published in 2006. 
 
In 1969, the ICEW set up the Accounting Standard Steering Committee, later known as 
the Accounting Standard Committee (ASC), to mitigate professional criticism and reduce 
misleading financial reporting. The ASC issued Statements of  Standard Accounting 
Practice (SSAPs); this committee, however, was replaced by the ASB in 1990. The ASB has 
the authority to issue accounting standards, known as Financial Reporting Standards 
(FRSs), but has adopted a number of  previous SSAPs (Nobes and Parker, 2010).      
Germany    
The German Commercial Code, which is known as Handelsgesetzbuch or HGB, identifies 
German accounting regulations; all forms of German business, therefore, (e.g., 
partnerships, closed corporations and corporations) must follow these regulations. HGB 
contains essential accounting concepts and principles (e.g., prudence, recognition and 
timeliness), which firms are obligated to follow in their preparation of financial reporting 
(e.g., Evans, Eierle and Haller, 2002; Leuz and Wustemann, 2003; Eierle, 2005). In 
addition, decisions of tax law and the Federal Fiscal Court (TFFC), which is practically the 
highest authority, are a fundamental source of German rules. This is in contrast to the 
situation in the USA, where courts identify whether accounting standards are appropriate 
in specific circumstances. 
 
The GASB was established by the 1998 Corporate Control and Transparency Act. It could 
be argued that the association between accounting rules and shareholder distribution is 
essential to understand the nature of the German accounting system; hence, the priority is 
to ensure payments to ownership and restrict pay-outs to other parties, which leads to an 
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obvious restriction of revenue recognitions (e.g., long-term contract, securities). On the 
other hand, losses have to be recognised as soon as they arise. This is a direct impact of 
prudence and, in some cases; such accounting for liabilities and contingences is more 
prudent than what is required in the USA and the UK. In this regard, the concept of 
distribution of profits and the principle of prudence are the most important concepts that 
form the German accounting system.     
 
2.6.2. Cultural values 
In the following paragraphs, the current study identifies Hofstede‟s cultural dimensions in 
the USA, the UK and Germany. 
Power distance 
This dimension deals with the fact that not all individuals in societies are equal. It expresses 
the attitude of  the culture towards these inequalities amongst people (Hofstede, 1980-1991; 
Hussein, 1996; House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, Gupta, 2004). The United States scored 
40, suggesting a valued focus on equal rights in all aspects of  American society and 
government. The UK scored 35, suggesting that Britain sits in the lower rankings of  PD; 
this could be interpreted as British society believing that inequalities should be minimised. 
Highly decentralised and supported by a strong middle class, Germany scored 35, putting it 
among the lower power distant countries. German managers should take into account the 
co-determination rights, which are comparatively extensive. 
 Individualism 
This dimension concerns the degree of  interdependence a society maintains among its 
members and addresses whether people‟s self-image is defined in terms of  “I” or “We” 
(Hofstede, 1980-1991; Hussein, 1996; House et al., 2004). The USA scored 91 on this 
dimension, which indicates a highly individualistic culture resulting in a loosely knit society 
in which the expectation is that people look after themselves and their immediate families.  
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At a score of  89, the UK is amongst the highest of  the individualism scores, suggesting 
that the British are a highly individualistic and private people. Germany scored 67 on this 
dimension, suggesting that German society is truly individualistic.  
Masculinity  
This dimension concerns whether the society is driven by competition, achievement and 
success, with success being defined as being the “winner” or “best-in-the-field” (Hofstede, 
1980-1991; Hussein, 1996; House et al., 2004). The USA scored 62 on this dimension and 
is considered a “masculine” society. As a result, Americans tend to display and talk freely 
about their “successes” and achievements in life, which are another basis for hiring and 
promotion decisions. The UK scored 66, suggesting that Britain is a masculine society – 
highly success-oriented and driven. Germany scored 66, making German society a highly 
masculine one, indicating that the society is driven by competition, achievement and 
success. These countries, therefore, have similar scores on this dimension. 
Uncertainty avoidance 
This dimension concerns the way that a society deals with the fact that the future can never 
be known: should we try to control the future or just let it happen? (Hofstede, 1980-1991; 
Hussein, 1996; House et al., 2004). The US scored 46 on this dimension; American society 
can be described as “uncertainty accepting”, which can be considered slightly higher than 
the UK (35).  This suggests that British society has low uncertainty avoidance, which 
means that as a nation they are quite happy to wake up not knowing what the day brings 
and are happy to „make it up as they go along‟, changing plans as new information comes 
to light. Germany scored 65 in this dimension, suggesting that Germany is among the 
higher uncertainty avoidance countries. Such a result could stem from the philosophical 
heritage of  Kant, Hegel and Fichte, suggesting that there is a strong preference for 
deductive rather than inductive approaches. In other words, German society prefers to 
compensate for their higher uncertainty by strongly relying on expertise. 
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Long-term orientation 
This dimension concerns the extent to which a society shows a pragmatic future-oriented 
perspective rather than a conventional historical short-term point of  view (Hofstede, 1980-
1991; Hussein, 1996; House et al., 2004).The USA scored 29 in this dimension, the UK 25 
and Germany 31, suggesting that all three are short-term oriented cultures that focuses on 
traditions and fulfilling social obligations, have great respect for history and tradition, as 
well as a focus on quick results in the future. Planning horizons tend to be short and 
business in particular is very focused on short-term quarterly goals and quick results. 
Societies with a short-term orientation generally exhibit great respect for traditions, a 
relatively small propensity to save, and a strong concern with establishing the Truth. 
 
2.6.3. Legal systems  
Based on La Porta et al. (1998, 2000, 2008) and previous detailed discussion on regulatory 
frameworks, it can be seen that the USA and the UK are examples of  common law 
countries, while Germany is an example of  a code law country. These classifications are 
theoretically grounded (e.g., La Porta et al., 2008; Nobes and Barker, 2010) and are used in 
empirical prior research (e.g., Dong and Stettler, 2011). The legal system, as one could 
expect, might be considered an essential factor in interpreting variations on disclosure 
generally (e.g., Jaggi and Low, 2000; Hope, 2003) and risk reporting particularly. As argued 
by Dobler et al. (2011), risk disclosure is a function of  regulation and incentive that can be 
linked to the cultural environment (as will be explained in Section 4.4). 
 
2.6.4. Other factors 
 
In these three countries, while the economic conditions are very similar (Dong and Stettler, 
2011), the sources of finance differ among them. Specifically, the major source of finance 
in Germany is banks; by contrast, stock market (shareholders) is the major finance in the 
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USA and the UK. Nobes and Barker (2010) report that the equity market capitalisation 
relative to overall GDP is  28% in Germany, 55% in the UK and 81% in the USA.  
 
In the present context, differences across the USA, the UK and Germany in their cultural 
values and their legal systems are used to interpret any variations on risk reporting across 
these countries. The main reasons for considering these factors among other factors that 
are utilised in prior general disclosure literature can be justified. First, discussing Hofstede‟s 
(1980, 1991) dimensions across these countries reveals some distinctive differences, 
especially in uncertainty avoidance and individualism, which could be the reasoning behind 
choosing these dimensions to be associated with risk reporting. Second, exploring the 
regulatory regimes within these countries, which are consistent with the main requirements 
of  the legal system in each country, gives insights in how and the extent to which risk 
practices are organised within each country. 
 
The main requirements of  these regimes towards risk reporting are discussed in much 
detail in the following chapters in order to build a distinction between mandatory and 
voluntary risk disclosures. Other factors, such as economic factors, are excluded because 
these countries are in a very similar stage of  economic development. The impact of  the 
source of  finance and political factors may be a limitation of  the current study, as 
suggested for future research in Section 10.4. All previous discussions can be summarised 
as follows.   
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Figure 2.3: The theories of MRR, VRR, and cross-country variations in MRR and VRR  
 
 
2.7. Concluding remarks  
 
This chapter discusses the underlying basis of  risk reporting. It covers the concept of  risk 
and other related concepts by identifying the developments in these concepts from the 15th 
century until the present day. How a firm can identify its risks and how to categorise these 
risks are two main issues discussed in prior risk reporting literature and professional 
initiatives on risk disclosure. 
 
Providing risk information mandatorily and/or voluntarily is justified based on regulatory 
and managers‟ incentives theories, respectively. These theories are employed to explain why 
risk reporting may vary between firms in each country (the USA, the UK and Germany), 
shown as firm-level analysis. Furthermore, cultural values and legal systems are used to 
explain variations in risk reporting between firms across countries, shown as country-level 
analysis. To extend the theoretical underpinning of  risk reporting, both prior risk reporting 
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Chapter Three: Risk measurement and risk reporting: A review 
 
3.1. Overview 
 
 
This chapter reviews and appraises the main trends and directions of  prior risk 
measurement and risk disclosure literature. In line with this review, professional efforts on 
risk disclosure are analysed. Based on these reviews, the current study identifies the main 
gaps in prior research and then highlights its incremental contribution.   
 
This chapter is structured as follows: the next section reviews and appraises risk 
measurement. Section 3.3 reviews prior risk disclosure literature. Section 3.4 evaluates the 
professional efforts on both risk measurement and risk disclosure. Finally, Section 3.5 
highlights the main gaps in prior risk disclosure literature to distinguish the trend of  the 
current study, at the same time explaining how the current study contributes to the 
knowledge. Section 3.6 introduces the concluding remarks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
3.2. Risk measurement: A review 
 
Lev and Ohlson (1982), Ryan (1997) and Schrand and Elliott (1998) evaluate risk 
measurement in prior literature. In a comprehensive review of  market-based empirical 
research in accounting, Lev and Ohlson (1982) distinguish two main approaches in using 
accounting data to estimate systematic risk. The first, a positive approach, correlates 
accounting data content and beta values; the second approach, a normative approach, 
examines the importance of  accounting data in explaining and improving the assessment 
of  systematic risk. 
 
In discussing how accounting numbers can measure systematic risk, Ryan (1997) concludes 
that accounting earnings variability is historically the accounting variable most strongly 
related to systematic (non-diversifiable) equity risk. Thus, enhancing the information about 
the sources and amount of  variability would be useful, and this might be achieved by 
providing more information about fair value measurement.5 Ryan (1997) finds that 
systematic risk is positively related to sources of  operating risk and operating leverage, 
whereas operating leverage and financial leverage are negatively related to the sources of  
these risks. Ryan (1997) points out that ex post6 risk measures are not good predictors of  
future risk owing to changes in risk over time. Consequently, and relying on historical 
accounting data, accounting variables can be used as proxies to yield future risks using the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).  
                                                 
 
5  Recently, the fair value basis has become widely used to record and evaluate many financial statement items 
(e.g., financial instruments, investments and property, plant and equipment). This encourages accepting 
potential losses and gains to be recognised inside the financial statement in the current accounting model (for 
more details see for example, Statement of  Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No (157), 2006: fair value 
measurement). 
 
 6 ex post means after, or looking back. The root of  this word is the Latin language. ex ante means before, or 
forward looking (for more details, see e.g., McAnally, 1996; Cheon et al., 1996). 
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As discussed in Chapter Two, Schrand and Elliott (1998) summarise discussions from an 
AAA/FASB conference that addressed issuing an accounting standard for risk reporting. 
The models, which enable a firm to measure its risk, the suitable types of  risks to be 
quantified and the most suitable type of  data to measure, are three sub-aspects related to 
risk measurement. With regards to the models, they conclude that it is difficult to rely on a 
single model to measure all types of  risk. For the second point, the types of  risk, Schrand 
and Elliott (1998) conclude that not all types of  risks can be measured. With regards to 
data type, they conclude that historical and future data should be used, which in turn raises 
three problems: the reliability of  measuring risk, the suitable probability distributions of  
future outcomes and the potential effects on financial statement items.  
 
To overcome these problems, they suggest that using historical measures (e.g., volatility of  
cash flow) for risk exposure may help users to learn about firms‟ risks, and that combining 
historical and future data by using, for instance, simulation analysis, is an essential 
requirement to quantifying risk. 
 
Two principal streams in the literature have emerged since the seminal work of  Ball and 
Brown (1968, 1969).7 The first stream explores how accounting-risk measures can be 
considered as proxies of  market-risk measures (Beaver et al., 1970; Lev and Kunitzky, 
1974; Beaver and Manegold, 1975; Almisher and Kish, 2000; Giner and Reverte, 2006; 
Brimble and Hodgson, 2007). Most studies find that accounting-risk measures can 
accurately express changes in systematic risk. The second stream, simultaneously with the 
                                                 
 
7 The former study explains that accounting income numbers capture half  of  the net effect of  all 
information available. The latter study reveals that 40% of  the differences in market beta can be explained by 
the covariance of  three accounting variables (operating income, net income and earnings per share). 
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first, attempts to explain theoretical associations of  market and accounting-risk measures 
(Hamada, 1969, 1972; Bowman, 1979; Baginski and Wahlen, 2003; Chiou and Su, 2007). 
 
Using seven accounting variables (dividend payout, growth, leverage, liquidity, assets size, 
variability of  earnings and co-variability of  earnings), Beaver et al. (1970) argue that these 
measures can surrogate total variability of  firms‟ returns. Consequently, accounting-risk 
measures reflect both systematic and unsystematic risks. They find that accounting data 
generally, not just accounting beta, can provide a good basis to assess and anticipate market 
risk.  
 
In the same context, Lev and Kunitzky (1974) use the same accounting measures for risk, 
volatility of  income and lack of  income smoothing, as predictors for market risk, aiming to 
investigate the associations between them. They reveal that there is a relationship between 
some determinants of  income smoothing (volatility on sales, capital expenditures, 
dividends and earnings) and the risk of  common stock. 
 
Addressing the extent of  the relationship between accounting beta and market beta more 
specifically, Beaver and Manegold (1975) point out significant associations between 
accounting beta and market beta with explanatory power of  20% for accounting beta. 
 
To summarise, some prior research results conflict in their ranking of  the extent to which 
accounting-risk measures act as surrogates for market-risk measures. Nevertheless, the 
majority of  these studies suggest that accounting variables, especially accounting beta, can 
express changes in market systematic risk (market beta). Within this majority, however, the 
results do not reveal the same percentage for the explanatory power of  accounting beta. 
The importance of  some accounting variables, such as volatility of  earnings, is another 
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area of  conflict between prior researchers. Lev and Kunitzky (1974) support such 
importance, contrary to Bowman‟s (1979) findings.  
 
Recent literature (e.g., Almisher and Kish, 2000; Chun and Ramasamy, 2003; Abdelghany, 
2005; Giner and Reverte, 2006; Brimble and Hodgson, 2007) supports the possibility of  
replacing market-risk measures with accounting-risk measures.  
 
Simultaneously with the first stream, another stream of  literature has formed, which 
concerns the theoretical basis for associations between accounting- and market-risk 
measures. The relation between these two measures is analytically analysed by Hamada 
(1969, 1972), who divided firms‟ market-based beta into operational and financial leverage. 
 
 
Based upon Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) assumptions, Bowman (1979) provides a 
theoretical basis for accounting market-risk measures. In particular, he reveals a direct 
theoretical relation between market risk or systematic risk and leverage and accounting 
beta. In contrast, market risk is not directly correlated with earning variability, firm size or 
dividends.  
 
Chiou and Su (2007) analyse the theoretical background of  the relationship between the 
accounting measures for risk (proxied by eight accounting variables, such as operational 
and financial leverage, sales growth and dividends) and market risk (systematic risk). Chiou 
and Su‟s (2007) theoretical framework is based on a wider perspective than previous similar 
analyses (e.g., CAPM, scenario analysis). 
 
To sum up, from the early works of  Ball and Brown (1968, 1969) two main streams have 
been formed. The first concerns how accounting-risk measures can be used as a proxy for 
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market-risk measures (Beaver et al., 1970; Lev and Kunitzky, 1974; Beaver and Manegold, 
1975; Almisher and Kish, 2000; Giner and Reverte, 2006; Brimble and Hodgson, 2007). 
The second stream concerns the theory of  the relation between these measures (Hamada, 
1969, 1972; Bowman, 1979; Chiou and Su, 2007). In the following paragraphs, the current 
study explains its approach to capturing a firm‟s risk levels by addressing the quantification 
of  risk. 
 
Ho and Pike (1992) explain that a firm could measure risk by relying on the probabilistic 
approach, which depends on the probabilities of  the events under study. To obtain a value 
for the firm‟s risk, three main steps should be identified: estimating the uncertainty, 
deriving the suitable probability distributions and deriving the statistics variables (e.g., the 
mean, the variance and the standard deviation). All these steps can be derived through 
sensitivity analysis and/or probability analysis.  
 
Sensitivity analysis begins with identifying the risk factors that have a high impact on the 
main variables under analysis. These may include future cash flow, expected profit, share 
prices and discounted rate. Probability analysis concerns how to derive the probabilities 
through many analytical methods, such as decision trees. To generate a probability 
distribution for the period, it is essential to generate the probability distribution for cash 
flows period by period (Ho and Pike, 1992).  
 
Based on the concept of  dispersion, two measures of  total risk are suggested by 
Brachinger (2002). The first measure is variance, or standard deviation, and the second 
measure is absolute deviation. In the same context, Clarke (2003) explains that there are 
some measures, which are commonly used to measure risk, such as standard deviation or 
variance, tracking error variance, probability of  shortfall, expected shortfall, lower partial 
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moments and semi-variance. These measures will be discussed in more detail in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
Culp and Mensink (1999) illustrate that volatility of  returns is a common measure of  a 
firm‟s total risk. In this case, the expected returns are usually drawn from some probability 
distribution, such as normal distribution. For this reason, the variance of  returns reflects 
the possibility that the actual returns may be above or below the expected returns.  
 
The previous measures, however, assume that the probability distribution of  returns is 
known, which may be practically difficult. Statistical measures relying on sample and 
historical data, therefore, can be used instead, to determine the potential statistical 
distribution of  the whole population (Culp and Mensink, 1999). 
 
Previous measures also suppose that a firm‟s returns are distributed normally. In other 
words, variance as a measure of  volatility (total risk) assumes that the data of  the returns is 
symmetrical. In practice, however, it may be difficult for market returns data to meet the 
symmetrical assumption (e.g., Damodaran, 2008). In this case, using variance or standard 
deviation as measures for risk is misleading. Consequently, some other measures should be 
conducted, such as skewness, to measures the degree to which a return distribution is 
asymmetric, and kurtosis, to measure the fitness of  the distribution through the tail and the 
peak of  the central distribution (Culp and Mensink, 1999).   
 
Some other measures of  risk can be used when the return is not distributed normally or is 
asymmetrical. A popular measure for risk is downside risk; it concentrates on potential 
losses, which in turn can be derived by comparing actual or expected returns with the 
target value of  this return.    
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All previous risk measures concentrate on a firm‟s total risk, which in turn can be 
attributed to two main sources, a firm‟s market and specific risks, referring to systematic 
risk or un-diversified risk, and unsystematic risk or diversified risk. To measure systematic 
risk, beta is widely used to measure the effect of  the movements of  the market‟s returns on 
the firm‟s returns. In other words, this measure expresses the extent to which variances in a 
firm‟s returns are associated with variance in the market‟s returns, so it is also known as un-
diversified risk. The random error of  CAPM, in contrast, can be used as a measure for 
unsystematic risk.  
 
In a summary, risk can be quantified by a variety of  measures.8 The measures representing 
a firm‟s total risk, namely volatility measured through variance or standard deviation, are 
the most popular. These measures are also expanded by compartmentalising a firm‟s total 
risk into its components, based on its sources; specifically, beta and the standard error of  
CAPM to measure systematic and unsystematic risk, which expresses wide and firm-
specific risks, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
8  In addition to these measures, VaR is another measure that summarises the possible portfolio losses which 
occur as a result of  normal market movements. To calculate VaR, two main methods may be utilised. The 
first are parametric methods, which include the variance-co-variance methods; the second are non-parametric 
methods, which include historical simulation and the Monte Carlo simulation. Each method requires 
identifying the basic parameters (e.g., time horizon, confidence level) and the relevant market factors (e.g., 
prices, earnings, cash flows). These requirements rely on frequent data on a daily basis, such as daily stock 
prices. The current study, therefore, will not use VaR because of  the nature of  its data, which is based on an 
annual basis (e.g., Jorion, 1996; Wiener, 1997; Schreiber, Wiener and Zaken, 1999; Alexander and Baptista, 
2003). 
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3.3. Risk reporting:  A review 
 
 
This section analyses and synthesises main trends in prior risk disclosure literature. The 
main focus is summarising these efforts; further discussions of  all these efforts, therefore, 
will be provided when the research hypotheses are generated in the following chapter. As 
discussed in the previous section, Ryan (1997) concludes that current disclosure models 
should concentrate on providing useful information, which helps investors identify the 
sources of  risk. This information should enable investors to determine both the ex post 
realisation of  risk as well as the ex ante exposure to risk. In other words, current disclosure 
models should permit firms to provide information about current risks and their impact 
(ex post) as well as expected risks and their potential effects (ex ante). 
 
Prior risk disclosure research can be distinguished into two main streams. While the first 
focuses on the impact of  mandatory risk disclosure on the usefulness of  financial 
reporting, and measuring this impact quantitatively (Rajgopal, 1999; Hodder and McAnally, 
2001; Jorion; 2002; Linsmeier et al., 2002; Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter, 2003, 2008), the 
second stream of  risk reporting literature concentrates on voluntary risk disclosure utilising 
content analysis and identifying the main determinants of  such disclosure. Most American 
research is part of  the first stream; most European risk disclosure studies are in the second 
(e.g., Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Vandemaele et al., 2009), particularly UK studies (e.g. 
Marshall and Weetman, 2002; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007).  
 
Prior research in the first stream has informed some mandated requirements, such as 
Financial Reporting Release (FRR) No. 48, issued in 1997 by the Securities and Exchange 
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Commission (SEC)9 on market risk disclosures of  financial instruments. The requirements 
of  this release have become a major research focus (e.g., Rajgopal, 1999; Hodder and 
McAnally, 2001; Jorion, 2002; Linsmeier et al., 2002; Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter, 2003, 
2008). 
  
The main findings of  this stream report empirical usefulness of  the required SEC forms, 
either generally (Rajgopal, 1999) or in a specific form (tabular form: Hodder and McAnally, 
2001; VaR form: Linsmeier et al., 2002 and Jorion, 2002), on stock returns, share price 
sensitivity and predicting and comparing variability in trading revenues and portfolios. 
Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003, 2008) investigate the impact of  voluntary and 
mandatory risk disclosures on firms‟ stock returns, betas and future cash flows.  
 
In the second stream, which will be also discussed further in Section 4.3 in the following 
chapter, Marshall and Weetman (2002) provide empirical evidence of  the impact of  
regulation on risk reporting. Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) propose a framework to measure 
the quality of  risk disclosure, including the influence of  firm size and sector on both 
quality and quantity of  risk disclosure. Linsley and Shrives (2006) also investigate the main 
determinants of  risk reporting. Subsequent studies that draw on these three papers include 
Abraham and Cox (2007) and Vandemaele et al. (2009), which respectively explore the 
impact of  corporate governance and firm characteristics on risk disclosure. 
 
All previous studies regarding mandatory and voluntary risk disclosures concern either the 
usefulness or the main determinants of  risk disclosure in the USA or the UK, respectively. 
                                                 
 
9 (SEC) provides FRR (48), which deals with market risk of  derivatives. In particular, three formats for 
quantitative disclosure are provided: sensitivity analysis, value at risk and tabular formats. These three formats 
should provide the impact of  any changes in the market rate and prices on cash flow, earnings and fair value. 
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In the following section, professional efforts by these two countries, alongside with such 
efforts in Germany, are discussed, aiming at identifying main features of  risk reporting 
within each national context.   
 
3.4. Risk measurement and risk reporting: Professional efforts: A review  
 
The main purpose of  this review is to identify the main requirements to measure and 
report risk. To this end, the current study distinguishes national levels, comprising 
professional efforts in the UK, the USA and Germany, and international levels, comprising 
the professional efforts of  the IASB. These countries have unique approaches towards risk 
reporting (as explained in Section 1.2) and prior risk research within these countries is 
influenced by these approached (as explained in the previous section). At both levels the 
special reports, conceptual frameworks and accounting standards which have been 
provided by the professional bodies will be analysed. This will be illustrated in the 
following subsections.  
3.4.1. Professional efforts in the UK 
This section reviews and evaluates professional efforts in the UK. To this end, the efforts 
of  the Institute of  Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) and the 
Accounting Standards Board (ASB) will be evaluated. Thus, the special reports of  the 
ICAEW (1997, 1999, 2002a, 2002b, 2011), the relevant accounting standards and its 
conceptual framework issued by ASB (ASB, 1990 to present) will be reviewed in the 
following paragraphs in terms of  risk reporting. These two professional bodies are chosen 
because of  their essential efforts towards measuring and reporting risk. 
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The content of  regulations and professional initiatives on risk is fundamental to the 
distinction between voluntary and mandatory risk disclosure and thus to the main purpose 
of  the research investigating the incentives for each disclosure type. This section reviews 
UK professional risk reporting initiatives as well as accounting standards with a risk 
orientation. Thus, the publications of  the Institute of  Chartered Accountants in England 
and Wales (ICAEW 1997, 1999, 2002a, 2002b, 2011) on risk reporting and the conceptual 
frameworks and relevant accounting standards of  the International Accounting Standards 
Board10 (IASB) and the UK Accounting Standards Board (ASB) are reviewed.  
 
Since neither the IASB nor the ASB has issued standards specifically on risk reporting, the 
non-mandatory risk publications of  the ICAEW assume particular importance. The 
ICAEW‟s first publication to address risk reporting (1997) discusses comprehensively why 
and how firms provide risk disclosures in their annual reports. The four key points of  
ICAEW (1997) are: (1) the adoption of  the volatility approach to risk, encapsulating both 
gains and losses; (2) that firms have to deal with different types of  risk but special attention 
is paid to the distinction between financial and non-financial risks; (3) that commercial 
sensitivity moderates the disclosure of  certain risks; and (4) the quantification of  risk using 
both accounting and non-accounting data is given special attention. 
 
ICAEW (1999) recommends that firms provide risk information voluntarily in order to 
minimise cost of  capital, providing theoretical and practical arguments for its principles-
based recommendations. ICAEW (2002a) summarises previous risk reporting efforts and 
addresses the theory underpinning risk disclosure, while ICAEW (2002b) deals with risk 
reporting for small entities. 
                                                 
 
10 There has been a requirement for UK listed companies to adopt International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) since 2005. 
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ICAEW (2011) identifies challenges in disclosing risk information in annual report 
narratives (e.g., doubts regarding the accuracy of  reporting either quantitative or qualitative 
risk disclosures, raising higher competitive cost for firms that disclose risk information 
relative to those do not, and the difficulties of  outlining all risks that firms face). ICAEW 
(2011) suggests, therefore, some ways of  improving risk reportage in annual reports (e.g., 
continuously considering investors‟ needs, prioritising quantitative over qualitative risk 
information and running effectively short lists of  risks).  
 
While the ASB has not published accounting standards specifically on risk reporting, the 
conceptual frameworks, as well as various standards, address some aspects of  risk 
reporting. The ASB conceptual framework, or Statement of  Principles (ASB, 1999), states 
that financial statements are intended to: (1) provide information about firms‟ financial 
structure to assess their ability to generate future cash flows and ensure the suitable 
distribution of  these future cash flows; (2) provide information about firms‟ risk profile, 
risk management and ability to adapt to surrounding circumstances so as to give investors 
information about the extent to which firms are at risk; and (3) provide information 
identifying how and to what extent investors will suffer or profit from variability in firms‟ 
outcomes. 
 
The researcher notes six principal themes or topics related to risk which are addressed by 
UK and international accounting standards; namely, contingencies (FRS 12), segment 
reporting (SSAP 25), foreign exchange (FRS 23), substance of  transactions or investments 
(FRS 5), related party disclosure (FRS 8) and derivatives (FRS 13, 25, 26 and 29). Table 3.1 
provides an overview of  these accounting standards and professional publications on risk 
reporting.                                
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Table 3.1: Summary of UK professional efforts on risk reporting  
Body and study 
year 
Study 
objective(s) 
Study discussions 
 
ICAEW (1997) 
 
Provides a 
framework for 
preparers and 
users who 
believe that 
risk reporting 
should be 
enhanced. 
 
 
ICAEW (1997) discusses three themes. First, it considers all risk 
types, based on the Arthur Andersen Business Risk Model TM. A 
wide range of  risks can affect a firm‟s future cash flows; thus, all 
risks related to business risk are considered in this statement. 
Second, firms should inform their users about actions taken to 
manage risk, especially if  this constitutes useful information to 
investors. Third, using a wide range of  risk measurements using 
both accounting and non-accounting information, ICAEW (1997) 
states that the development and improvement of  risk measures is 
important not only to the future of  external risk reporting but also 
to internal risk control itself. 
 
ICAEW (1999) 
 
Explains how 
providing risk 
information 
can help firms 
obtain capital 
at the lowest 
cost.  
 
 
ICAEW (1999) reveals, firstly, the importance of  and the reason for 
providing risk information. Secondly, ICAEW (1999) depends on 
analysing five UK listed firms‟ annual report narratives. Thirdly, this 
report shows that these firms had the ability to provide suitable risk 
information in their annual reports. Fourthly, ICAEW (1999) 
illustrates that strong incentives for risk reporting exist. 
 
Additionally, the ICAEW does not envisage a need for additional 
risk reporting requirements. Nevertheless, it is necessary to persuade 
UK listed firms to provide risk information since that is key to 
reducing their cost of  capital. 
 
ICAEW (2002a) 
 
Reviews the 
previous 
reports to 
explain the 
theory behind 
providing risk 
information.    
 
 
ICAEW (2002a) summarises the two previous reports. However, it 
highlights some important points which reflect the ICAEW‟s policy 
on risk disclosure. These are: firstly, risk disclosure is essential for 
listed firms in order to minimise cost of  capital. Secondly, UK listed 
firms‟ annual report narratives should contain information about 
significant risk factors. Thirdly, directors should communicate their 
actions to manage these risk factors clearly. Fourthly, information 
that enables investors to assess or judge different types of  risk 
should be provided. Fifthly, firms should indicate how they measure 
risks.  
 
ICAEW (2002b) 
 
Establishes 
good practice 
for SMEs.  
 
ICAEW (2002b) concentrates on risk management and risk 
reporting as a dual objective, whereby each element reinforces the 
other. Accordingly, an integrated risk management process should 
result in better risk reporting. 
 
ICAEW (2011) 
 
Explores risk 
reporting 
practices in 
either financial 
 
ICAEW (2011) identifies challenges in disclosing  risk information 
in annual report narratives (e.g., doubts regarding the accuracy of  
reporting either quantitative or qualitative risk disclosures, higher 
competitive cost for firms that disclose risk information relative to 
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After reviewing UK professional efforts, the main features of  the UK approach to risk 
reporting can be identified as follows. First, voluntary rather than mandatory disclosure is 
or non-
financial firms 
and provides 
some 
suggestions for 
further 
improvements. 
those do not, and the difficulties of  outlining all risks that firms 
face). Considering investors‟ needs, prioritising quantitative over 
qualitative risk information and running effectively short lists of  
risks are the main areas that require more attention in order to 
improve risk reportage in annual reports.  
 
ASB (1990 –
2009) 
 
The Statement 
of  Principles. 
 
 
The conceptual framework of  the UK accounting standards 
emphasises the importance of  providing suitable information that 
helps users in decision-making. This type of  information is related 
to a firm‟s risks and uncertainties. Furthermore, the definition of  
assets and liabilities reflects the uncertainty in expected cash flows. 
 
SSAP 25  
 
Segmental Reporting, this standard indicates how different segments 
may have different rates of  profitability, growth opportunities and 
degrees of  risk. Thus, SSAP (25) emphasises providing information 
that enables users to understand the potential losses and gains of  
certain forms of  risk, such as political, industrial and market risks. 
 
FRS 5  
 
 
Reporting the Substance of  Transactions, this standard includes the 
definition of  uncertainty, and how to deal with both potential losses 
and potential gains. 
 
FRS 8  
 
 
Related Party Disclosures, this standard requires providing information 
about the future to reduce the negative effects of  the historical cost 
model. 
 
FRS 12  
 
 
Accounting for Contingencies, this standard explains how a firm can 
involve loss in its financial statements because of  risk consequences. 
 
FRS 23  
 
The Effects of  Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates, this standard explains 
that firms‟ foreign investments are subject to many changes in 
exchange rates that consequently affect investment value. These 
changes should be reported in annual reports. 
 
FRS 13 
FRS 25 
FRS 32 
 
FRS 26  
FRS 29  
 
 
Derivatives and other Financial Instruments, these standards generally 
require disclosing risk information related to currency, liquidity, fair 
value, financial assets and liabilities hedging, market price and 
commodity contracts.  
 
FRS 26, Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement and FRS 29, 
Financial Instruments: Disclosures, highlight the importance of  
qualitative and quantitative market risk disclosures, and the 
aggregation of  related risks. 
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preferred. Second, each firm can identify its risks individually and accurately rather than 
providing a list of  risk types. Third, providing risk information in annual reports has 
positive effects on increasing the quality of  accounting information and reducing the cost 
of  capital. Fourth, these reports provide risk measures which depend on non-accounting, 
as well as accounting, information (e.g., number of  employees). 
 
3.4.2. Professional efforts in the USA 
In 1994, The American Institute of  Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) provided the 
Statement of  Position (SOP) to identify the required disclosure of  certain types of  
uncertainties and risks. AICPA and CICA (2000) provide a special report on how firms can 
manage their risks. This report adopts a broad approach in identifying risk by including 
gains with losses; moreover, it provides many instances of  both quantitative and qualitative 
methods of  quantifying firms‟ risks, as well as emphasising the importance of  providing 
both internal and external risk reporting. 
 
SEC (1997) provides FRR No. 48 to organise how listed firms disclose suitable 
information about their market risk that is sufficiently related to their derivatives. In 2000, 
the SEC proposed two main forms, 10-K and 20-F, for domestic and international firms 
respectively, which organise many aspects of  risk reporting under items 1.a and 7.a to 
describe a firm‟s risk factors and market risks. 
 
Similar to the SEC‟s requirements, the SOX (2002), in sections 302 and 404, requires that 
US firms protect their investors by improving both the accuracy and reliability of  their 
disclosures. Particularly, these two sections require providing information about firms‟ 
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significant risks, hedging activities, contingent liability identification and foreign exchange 
accounting (for more details see Leech, 2003; Kogan, Routledge, Sagi and Smith, 2010). 
 
Although the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) does not provide a specific 
standard of  risk reporting, many of  its accounting standards deal with how firms report 
certain types of  risk. The current study finds six main themes or topics especially related to 
risk reporting: contingency (FAS 5), segment reports (FAS 14), foreign exchange (FAS 52), 
investment (FAS 115), derivatives (FAS 133) and fair value (FAS 157). The current study 
summarises all these efforts in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2: Summary of  USA professional efforts on risk 
 
Body / 
Year 
Aim(s)  Discussions and Findings 
 
AICPA 
(1994) 
 
The SOP indicates 
the required 
disclosures for 
certain significant 
risks and 
uncertainties.  
 
This study describes the information that firms have to provide in 
their annual reports, particularly regarding certain types of  risks.  
 
AICPA 
and CICA 
(2000) 
 
Provides a report to 
explain how firms 
can manage their risk 
under the new 
economy. 
 
The study explains: (a) how companies can identify their risks; (b) 
how to choose suitable strategies to manage their risk; (c) how to 
quantify risks; and (d) how to report their risks. 
 
SEC 
(1997) 
  
 
FRR 48 illustrates 
that every firm has to 
provide quantitative 
and qualitative 
disclosures of  market 
risks that arise from 
movements in 
market rate and 
prices, such as 
interest rate, foreign 
exchange rates; 
commodity prices 
and changes on 
equity prices. 
 
Three tools were provided in this study. These tools present a new 
approach to providing suitable information about risk disclosure 
related to derivatives. The researcher can summarise them as 
follows: 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
 
Potential losses in income, cash flow and 
fair value because of  the market rate or 
prices.  
 
Value at Risk 
 
The maximum loss of  the firm at a given 
period with a given probability because of  
market rate or price changes, which 
includes other sources of  risks. 
 
Tabular disclosure 
 
The losses in this method are unmeasured. 
However, firms can provide suitable 
information about the impacts of  market 
factors on their sensitive assets and 
liabilities. From that, users can derive the 
potential losses or gains.  
 
FASB  
from 1973 
to 2009 
  
FAS 5 
 
Accounting for Contingencies, this standard 
shows the following aspects related to risk: 
the likelihood that future event(s) will 
confirm the loss or impairment of  assets; 
the conditions of  recognition and 
disclosure of  losses and gains of  
contingencies; the definition of  probable, 
reasonably and remote, each of  which 
expresses a probability of  occurrence.  
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FAS 14 
 
Financial Reporting for Segments of  a Business 
Enterprise, the content of  this standard 
reflects risks because it adopts returns and 
risks as a basis to classify business into 
segments.  
  
Financial Reporting and Changing Prices, this 
standard emphasises providing suitable 
information to investors about a firm‟s 
ability to assess amounts, timing and 
uncertainty of  prospective net cash flows. 
It also concerns the potential effects of  
price changes on a firm‟s future cash flows 
and performances. 
 
FAS 52 
 
 
Foreign Currency Translation, the content of  
this standard indicates risk because it 
accounts for the potential impacts of  the 
movement of  exchange rates on 
decreasing or increasing a firm‟s assets and 
liabilities values. Therefore, the losses and 
gains related to these movements should 
be recognised in income statements or on 
the owner equity in balance sheet. 
 
FAS 115 
 
 
Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and 
Equity Securities, the main content of  this 
standard concerns how firms can report 
changes in fair value and how firms can 
measure, recognise and disclose unrealised 
holding gains and losses according to each 
type of  security. These changes express 
risks because they cause many 
fluctuations, which affect a firm‟s future 
losses and gains.  
 
 
FAS 133 
 
 
 
Accounting for Derivative Instruments and 
Hedging Activities, this standard explains the 
accounting treatment for potential losses 
and gains related to fair value and cash 
flow hedging. Furthermore, the standard 
requires that firms disclose information 
about their risks either quantitatively or 
qualitatively.  
 
FAS 157 
 
 
Fair Value Measurement, some of  the 
content of  this standard indicates risk, 
especially in the sections that deal with 
changes in valuation based on a fair value 
basis. 
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The 
American 
Conceptual 
Framework 
from 1973 
to 2009 
  
SFAC: No. 1 
 
 
Objectives of  Financial Reporting by Business 
Enterprises, this statement illustrates that 
financial reporting  should provide 
information about a firm‟s risks in order 
to achieve the following purposes: (a) to 
help present and potential investors in 
assessing the amounts, timing and 
uncertainty of  prospective cash flows; and 
(b) based on the reported earnings, 
investors could assess the risk of  investing 
in or lending to a firm.  
 
SFAC: No. 2 
 
 
Qualitative Characteristics of  Accounting 
Information, this statement indicates risk 
relative to the following definition: (a) it 
defines conservatism as a prudent reaction 
to uncertainty to ensure that uncertainty 
and risks inherent in business situations 
are adequately considered; and (b) it 
defines relevance as the capacity for 
information to make a difference in a 
decision by helping users make predictions 
about the outcomes of  past, present and 
future events. 
 
SFAC: No. 6 
 
 
Elements of  Financial Statements, the content 
of  this statement expresses risk in the 
following aspects: (1) the definitions of  
asset and liability reflect the meaning of  
risk; hence, they commonly require 
assessments of  probability to identify the 
degree of  future cash flow or future 
economic benefits; and (2) the effects of  
uncertainty show how the current 
accounting model should deal with the 
impact of  uncertainty. An effect of  
uncertainty is to increase the cost of  
financial reporting and the costs of  
recognition and measurements in 
particular. 
 
SFAC: No.  7 
 
 
Using Cash Flow Information and Present Value 
in Accounting Measurements,  this statement 
reflects risk relative to the following 
aspects: (1) the requirements to calculate 
the present value from the financial 
reporting data, such as estimating future 
cash flow; possible variations not only in 
the amount of  cash flow but also on the 
timing of  these amounts; the time value 
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The main features of  the American approach towards risk reporting can be summarised in 
four distinctive points. First, it respectively requires and encourages firms to provide 
information about their risk either mandatorily or voluntarily, in either quantitative (e.g., 
risk mapping, value at risk and sensitivity analysis) or qualitative formats, with particular 
attention to the former risk type and risk form. Second, the main interest of  this approach 
is to link risk reporting (especially market risk of  financial instruments) and the impact on 
either some accounting measures (e.g., future earning and future cash flow) or the 
qualitative characteristics of  financial information (e.g., comparability, relevance and 
reliability). Third, this approach is mainly rule-based rather than principle-based in 
organising risk reporting (the requirements of: SEC, 1997 and FAS, 133). Fourth, while the 
SEC considers losses as a main indicator of  risk, the AICPA considers losses and gains as 
elements of  risk, whilst the-FASB-uses-uncertainty-and-risk-synonymously. 
3.4.3. Professional efforts in Germany 
The German Accounting Standards Board (GASB) published GAS 5 for risk reporting, 
which makes Germany‟s experience unique by being the only attempt to organise risk 
of  money, which is represented by the risk 
free rate of  interest; and the price for 
bearing the uncertainty inherent in assets 
or liability; (2) risk refers to any exposure 
to uncertainty, especially when this 
exposure has potential negative 
consequences; and (3) the objective of  
including uncertainty and risk in 
accounting measurements is to imitate the 
market‟s behaviour toward assets and 
liabilities. 
 
Sarbanes-
Oxley 
(SOX) Act 
(2002) 
 
 
 
This Act was issued 
in 2002 after a chain 
of  the biggest 
collapses in the 
American market 
(e.g., Enron; 
Worldcom). 
 
 
 
Sections 302 and 404 indicate risk management by emphasising 
the importance of  protecting investors by improving the accuracy 
and reliability of  corporate disclosures. According to these two 
sections, firms are obligated to provide information about their 
significant risks, derivatives/hedging activities, contingent liability 
identification and foreign exchange accounting. 
All this information must be provided in financial statement 
consolidation, financial statement notes and supplemental 
SEC10K disclosures (e.g., Leech, 2003). 
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reporting by formally issuing an accounting standard. As a consequence, Dobler (2005, 
2008) argues that the German experience may lead accounting professional efforts towards 
issuing an accounting standard to deal comprehensively with risk reporting.11 
 
GAS 5 adopts the narrow perspective of  risk only describing losses and not gains. 
However, GAS 5 illustrates the importance of  providing information about a firm‟s 
opportunities (gains). GAS 5 provides instances of  firms‟ risk categories rather than 
restricting these categories according to a specific list of  risk types.  
 
GAS 5 explains that financial risks are more likely to be quantified with three conditions of  
each risk measure: its reliability, its cost and its relevance to users‟ decision-making. 
Remarkably, GAS 5 permits the insertion of  the financial impacts of  risks inside the 
financial statements through accruals and provisions. Thus, to the best of  the researcher‟s 
knowledge, this is the only standard that permits firms to include their measurable future 
risks in their financial statements. This could be interpreted based on the fact that German 
culture (as discussed in detail in Section 2.6) carefully avoids any uncertainty related to the 
future, so they may accept accounting for any future losses inside the financial statements 
once these losses are reasonably measured. Furthermore, the concept of  prudence that 
dominates many Germany accounting practices (e.g., leases, financial instruments), as 
                                                 
 
11  Schrand and Elliott (1998) summarise main discussions of  the AAA/FASB conference, which addresses 
obstacles to issuing accounting standards of  risk reporting within a US context. They explain, however, that 
risk concept, risk types and risk measurement are three main problems for issuing an accounting standard for 
risk reporting. They explain that the scope of  the concept of  risk should be expanded to contain losses and 
gains rather than using risk as an accounting synonym for uncertainty. They conclude that accurately 
identifying a list of  risk types for all firms is unrealistic, owing to each firm having its own circumstances, 
which in turn generate different types of  risks. The model, eligibility to be quantified and type of  data are the 
core issues related to measurement. Schrand and Elliott (1998) explain the difficulties of  a single model of  
risk measurement, because not all risk types can be measured, and that risk measures should rely on both 
historical and future data. To overcome these shortages, they provide two suggestions: the first is that using 
historical measures (e.g., volatility) of  risk exposure may help users be aware of  firms‟ risks; the second 
suggests combining historical with future data by using simulation analysis. 
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discussed earlier in Section 2.6, could be behind the practical treatment of  future losses. 
The standard, however, neither explains the suitable information to quantify a firm‟s risks 
nor explains how to confirm the three conditions to quantify risk. These aspects can be 
summarised in the following table. 
 
GAS 5 emphasises disclosing firms‟ residual risks, especially indusial and market risks, or 
any other risks having a significant impact on firms‟ existence. All these disclosures should 
be addressed in a specific section of  annual reports narratives (normally under Risks and 
Opportunities or Outlook). All German firms, therefore, are obligated to provide risk 
information in a specific place in their financial reporting. But the problem is that the 
standard neither shows exactly what information firms have to provide nor how firms can 
link their different types of  risk. 
Table 3.3: Summary of  GAS 5  
Body/Year Contents and Discussions  
GASB 
(2000) 
 
Concept of  
risk 
 
The possibility of  a future negative impact on the economic 
position. 
 
Risk 
categories 
 
Provides examples of  risk types. The standard explains the 
difficulties in having a specific list of  risk types for all German 
firms. 
 
Recognition  
 
Permits recognition in the financial statement by accruals and 
provisions. 
 
Measurement 
 
 
 
 
The standard suggests some measures, such as sensitivity 
analysis, cash flow at risk, earnings at risk, or more generally 
using VaR. The standard provides three main conditions as the 
main determinants for risk measurement: the reliability of  the 
measurement, the cost of  the measurement and the usefulness 
of  quantified information for users.  
 
Disclosure 
 
German firms have to provide suitable information about their 
risks and suitable procedures to reduce these risks. 
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The main features of  the German approach to risk reporting can be summarised, 
therefore, in the following aspects. Firstly, GAS 5 is the only formal accounting standard, 
which deals comprehensively with both measurement and disclosure of  firms‟ risks. 
Secondly, while the standard formally adopts losses as the main expression of  risk, it 
nevertheless encourages German firms to provide information voluntarily about their 
opportunities.  
 
3.4.4. Professional efforts of the IASB 
What has been mentioned previously represents the professional efforts of  some 
developed countries (the UK, the USA and Germany). These countries have many 
regulations to organise how companies can provide risk information in their financial 
reporting. In order to extend the previous country-level perspective to include international 
professional bodies, the efforts of  the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB, 
formerly the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), are analysed and 
evaluated. Considering these efforts is essential, especially after the adoption of  such 
efforts (IFRSs) within the UK and Germany in 2005, and the convergence of  these efforts 
within the USA. To this end, the conceptual framework and the relevant accounting 
standards-are-analysed-as-summarised-in-Table-3.4.
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Table 3.4: Summary of the IASB‟s efforts on risk 
 
The main features of  the IASB‟s approach to risk reporting can be summarised as follows. 
First, it requires some specific information about risk (such as those required within 
financial instruments) and it encourages firms to provide more risk information voluntarily, 
in either quantitative (using sensitivity analysis) or qualitative formats. 
Body/Year  Contents and Discussion 
 
IASB 
(1973- 
2009) 
 
IAS 11  
 
Construction Contracts, this standard indicates risk relative to expressing the 
accounting treatment of  the potential losses and potential gains.  
  
IAS14 
(replaced by 
IFRS (8) 
2008)) 
 
Segment Reporting, this standard adopts a return and risk approach to 
distinguish between businesses in order to measure and disclose risk. 
 
 
IAS 32 (issued 
1995) 
 
 
Financial Instruments: Presentation , this standard explains many types of  
risks related to derivatives, and the information that should be provided 
in financial reporting. 
 
IAS 37 (issued 
1998) 
 
 
 
 
Provision, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets, this standard refers to 
risk in some aspects; hence, it defines the provision as a liability of  
uncertain timing or amount. It is essential, therefore, to consider the 
impact of  future events. The standard explains that contingent assets and 
liabilities should be unrecognised but that the firm has to provide suitable 
information about them in their narratives. 
  
IFRS 7  
 
 
Financial Instruments: Disclosures, this standard requires providing 
information about credit, liquidity and market risks qualitatively and/or 
quantitatively, using sensitivity analysis. 
 
The 
conceptual 
framework 
 
 
 
The conceptual framework in its first chapter explains that financial 
reporting should provide information which enables present and 
potential users to assess all the variables related to the entity‟s future cash 
flows. Furthermore, in its second chapter, it illustrates that the relevant 
information is capable of  making a difference in users‟ decisions by 
helping them evaluate the potential effects of  the past, present and future 
on the future cash flow (predictive cash flow).  
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Second, this approach is mainly principle-based rather than rule-based in organising risk 
reporting. Third, the term uncertainty is alternatively used to refer to the term risk, which 
includes both potential losses and gains. 
3.5. The current study: Overall and assessment  
 
 
The main gaps in prior research and professional efforts can be summarised through the 
following two main research questions. First, do firms disclose their risk information as a 
function of  their risk levels? In other words, how and to what extent do a firm‟s risk levels 
influence its risk disclosure levels? Prior research (e.g., Marshall and Weetman, 2002, 2007; 
Beretta and Bozzollan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2006) has not provided a comprehensive 
explanation of  such influences. 
 
Second, how can country characteristics affect the provision of  risk information? And 
what is the extent to which these characteristics can react with other firm characteristics in 
explaining the variability of  providing information about risk reporting either voluntarily 
or mandatorily? As suggested by prior research (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Vandemaele 
et al., 2009), investigating the main drivers of  risk reporting across countries is essential to 
deepen the understanding of  the main incentives for risk reporting.  
 
 
3.6. Concluding remarks 
 
 
This chapter summarised main efforts of  both prior risk reporting literature and prior 
professional efforts to measure and disclose risk information. Based either on intensive 
literature that investigates the extent to which accounting data can be used as proxies for 
market risk or on two major trends in risk reporting, investigating potential associations 
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between a firm‟s risk levels and a firm‟s risk disclosure levels becomes essential to fill a real 
gap in extant literature. 
 
Rising the same question relative to prior professional efforts in the USA, the UK and 
Germany emphasises investigating how and the extent to which firms might respond to 
their risk levels by providing more or less information about their risks in their annual 
report narratives. Observing this pattern of  associations gives indications to support or 
warn professional bodies in each country. In the following chapter, the research questions 
and research hypotheses will be discussed.   
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Chapter Four: Research questions and hypotheses development 
 
4.1. Overview  
 
Based on the review of  prior literature and prior professional efforts on risk reporting 
previously carried out in Chapter Three, the current research was able to identify two main 
gaps addressing both firm- and country-level analyses. This chapter aims, therefore, to 
highlight the main research questions in these levels of  analyses and then develops the 
hypotheses. These hypotheses are statistically examined by four different models in four 
different contexts. Specifically, the study commences its empirical evidence by using 
multivariate analysis of  variance (MANOVA) and correlation analysis in 15 firms in each 
country as a pilot study, in Chapter Six, and then uses the linear mixed model (LMM) in 
contrast to traditional approaches (e.g., OLS and FEM) within one country (the UK), in 
Chapter Seven. After that, repeated measures multilevel analysis is utilised to draw specific 
conclusions about the main incentives of  variations in both MRR and VRR in each 
country (single analysis), in Chapter Eight, and all three countries together (pooled 
analysis), in Chapter Nine. 
 
The reminder of  this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 addresses the main 
research questions, at firm and country levels. Based on these questions, the current study 
proposes its firm- and country-level hypotheses in Section 4.3 and Section 4.4, respectively. 
Concluding remarks are provided in Section 4.5. 
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4.2. Research questions: Firm- and country- level analyses 
 
4.2.1. Firm-level analysis research questions 
These questions concern how and the extent to which a firm‟s characteristics generally, and 
a firm‟s risk levels particularly, might affect and motivate US, UK and German firms to 
provide mandatory and/or voluntary risk reporting in their annual report narratives. The 
research question concerning this level can be presented as follows. Do a firm‟s risk levels 
(captured by market- and accounting-risk measures) motivate firms to provide their risk 
disclosure mandatorily and/or voluntarily (MMR and/or VRR) in their annual report 
narratives? What other firm characteristics affect providing risk information in annual 
report narratives?  
 
4.2.2. Country-level analysis research questions 
These questions investigate the impact of  a country‟s legal system and its cultural values in 
expressing why firms across the USA, the UK and Germany might provide varying degrees 
of  risk information in their annual report narratives. These questions can be introduced as 
follows. 
 
Do MRR and VRR vary within and between firms across the USA, the UK and Germany 
between 2005 and 2009? Can MRR and VRR variations be attributed to firm characteristics 
(risk levels) and/or country-level characteristics (legal systems and cultural values)? Which 
variables of  both firm- and country-level characteristics are significantly associated with 
variability of  MRR and VVR?  
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4.3. Firm-level hypotheses: Firm characteristics (risk levels and control variables) 
 
At this level, the current study essentially distinguishes between potential associations 
between a firm‟s characteristics and its risk reporting in general and risk disclosure studies. 
As discussed in Section 2.4 of  Chapter Two, regulatory theory could be utilised to justify 
why regulators might require firms to provide risk information in their annual reports 
narratives. It has been argued that imperfect markets and market failure are the two main 
reasons that are widely accepted to justify enforcing firms to reveal risk information 
(Leftwich, 1980; Cooper and Keim, 1983; Fields et al., 2001; Ogus, 2001). 
 
Managers have incentives to provide risk information voluntarily in annual report 
narratives. These incentives aim at reducing information asymmetry by reducing the gap 
between managers, who have access to all information, and investors, who do not have 
such access to all information. 
  
Three different motives for reducing this gap have been suggested, each of  which has 
different consequences. First, managers voluntarily disclose risk information to reduce 
uncertainty related to investors‟ future cash flows, resulting in reducing their potential 
desired rate, which practicably is used as a discount rate to calculate the cost of  capital for 
those managers‟ firms that encourage investors to invest in them. If  managers need 
external funds, they could, therefore, provide higher levels of  risk information voluntarily 
(known as capital needs theory; see e.g., Botosan, 1997; ICAEW, 1999). 
 
Second, managers could reduce information asymmetry to signal their quality to the stock 
market by clearly disclosing more information about their abilities to identify and manage 
risks. This would distinguish them from managers who could not manage their risks 
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effectively (known as signalling theory; see e.g., Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973; Watson et al., 
2002). 
  
Third, to increase stockholders‟ confidence and reduce any conflict between agency parties, 
managers might disclose more about their risks to assure other parties that they dealt with 
their firms‟ risks successfully (known as agency theory; see e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Abraham and Cox, 2007). Accordingly, the agency cost, which includes some other costs, 
such as bonding cost, will be reduced by voluntarily revealing more information about 
risks.  
 
Based on this theoretical underpinning, prior research (the main trends of  which are 
grouped and synthesised in Section 3.3) from each country are reviewed and evaluated in 
order to associate both market- and accounting- risk measures with risk reporting, as will 
be discussed in the following sub-sections.  
 
4.3.1. Market-risk measures and firms’ risk reporting  
Within an American context, general prior disclosure studies examine the extent to which a 
firm‟s risk levels may affect its provision of  general voluntary disclosures (Lev and 
Penman, 1990; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Alexander, 1996; Kothari et al., 2009).  
Kothari et al. (2009) regress firms‟ disclosures (from three main sources: corporate annual 
reports, analysts‟ reports and business press) on their stock returns volatility as a proxy for 
total risk, distinguishing between good news disclosure (favourable) and bad news 
disclosure (unfavourable). They reveal that when firms provide (un)favourable news their 
levels of  risk (increase) decline significantly. 
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Examining the same association from the opposite direction, Lang and Lundholm (1993) 
argue that performance variability affects information asymmetry, and consequently 
disclosure levels, negatively. They find a negative association between the volatility of  stock 
returns and general firm disclosure levels.  
 
Other research provides mixed results. Lev and Penman (1990) find no significant relation 
between disclosure frequency and earnings volatility. Alexander (1996), however, reveals 
that firms with more volatile earnings are more likely to provide information in their 
annual reports in order to reduce this volatility.  
 
Ryan (1997) surveys the accounting and finance literature to identify the extent to which 
accounting numbers can measure equity systematic risk. He concludes that accounting 
earning variability has historically been the accounting variable most strongly correlated to 
systematic (non-diversifiable) equity risk. Consequently, enhancing information about the 
sources and amount of  variability would be very useful; this can be achieved through 
providing more information about fair value measurement. Consecutive prior risk 
reporting literature mainly examines the usefulness of  mandated risk reporting according 
to the SEC‟s requirements (e.g., Rajgopal, 1999; Hodder and McAnally, 2001; Jorion, 2002; 
Linsmeier et al., 2002; Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter, 2003, 2008; Li, 2008).  
 
Rajgopal (1999) examines the usefulness of  the SEC‟s requirements and finds a significant 
association between these requirements and both stock returns and share price sensitivity. 
He finds, however, incomparability of  divertive market risk reporting under the three 
required formats. To overcome this weakness, Hodder and McAnally (2001) propose a 
methodology to convert the information from the tabular format to the other two formats, 
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suggesting that the tabular format is effective in providing useful information about firms‟ 
derivatives market risk. 
 
Nevertheless, Jorion (2002) points out that value at risk disclosures are informative since 
this type of  disclosure enables investors to predict variability in trading revenues and make 
sufficient comparisons of  trading portfolios. Linsmeier et al. (2002) draw the same 
conclusion.  
 
Firms‟ future cash flows theoretically are a function of  two sources of  risk: market-wide 
risk and firm-specific risk. Concerning the first source of  risk, Jorgensen and 
Kirschenheiter (2003) propose managers‟ strategies to provide risk information, relying on 
variance in future cash flow, according to the SEC‟s requirements for market risk. They 
conclude that managers‟ decisions to make voluntary disclosures affect firms‟ returns, betas 
and share prices. Considering firm-specific risk, Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2008) 
propose a theoretical model to analyse the consequences of  firms‟ mandatory disclosure 
for their future cash flow sensitivity.  
 
By counting the frequency of  words related to risk and uncertainty in the 10-K from 1994 
to 2005, Li (2008) finds that US firms which provide higher levels of  risk sentiment are 
more likely to have negative future returns relative to firms with lower levels of  risk 
sentiments for the year ahead. He concludes that the stock market does not fully reflect the 
risk content in future earnings, which in turn signals market inefficiency.   
 
Within a UK context, both prior general and risk disclosure results are relatively mixed 
regarding the extent to which a firm‟s risk levels motivates it to provide general or risk 
disclosures, respectively. Firth (1984) hypothesises a positive relationship between a firm‟s 
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disclosure level and its risk exposure. He utilises the variance of  stock returns, beta and the 
standard error of  CAPM as measures for total, systematic and unsystematic risks, 
respectively. Based on these measures as proxies for firm risk exposure, he investigates the 
association between them and the aggregated disclosures in annual report narratives. His 
results, nevertheless, indicate no significant impact of  firms‟ disclosure level on their risks. 
More recently, utilising beta as a proxy for a firm‟s risk level, Hussainey and Al-Najjar 
(2011) reveal a non-significant association with future-oriented information in a large-scale 
study of  UK firms. They suggest, however, the possibility of  identifying other proxies of  a 
firm‟s risk levels, such as volatility. 
 
Prior risk reporting studies, however, mainly examine determinants of  voluntary risk 
reporting. One such determinant is firm risk level, which is captured by a variety of  
measures. The main weakness of  this research is that it does not determine the extent to 
which a firm‟s risk levels motivate it to provide risk reporting; furthermore, the pattern of  
such associations gives signals to support or warn regulators. 
 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) argue that the associations between risk levels and risk 
disclosure level can be hypothesised positively or negatively. The positive trend assumes 
that managers in high-risk firms are more likely to provide information to justify their high 
risks and explain the extent to which they can manage these successfully. The opposing 
argument presumes that higher-risk firms may not wish to attract market attention and so 
they provide less risk information. Linsley and Shrives (2006), however, do not find 
significant associations, and instead find that risk disclosure level is related more to firm 
size than to firm risk levels. Their results are consistent with their earlier work (Linsley and 
Shrives, 2000, 2005). Abraham and Cox (2007) support the first direction; hence, they find 
a positive association between risk levels and risk disclosure. Marshall and Weetman (2002), 
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however, support the contention that firms with high risk levels are more likely to disclose 
less than those with marginally lower risk levels. Hill and Short (2009), however, do not 
find that risk levels impact significantly on the provision of  risk information for a sample 
of  initial public offering (IPO) firms. Likewise, Dobler et al. (2011) reveal that aggregated 
risk disclosure is not significantly associated with risk levels.   
 
Within a German context, among general disclosure studies, Cormier, Magana and 
Velthoven (2005) find a positive association between German firms‟ betas and their 
environmental disclosure levels. In terms of  prior risk reporting, little research has been 
conducted on the extent to which German firms‟ risk levels can motivate these firms to 
disclose risk information in their annual reports narratives. One main reason for this could 
be that the mandated approach to risk reporting in Germany may restrict research from 
empirically investigating the incentives of  such disclosure, even though such reason seems 
inconsistent with Dobler‟s (2008) conclusion about investigating risk reporting incentives 
being essential even in highly regulated countries. Dobler et al. (2011), however, find that 
systematic risk does not significantly influence German firms in providing risk 
information. 
   
The Sharp ratio12 may be used as a proxy for firm risk levels (Scholz and Wilkens, 2005), as 
firms with higher Sharp ratios may be more attractive to investors in exhibiting lower levels 
of  risk relative to excess returns. Firms with low Sharp ratios may be more likely to 
disclose risk information in order to justify their high risk levels to investors. 
 
                                                 
 
12  The Sharp ratio is a measure of  the excess return (which is the difference between market returns and risk 
free rate; e.g., it could be the governmental Treasury rate) divided by standard deviation of  market returns.   
 93 
 
Based on a review of  the theory and literature, the following set of  hypotheses posits 
positive associations between risk levels (proxied by market-risk measures) and risk 
reporting (MRR and VRR). 
 
H1: Firms‟ market volatility (as a proxy of  firms‟ total risk) is likely to be significantly and 
positively correlated to MRR and VRR. 
 
H2: Firms‟ market beta (as a proxy of  firms‟ systematic risk) is likely to be significantly and 
positively correlated to MRR and VRR. 
 
H3: Firms‟ market volatility of  the standard error of  CAPM (as a proxy of  firms‟ un-
systematic risk) is likely to be significantly and positively correlated to MRR and VRR. 
 
H4: Firms‟ Sharp ratio (as a proxy of  firms‟ risk-adjusted return) is likely to be significantly 
and positively correlated to MRR and VRR. 
4.3.2. Accounting-risk measures and firms’ risk reporting 
General disclosure literature argues that both leverage and liquidity influence disclosure 
level (Malone, Fries and Jones, 1993; Wallace, Naser and Mora, 1994; Ferguson, Lam and 
Lee, 2002; Cormier et al., 2005). High-leverage firms are more likely to have higher levels 
of  monitoring costs, making these firms more likely to provide more information to 
reduce these costs (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). Distinguishing between bad and good news 
disclosures, Kothari et al. (2009) find the nature of  this relation to be negative and positive, 
respectively, for these two types of  disclosure. Wallace et al. (1994) suggest that high-
liquidity firms are more motivated to disclose risk information than low-liquidity firms. 
They find, however, that liquidity has a significant and negative impact on disclosure level. 
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Prior risk research also uses leverage as a proxy for firm risk levels (Linsley and Shrives, 
2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Marshall and Weetman, 2007; Rajab and Handley-
Schachler, 2009), but with mixed results. Abraham and Cox (2007), Linsley and Shrives 
(2006) and Rajab and Handley-Schachler (2009) all reveal that there is no significant 
association between leverage and risk disclosure. Marshall and Weetman (2007) confirm 
that high-leverage firms are more likely to provide foreign exchange risk disclosure.  
 
Marshall and Weetman (2007) argue that low liquidity firms are more motivated to provide 
higher levels of  risk information. However, their findings suggest that high-liquidity firms 
provide more foreign exchange risk information in order to signal their strong position to 
investors. More recently, Dobler et al. (2011) find that high leverage US firm are likely to 
provide more risk information in their annual reports narratives than German firms, which 
tend to report less risk information. Their findings, nevertheless, do not support any 
influence of  leverage on risk disclosure for UK firms. Hill and Short (2009) find that high 
leverage and low liquidity firms disclose more risk information. 
 
Based on a review of  the theory and literature, the study suggests the following set of  
hypotheses positing positive associations between risk levels (proxied by accounting-risk 
measures) and risk reporting (MRR and VRR). 
 
H5:  Firms‟ leverage (as a proxy of  firms‟ financing risk) is more likely to be significantly 
and positively correlated to MRR and VRR. 
 
H6: Firms‟ current ratio (as a proxy of  firms‟ liquidity risk) is more likely to be 
significantly and positively correlated to MRR and VRR.  
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4.3.3. The control variables (other firm characteristics) 
In order to examine the association between risk reporting levels and risk levels, the 
current study discusses the following potential effects. 
 
Firm size 
 
Prior general disclosure research has found firm size to be positively associated with 
general disclosure level (e.g., Meek et al., 1995; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Francis et al., 
2005; Chavent et al., 2006). One explanation is that larger firms have larger analyst 
followings and hence are better able to distribute firm information (King, Pownall and 
Waymire, 1990). Smaller firms, however, are motivated to provide less information owing 
to the disadvantages related to their competitive situation (Chavent et al., 2006). 
 
Prior risk disclosure research has provided mixed results. Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) and 
Rajab and Handley-Schachler (2009) find that firm size does not influence risk disclosure. 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) and Abraham and Cox (2007), however, find that aggregated 
and voluntary risk disclosures are significantly and positively correlated with firm size.  
 
Firm profitability  
 
While no study specifically focuses on the effect of  firm profitability on risk disclosure 
level, a positive relation could be suggested based on prior studies on general voluntary 
disclosure13 (Wallace and Naser, 1995; Giner, 1997; Chavent et al., 2006) indicating that 
firms with higher levels of  profitability are more likely to provide information about their 
risks and their management.  
                                                 
 
13 Ahmed and Courtis (1999) are an exception in not finding any significant association between aggregated 
disclosure level and profitability. 
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Firm growth 
 
Khurana, Pereira and Martin (2006) argue that as disclosure enhances firms‟ abilities to 
obtain external financing through reducing information asymmetry, firm growth is likely to 
impact positively on disclosure level. This is supported by their empirical evidence and that 
of  Chavent et al. (2006) and O‟Sullivan, Percy and Stewart (2008). 
 The current study argues that high-growth firms have positive incentives to provide risk 
disclosure in order to signal how they cope with these risks. 
 
Firm dividends 
 
Empirical research (e.g., Khang and King, 2006; Hussainey and Walker, 2009) based on 
signalling theory argues that firms that have high levels of  asymmetric information are 
more likely to signal to their investors by paying higher dividends, and finds a negative 
association between a firm‟s disclosure and its dividends policy. Some other research (e.g., 
Deshmukh, 2005; Li and Zhao, 2008) finds that firms that have low levels of  asymmetric 
information are more likely to pay higher dividends; such firms may be underinvested. 
Consistent with these studies in the USA, Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2011) reveal a positive 
association between future-oriented information and dividends for UK firms. 
 
Based on this literature, the study controls for firm dividend effect and expects to find a 
positive association between risk disclosure and dividends; hence, firms with high-risk 
disclosure may be more motivated to pay higher levels of  dividends to compensate  their 
investors for their high risk levels.  
 
To sum up, the current study controls for these four effects and expects, based on 
signalling theory, that large-size, high-profit, high-growth and high-dividend firms have 
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greater incentives to signal their ability in identifying and managing their risk relative to 
other firms. 
 
Corporate governance (CG) effects 
 
To further control for corporate governance effects, the analysis is informed by the 
following considerations. 
First, further research on the impact of  board size on corporate disclosure is suggested by 
Gul and Leung (2004). Jensen (1993) argues that large board size may lead to less effective 
coordination, communication and decision-making. Prior research provides mixed results; 
for instance, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) find that the impact of  board size on disclosure 
is insignificant. Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2011) and Byard, Li and Weintrop (2006) find 
positive and negative associations between board size and disclosure, respectively.  
 
Second, board composition (executive directors, or EDs, and non-executive directors, or 
NEDs) and independence (dependent NEDs and independent INEDs) have also been 
highlighted by prior research as potentially important corporate governance variables for 
financial disclosure (e.g., Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Gul and Leung, 2004; Cheng and 
Courtenay, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Jaggi, Leung and Gul, 2009). 
 
The role of  NEDs, in countries such as the UK, may be rationalised in terms of  reducing 
agency costs and strengthening the motivation for risk disclosures (Abraham and Cox, 
2007). Prior research further distinguishes between NEDs who have businesses or 
relationships with management from those who do not. Chen and Jaggi (2000) and Cheng 
and Courtenay (2006) find a positive association between INEDs and general disclosure; 
Abraham and Cox (2007), however, find a specific and positive association between 
INEDs and risk disclosure.  
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Third, Jensen (1993) suggests, from an agency theory perspective, that firms separate CEO 
responsibilities and roles from those of  the board chair. Gul and Leung (2004) find that 
firms where those roles are combined (CEO duality) disclose significantly less information 
than do other firms. They also analyse the extent to which NED expertise can mitigate the 
negative impact of  CEO duality on disclosure, and find that a high proportion of  expert 
NEDs moderates the negative association between CEO duality and disclosure. Cheng and 
Courtenay (2006), however, find that the impact of  CEO duality is insignificant.  
 
These considerations motivate the researcher to include several proxies for corporate 
governance; specifically, board size (BZ), proportion of  non-executive directors (PNED), 
proportion of  independent non-executive directors (PINED) and chief  executive officer 
(CEO) duality. 
 
4.4. Country-level hypotheses: Country characteristics: (legal systems and cultural 
values)  
 
Two main streams in prior research have examined Hofstede-Gray‟s framework. The first 
considers the associations between societal and accounting values as proposed by Gray 
(1988) (e.g., Eddie, 1990; Salter and Niswander, 1995). The second stream concentrates on 
the impact of  the societal values suggested by Hofstede (1980) on disclosure, which has 
been used as a proxy for secrecy14 (e.g., Gray and Vint, 1995; Jaggi and Low, 2000; Hope, 
2003; Williams, 2004). The current study considers the second stream because it analyses 
                                                 
 
14  Gray‟s (1988) original hypothesis (p.11) is that „‟if  a country has a high score in uncertainty avoidance and also a high 
score in power distance, with a lower score in individualism and masculinity, then this country is highly expected to have a high 
rank in secrecy’’. 
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the cultural dimensions as indicators of  variability of  both mandatory and voluntary risk 
reporting across the USA, the UK and Germany.    
 
Zarzeski (1996) argues that market forces in addition to cultural factors will affect financial 
disclosures. Her findings are consistent with theory and results of  prior research; hence, 
she finds a significant impact of  all Hofstede‟s (1980) dimensions in the expected 
directions, except for power distance. Zarzeski (1996) further analyses financial disclosure 
and its associations with cultural factors, distinguishing local from international firms based 
on a ratio of  foreign sales to total sales, and finds that cultural dimensions, especially 
uncertainty avoidance (UA) and masculinity (MAS), are more likely to explain differences in 
financial disclosure for local firms than international firms.  
 
The main conclusion from such results is that international firms moderate the association 
between Hofstede‟s societal values (1980) and Gray‟s accounting values (1988). The same 
conclusions are also held by Wingate (1997), who empirically tests the impact of  cultural 
dimensions on firms‟ disclosure. She finds a significant impact of  UA and individualism 
(IND), rather than power distance (PD), on disclosure. 
 
Williams (2004) finds that firms from common law countries were more likely to provide 
higher levels of  disclosure about the problem of  the year 2000 (Y2K) than firms in code 
law countries. Power distance is the only factor that significantly explains the variability of  
firms‟ disclosures. The sensitivity of  these results does not imply the impact of  including 
or excluding legal systems on the associations between cultural values and disclosure levels. 
In other words, the extent to which the observed trend of  disclosure differs with cultural 
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values (among some other variables, like firm size) is subject to interacting the legal 
systems with cultural values.  
 
Jaggi and Low (2000), therefore, argue that the cultural factors of  a country have an 
indirect impact on financial disclosure through its legal system, based on prior research 
which investigates the effect of  a legal system on accounting practices (e.g., La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silance, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998, 2000). Jaggi and Low (2000) find that firms 
from common law countries are more likely to provide significantly higher levels of  
disclosure than firms from code law countries. However, in the case of  common law 
countries, they find a non-significant impact of  cultural values on disclosure. Nevertheless, 
in code law countries, they find a significant impact of  Hofstede‟s (1980) values (expect 
UA) on disclosure, but in diverted directions (except IND). 
 
Discriminating code from common law countries, Hope (2003) addresses the question of  
whether cultural values have any explanatory power for disclosure in each legal system. 
Based on Jaggi and Low‟s (2000) argument and a larger sample (from the Centre for 
International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR) in 1993 and 1995), he provides 
empirical evidence on the importance of  the legal system as a conditioning variable for the 
role of  cultural values. For the full sample, he finds a limited role of  culture to explain 
disclosure variability; IND and MAS are the only significant factors, with an unpredicted 
direction for the latter. Once he distinguishes common from code law countries, he finds, 
in the case of  common law countries, that all cultural dimensions are significantly 
associated with disclosure and in the expected direction, except IND. In the case of  code 
law countries, he finds that all the cultural variables are significant in explaining the 
variability of  disclosure, except PD, but the directions of  significance of  the variables are 
in the unexpected direction, except IND.  
 101 
 
 
To sum up, prior research (e.g., Jaggi and Low, 2000; Hope, 2003; William, 2004) finds 
mixed results regarding the extent to which cultural values and legal systems have 
explanatory power to express differences of  disclosure. Hope (2003) finds all the cultural 
values have significant influences on firms‟ financial disclosure in both common and code 
law countries (with the exception of  PD in the latter countries). The directions of  such 
impacts are wholly diversified in these two kinds of  legal systems. These directions are 
consistent with neither what is theoretically anticipated by Hofstede-Gray‟s framework nor 
what is empirically revealed by Jaggi and Low (2000) for common law countries.  
 
The current study expects that cultural dimensions and legal systems may simultaneously 
have an essential role in explaining variations in risk reporting across countries. The current 
study, therefore, expects complementary rather than substitutable reactions between a 
country‟s legal system and its cultural values.   
 
 H7: Legal system and cultural values are more likely to be complements than substitutes 
in explaining variations of  MRR and VRR. 
 
To examine and explore the extent to which these two variables can reduce the un-
explained variance of  both MRR and VRR, two distinct changes are made. First, the 
current study weights code law/low cultural score countries relative to common law/high 
cultural score countries, respectively. In other words, the current study intends to treat both 
of  these variables as factors or dummies rather than covariates, due to the small number of  
countries (three countries) at the higher level (level 2). Having a bigger number of  
countries makes the variations in cultural and legal variables between these countries large 
enough to drawing conclusions. Another possible justification is that these two variables 
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slowly change over time, they could be treated as factors or as dummies variables (e.g., 
Doupnik and Tsakumis, 2004; Heck et al., 2010).15 Second, MRR from VRR are 
distinguished to observe the impact of  both legal system and culture on explaining 
variations in each risk reporting type.  
 
The current study argues that both mandatory and voluntary risk reporting have different 
patterns of  associations with both legal systems and cultural values. It could be argued that 
both legal and cultural values have a higher explanatory power to express and anticipate the 
observed variations of  MRR between firms across the USA, the UK and Germany than 
variations of  VRR. The main reasoning behind such an argument is that different legal 
systems could imply different regulations to organise risk reporting, which in turn can 
affect what firms disclose about their risk in their annual report narratives. Nevertheless, 
firms‟ variations of  VRR can be attributed to managers‟ incentives theories. The following 
hypothesis, therefore, can be formulated for MRR and VRR. 
 
H8: The explanatory power of  country characteristics (legal systems and cultural values) 
explaining the observed MRR variability between firms is higher than those explaining 
VRR variations. 
4.5. Concluding remarks  
 
 
In this chapter addresses the research questions that are related to either firm-level analysis, 
based on regulatory and managers‟ incentive theories of  both mandatory and voluntary 
risk reporting, respectively, or country-level analysis, based on culture theory. The former 
                                                 
 
15 Econometrically having dummy variables and if  the empirical model includes intercept, for the legal 
system; this requires excluding the other category of  legal system (common law countries). For culture 
variables, which have more than two categories, so high scores in each dimension will be excluded and the 
model will report the low score of  each dimension (see, for instance, Heck et al., 2010; Gujarati, 2004). 
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level is concerned with how, and the extent to which, a firm‟s risk levels can influence 
whether it provides more or less risk information in its annual report narratives. The latter 
level is concerned with how a country‟s legal system and its cultural values act as substitutes 
and/or complements to express how, and the extent to which, either mandatory and/or 
voluntary risk reporting vary across countries. 
 
In firm-level analysis, hypotheses are proposed based on market- and accounting-risk 
measures. At this level, four other effects are accounted for because they might affect the 
main associations. In particular, the analysis further considers a firm‟s size, profitability, 
growth and dividends. In country-level analysis, the current study investigates whether 
country characteristics act as substitutes or complements in explaining variations in MRR 
and VRR. Furthermore, the analysis highlights the extent to which legal systems and 
cultural values have different explanatory powers in interpreting variations in mandatory 
and voluntary risk reporting across the USA, the UK and Germany. To examine these 
hypotheses, the methodology is described in the following chapter and then empirical 
results are produced in three following chapters.   
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Chapter Five: Research methodology 
 
5.1. Overview 
 
This chapter discusses the research methodology. Specifically, the chapter describes how 
the data is collected and the main criteria used to generate the main sample. The study 
utilises automated content analysis to measure mandatory and voluntary risk reporting 
(MRR and VRR). Accordingly, this chapter explains the three main steps taken to generate 
risk disclosure scores: constructing a risk word list, interacting disclosure scores by 
designed programme, and explaining the main risk reporting scores. These scores are then 
validated manually and statistically. To associate these scores (dependent variable) with a 
firm‟s characteristics and a country‟s characteristics (independent variables), all these 
variables are first defined and all these variables sources are then identified.  
 
The reminder of  this chapter consists of  five sections. The philosophy of  research of  
research and the current study's methodology are discussed in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 
provides a description of  the data collection and sample selection. Section 5.4 summarises 
the main approaches to measure mandatory and voluntary risk reporting. Section 5.5 
introduces the automated content analysis to capture both mandatory and voluntary risk 
reporting. Defining the dependent and independent variables at either firm or country level 
and the measurement of  these variables is discussed in Section 5.6. Section 5.7 offers 
concluding remarks.    
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5.2. The current study’s methodology: Alternatives and justifications 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Summary of  research paradigms, strategies, approaches and designs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This section states the current study's research paradigm and philosophy (as presented in 
Figure 5.1). The research paradigm can be referred to as a set of  general philosophical 
assumptions that concern the nature of  the world (ontology) and how we can understand 
it (epistemology). The research paradigm compromises both ontology and epistemology to 
identify how the researcher sees his subject and how he intends to investigate it (e.g., 
Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Remenyi, Williams, Money and Swartz, 1998; Maxwell, 2005). 
 
The ontological considerations concern the nature of  existence by considering whether, 
for instance, social entities can be regarded as objective entities that have a reality external 
to social actors, or could be built up from the perceptions of  those social actors (e.g., Collis 
and Hussey, 2003; Bryman, 2004). The former consideration is known as objectivism or 
realism, and the latter consideration is known as constructivism or idealism. 
•Deductive 
•Inductive 
 
•Cross-sectional 
•Longitudinal 
•Comparative 
study 
•Quantitative  
•Qualitative 
•Objectivism 
•Constructivism 
•Positivism 
•Interpretivism 
Research 
paradigms and 
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Research 
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Research 
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Research 
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Epistemology can be seen as a branch of  philosophy that investigates the nature of  
knowledge and how it is created. Therefore, it concerns the question of  how we know 
what we know (Crotty, 1998). The research epistemology, therefore, could be classified 
based on our beliefs, and goes from positivism, at one extreme, to interpretivism on the 
other. Positivistic researchers are interested in testing hypotheses that are formulated based 
on certain theories (deductive research), or based on relationships discovered through the 
analysis of  data; they could develop new hypotheses (inductive research). Such theories 
tend to be aggregated rather than specific to the cases. Interpretivism denotes an 
alternative to positivist epistemology. It is predicated upon the view that a strategy is 
required that respects the difference between people and the objects of  the natural 
sciences and therefore requires a social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of  social 
action (Bryman, 2004). 
 
The research strategy identifies the research orientation. To this end, two main distinctive 
approaches are widely utilised in social research. The first is quantitative, emphasising 
quantification in the collection and analysis of  data. The second is qualitative, emphasising 
words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of  data.   
 
The research approach shapes the way these strategies are used. Based on the link between 
the relationships under investigation and the theory, two main approaches can be adopted. 
The first is the deductive approach, where the researcher is normally interested in 
developing a hypothesis (or hypotheses), empirically testing it (these) and then accepting or 
rejecting this (these) hypothesis (es). In the inductive approach, in contrast, the theory is 
the outcome of  analysing observations. Researchers using the former approach begin with 
what is known about a particular domain, based on theoretical considerations in relation to 
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that domain, and then end with being consistent or inconsistent with that theory. The latter 
approach begins with collecting observations and interpreting these observations in a 
specific context and ends with formulating a theory (Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis, 2009). 
The research design is a framework by which the data collection and the data analysis can 
be explained (Bryman, 2004). 
 
 
The current study 
 
Quantitative research, on the one hand, entails a deductive approach to the relation 
between theory and research, incorporates the practices and norms of  the natural scientific 
model (positivism) and views social reality as an external (objectivism). Qualitative 
research, on the other hand, is inductive in its approach to formulating a theory, rejects the 
practices and norms of  the natural scientific model (interpretivism) and views social reality 
as emerging from individuals. 
 
The current study aims at investigating the main incentives for risk reporting across the 
USA, the UK and Germany over a period of  five years (for the period of  30 June 2005 to 
30 June 2010). To achieve this aim and further answer the research question, the current 
study uses a mixed-method approach to capture mandatory and/or voluntary risk 
reporting, which is based on analysing annual reports narratives during this period. This 
approach could be seen as a direct implication of  qualitative research, as discussed earlier 
in this section. Furthermore, based on relevant theory and prior research, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, identifying some incentives that could interpret the reasoning behind 
providing risk information in each country or across these countries over time, could be 
seen as a direct implication of  quantitative research. More details are given in the following 
section to highlight the data collection and sample selection, and how the current study 
captures both dependent and independent variables.     
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5.3. Data collection and sample selection 
 
Thomson One Banker is used to obtain a list of  NASDAQ, FTSE, Frankfurt (CDAX) all 
share firms. Financial firms are excluded, as in prior research (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; 
Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007), because of  their distinctive regulations 
and accounting practices. These criteria yield a list of  1680, 339 and 716 US, UK and 
German firms, respectively. The 1680 US firms are then re-sampled randomly to be 
consistent with the UK sample, whereas choosing annual reports written in English or 
German and English is the main criterion to re-sample the German list. Three main 
reasons could justify such re-sampling for German firms. First, the researcher does not 
know German and so could not read and understand many of  these annual report 
narratives, either in the stage of  identifying the initial word list or in the stage of  validating 
risk disclosure scores. Second, Campbell, Beck and Shrives (2005) study the extent to 
which translated annual reports from German to English convey the same context; they 
find empirical evidence that supports the usage of  the translated German annual reports. 
Third, more recently, Dobler et al. (2011) use translated annual reports from German to 
English in their risk disclosure study to avoid any bias of  comparing different languages. 
Accordingly, the current study obtains a list of  320, 339 and 219 US, UK and German 
firms, respectively.  
 
Annual reports for the UK and German firms are collected from either Thomson One 
Banker or the company‟s website, and the SEC annual filing of  10-K of  the US firms is 
collected from historical SEC EDGAR. All these collections are for financial years ending 
within the period 30 June 2005 to 30 June 2010. The research focuses on annual reports 
since these remain a primary source of  information for investors compared with other 
forms, like interim reports. There is increasing usage of  these reports, indicating their value 
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relevance to investors (e.g., Beattie, McInnes and Fearnley, 2004; Beattie, McInnes and 
Pierpoint, 2008). This time period is chosen since IFRSs became mandatory for UK and 
German listed companies in 2005.   
 
All annual reports are converted to text files so as to be readable by Nudist 6. Therefore, 
those annual reports which could not be converted to text files are excluded (15 US firms, 
16 UK firms and 15 German firms). Furthermore, any firm without a complete time series 
of  both annual reports and market data is omitted (US (51), UK (41), and Germany (4)). 
Consequently, the total size of  the sample is 1270, 1410 and 1005 firm-years for the USA, 
the UK and Germany, respectively.16 
 
 
5.4. Measuring MRR and VRR using automated content analysis 
 
Much research has used content analysis to measure firm disclosure levels (e.g., Botosan, 
1997; Core, 2001; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Beattie et al., 2004, 2008; Kothari et al., 
2009; Gruning, 2011). Some research uses content analysis to measure specific types of  
disclosure; namely, forward-looking information (e.g., Hussainey et al., 2003; Muslu et al., 
2010; Li, 2010) and risk disclosure (e.g., Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 
2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007).  
 
Two principal methods of  content analysis have been employed by previous research: (1) 
the manual method (Beattie et al., 2008; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 
2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007); and (2) the automated method (Hussainey et al., 2003; 
Kothari et al., 2009; Muslu et al., 2010; Gruning, 2011). Either method may employ the 
                                                 
 
16 These are the main criteria and the main sample of  the current study. Some of  the following chapters, 
however, use different numbers based on some other circumstances, which will be explained in their context.  
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word, sentence or line as the unit of  analysis. Hussainey et al. (2003), Beattie et al. (2004, 
2008) and Muslu et al. (2010) use the sentence as the unit of  analysis; Kothari et al. (2009), 
Li (2010) and Gruning (2011) use a combination of  word, sentence and line.  
5.5. The automated content analysis steps  
 
The researcher constructs three successive steps, shown in Figure 5.1, to measure both 
MRR and VRR of  firms in the USA, the UK and Germany. Firstly, in order to determine 
the final risk word list, the researcher identifies a comprehensive list of  risk-related 
keywords. To construct such a list, the current study is essentially based on three main 
sources. First, prior academic and professional research on risk concepts (e.g., Bernstein, 
1996; Luhmann, 1996; Ricciardi, 2004; AICPA & CICA, 2000) are used.  To expand these 
words, secondly, Roget‟s Thesaurus is used to source all relevant synonyms for words the 
current study gets from the first source(s). Lastly, 15 annual report narratives from each 
country are randomly selected and read to identify words indicating risk. To examine the 
extent to which words featuring in the initial list, as shown in Table 5.1, are in use, an 
intensive text search is conducted using Nudist 6 for another 15 randomly selected annual 
report narratives from each country. All words that do not appear in this text search are 
excluded. The study thus identifies the final risk word list, as shown in Table 5.2, which is 
further examined for reliability and validity as explained in the following section. From this 
world list, Table 5.3 is derived; hence, positive and negative risk disclosures are derived. As 
well, mandatory risk disclosure is derived based on mandated topics or mandated themes 
discussed in Section 3.4. 
 
The annual report narratives from each country are then prepared for text-searching to 
capture the risk reporting level in each country. 
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For USA and Germany, the researcher eliminates all the sections indicative of  mandated 
risk reporting (as shown in Section 3.4) according to the SEC‟s requirements in the USA 
(item 1.a for Risk Factor; 7.a for Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosure about Market 
Risk), and GAS 5 in Germany (the section of  Risk and Opportunity or Outlook). While 
these sections indicate mandatory risk reporting (MRR) according to these requirements 
(MRR_I), there are some possibilities for US and German firms to disclose information 
about some aspects related to MRR in other annual report narrative sections. In these 
other sections, firms mainly provide their voluntary risk disclosure (VRR), but firms could 
still voluntarily disclose information about risks, which is related to mandated topics or 
themes, (MRR_V). The total mandatory risk disclosure scores in USA and in Germany is 
obtained as the total number of  sentences, which indicate risk in the mandated sections 
(MRR_I) and in the other narrative sections of  annual report (MRR_V).  
 
In the case of  the UK firms‟ annual report narratives, however, the full annual report is 
used to obtain MRR and VRR since there are no mandated requirements similar to those 
in the USA or Germany.  
 
The current study therefore uses the special command instructions of  the Nudist software 
and designs an automated programme to search for the words on the risk word list 
previously generated. The current study counts all statements containing at least one 
relevant risk word in mandated sections (for the US and German annual report narratives) 
and voluntary sections (for the US, German and UK annual report narratives). Statements 
of  risk in voluntary sections are used as a proxy for firms‟ aggregated risk reporting levels.  
 
By assessing the regulations in these three countries, as detailed in Section 3.4., the 
researcher is able to identify the mandated risk reporting topics. To differentiate between 
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voluntary and mandatory statements in the entire annual reports of  the UK firms, or from 
the other narrative sections of  annual reports of  the US and German firms, the researcher 
separates those statements, which contain at least one mandated risk theme or topic from 
aggregated risk statements. The researcher, therefore, obtains total mandatory risk scores 
for UK firms, or MRR_V, for the US and German firms. The researcher then excludes 
these scores from the aggregated risk scores to determine voluntary risk reporting for the 
UK, US and German firms; examples of  risk statements that captured by Nudist  6 , are 
provided in Appendix 1. The total mandatory risk disclosures for the USA and Germany 
are obtained by considering all risk statements in mandated sections (MRR_I) in addition 
to all mandated statements outside these sections (MRR_V). Finally, all scores are tested 
manually and statistically to ensure their reliability and validity. Tests for reliability and 
validity are discussed in the following sub-section. 
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Figure 5.2: Automated content analysis steps 
This figure describes the three main steps to generate MRR and VRR scores.   
 
1. Identifying the risk 
word list 
Identifying the final risk 
word list as shown in 
Table 5.2 
Identifying the initial risk 
word list as shown in 
Table 5.1 based on three 
main sources 
2. Designing the 
command file 
3. The Nudist output 
The 
interaction 
between 
aggregated 
risk 
disclosures 
and risk 
sentence 
characteristics, 
as shown in 
Table 5.3 
Searching outside 
mandated sections 
(USA and 
Germany) or entire 
annual reports in 
the UK 
Bad Risk 
Disclosure 
Mandatory Risk 
Disclosure 
All the sentences containing at 
least one word indicating risk 
and one word indicating  good, 
bad and mandatory risk 
disclosure  
The accounting 
literature  
Synonyms for the 
previous keywords 
The narrative sections 
of  the annual reports 
Eliminate words, which 
have not appeared in this 
search 
Good Risk 
Disclosure 
 
Searching inside 
mandated 
sections in the 
US and German 
annual reports 
narratives. 
15 annual reports from 
each country are text-
searched using Nudist 6. 
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Table 5.1: The risk word list 
Negative effects Positive effects 
 
Statistical concepts  
1. Against 
2. Adverse effect 
3. Adversely 
affect 
4. Bad effect 
5. Catastrophic 
6. Challenges 
7. Confusion 
8. Dare 
9. Damage 
10. Danger 
11. Decline 
12. Decrease 
13. Diminish 
14. Do not realise 
(realize) 
15. Downside 
16. Exposure 
17. Fail 
18. Harm 
19. Hazard 
20. Hinder 
21. Inhibit 
22. Insufficient   
23. Less 
24. Loss(es) 
25. Lower  
26. Offset, partially 
offset 
27. Overestimate, 
overestimated  
28. Potential 
disadvantage(s) 
29. Potential losses 
30. Risk* 
31. Reduce 
32. Shortage 
33. Threat 
34. Unable 
35. Uncertain 
36. Undiversified 
37. Unfavourably 
38. Unsatisfactory 
39. Verse 
40. Viable 
41. Went down 
 
 
42. Chance 
43. Changes 
44. Differ 
45. Differences 
46. Diversify 
(diversified, 
diversification, 
diversifications) 
47. Fluctuation  
48. Growth 
49. Grew over 
50. Highest  
51. Increase  
52. Opportunity 
53. Over 
54. Peak(ed) 
55. Potential 
advantage 
56. Potential gains 
57. Sufficient 
58. Upside 
59. Variability 
60. Vary  
61. Went up 
 
 
 
 
62. Likelihood 
63. Likely  
 
64. Probability 
(probabilities) 
65. Possible  
66. Possibilities 
67. Potential 
consequence(s) 
68. Random 
outcome 
69. Significant 
impact 
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* means any other derivatives from the original word  
 
Table 5.2: The final list of  risk words 
This table summarises the final word list in three categories (negative, positive effects and statistical 
concepts). * means any other derivatives of  the original word.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Negative effects  Positive effects  Statistical concepts 
1. Against 
2. Catastrophe (catastrophic)  
3. Challenge (challenges) 
4. Decline (declined, decrease 
(decreased) 
5. Fail (failure) 
6. Less 
7. Loss (losses) 
8. Low* 
9. Risk (risky, riskiness) 
10. Shortage 
11. Threat 
12. Unable 
13. Uncertain (uncertainty, 
uncertainties) 
14. Verse (versed, reverse, reversed) 
 
 
15. Chance (chances) 
16. Differ (differed, 
difference, differences 
17.  Diversify* 
18. Fluctuate (fluctuated, 
fluctuation, 
fluctuations)  
19. Gain (gains)  
20. Increase (increased) 
21. Peak (peaked) 
 
22. Probable * 
23. Significant 
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Table 5.3: The final list of  risk sentence characteristics 
The first and second columns (good and bad risk disclosures, respectively) are derived from the previous list 
of  risk words (Table 5.2). The third column is derived from accounting standards‟ topics related to risk 
(analysed and discussed in more detail in Chapter Three).  
 
Good risk disclosure Bad risk disclosure Mandatory risk reporting 
1. Chance 
(chances) 
2. Differ (differed, 
difference, 
differences 
3.  Diversify* 
4. Fluctuate 
(fluctuated, 
fluctuation, 
fluctuations)  
5. Gain (gains)  
6. Increase 
(increased) 
7. Peak (peaked) 
 
1. Against 
2. Catastrophe 
(catastrophic)  
3. Challenge 
(challenges) 
4. Decline (declined, 
decrease 
(decreased) 
5. Fail (failure) 
6. Less 
7. Loss (losses) 
8. Low* 
9. Risk (risky, 
riskiness) 
10. Shortage 
11. Threat 
12. Unable 
13. Uncertain 
(uncertainty, 
uncertainties) 
14. Verse (versed, 
reverse, reversed) 
 
USA 1-Contingence (FAS 5) 
2-Derivatives (FRR 48;  FAS 
133) 
3-Fair value (FAS 157) 
4-Investment (FAS 115) 
5- Segment reports (FAS 
14) 
UK 1-Contingence (FRS 12) 
2-Derivatives (FRS 4) 
3-Foreign exchange (FRS23) 
4-Investment (FRS 5) 
5- Related party disclosure 
(FRS 8) 
6- Segment reports  
(SSAP 25) 
Germany GAS 5, 2000 for risk 
reporting 
 
Common topics 
1-Contingency 
2-Derivative;  financial instrument; 
financial instruments  
3-Fair value; fair values  
4- Foreign currency 
5- Investment; investments 
6-Segment; segments  
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5.6. The reliability and validity of  risk disclosure scores 
The reliability and validity of  the risk disclosure scores are checked in two stages. First, the 
extent to which the final word list captures statements with a risk focus in firms‟ annual 
report narratives is examined. To this end, 30 randomly selected statements from the 
Nudist output for 15 firms in each country are read. The researcher finds that the final risk 
keywords list is very successful (80% on average) in identifying statements indicative of  
risk. 
 
 Second, after calculating final risk disclosure scores, two post hoc procedures are carried 
out. Firstly, the first stage statements are manually reviewed, considering the word list‟s 
ability to discriminate between voluntary and mandatory risk reporting. To this end, the 
current study finds the keywords able to differentiate reasonably between these disclosures 
by around 77% (on average). This percentage is calculated based on reviewing those 30 
statements in those three countries in 2007, all examples of  risk statements, shown in 
appendix 1, reflect the mandatory risk disclosure. These examples are reviewed with 
supervisors17. Secondly, Cronbach‟s Alpha is used as a statistical test to examine the 
reliability of  the aggregated, voluntary and mandatory risk disclosure scores. This test 
measures how well a data set captures a particular underlying construct. For the computed 
risk disclosure scores, Cronbach‟s Alpha is 82%, as an average score in these three 
countries, indicating that inter-consistency between the aggregated, voluntary and 
mandatory risk reporting scores is high when compared with the generally acceptable 
                                                 
 
17 A related point that raised by one of  the examiners, the extent to which the mandated sections are checked 
for any voluntary disclosure.  The current study treats all risk information in the mandated sections as 
mandatory risk disclosure. Any risk information revealed outside these sections could either be related to 
some mandated topics that were identified in light of  the risk regulations within each country, as shown in 
Section 3.4, or could be treated as voluntary risk disclosure. The researcher manually checked item 1.a for 
Risk Factor and 7.a for Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosure about Market Risk. The raised point could be 
applicable with the latter item, but it could be difficult to apply to the former item. To explain more, it could 
be argued that the extent to which American firms could disclose information about risk in item 7.a, but this 
information does not relate to financial instruments. The result shows strong support for considering risk 
disclosure inside these sections as mandatory disclosure. 
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societal science measure of  70% (see Bryman, 2004; Deumes and Knechel, 2008). The 
current study concludes that the computed disclosure scores are reliable18. 
 
5.7. Study Variables 
5.7.1. Dependent variables 
Mandatory and voluntary risk reporting (MRR and VRR) are measured by counting the 
number of  statements, which include at least one word from the risk word list using the 
automated content analysis. 
5.7.2. Independent variables 
 Firm-level variables 
 
The current study employs various risk measures. In terms of  market-risk measures, 
volatility of  market returns (Datastream item 009E) is used as a measure for total risk, and 
beta (Datastream item 897E) and standard error of  CAPM (Datastream item 519E) as 
measures for systematic and unsystematic risk, respectively. The Sharp ratio (Datastream item 
457E) is employed to reflect the risk-adjusted return of  the firm. In terms of  accounting-
risk measures, the current study uses ratio analysis for further insights into unsystematic 
risk. Leverage (Worldscope item WC08231) and current ratio (Worldscope item WC8106) are 
used to measure financing and liquidity risks, respectively. In total, therefore, six risk 
measures are used to capture firm risk levels.  
 
Based on the prior literature, the current study also controls for firm size, measured by 
natural logarithm of  total assets (Worldscope item WC02999), firm profitability, measured by 
the Return on Equity (ROE) (Worldscope item WC08301), firm growth, measured by the 
                                                 
 
18  To validate the automated method against the manual method, at earlier stage before proceeding with the 
pilot study and using the automated method to capture risk disclosure, the researcher reviewed seven 10-K 
forms within the USA. The Coding was reviewed by Dr Hussainey.  
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growth in earnings (Datastream item E018) and dividend payments, measured by the 
dividends per share (Datastream item 512E) (if  not available, the current study uses 
dividends payout ratio (Worldscope item WC09502).   
 
Several proxies for corporate governance (CG) are manually collected19 and empirically 
included to control for any potential effects of  CG. Specifically, board size (BZ), 
proportion of  non-executive directors (PNED), proportion of  independent non-executive 
directors (PINED) and chief  executive officer (CEO) duality. 
Country-level variables 
 
A dummy variable as a proxy for a country‟s legal system is used, with a value of  1 or 0 if  
the country uses common law or code law, respectively. Hofstede‟s values for cultural 
values, specifically, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity and 
long-term orientation are also used (as discussed in Section 2.5). All of  these variables are 
obtained from Hofstede‟s official website (see http://www.geert-hofstede.com) 
 
All these variables and these two levels of  analyses are summarised in Figure 5.2, and the 
measurements and sources of  these variables are provided in Table 5.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
19 Availability of  CG data is essential to consider. The BoardEx database is the only authorised available 
source to collect CG data at the University of  Stirling; it provides CG data only for UK firms. It is worth 
mentioning that the analysis in Section 7.3.3 showed that including or excluding CG variables does have a 
serious impact on the main conclusions that are drawn in both cases.  
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Figure 5.3: Summary of  dependent and independent variables and levels of  analysis 
 
 
This figure provides both firm- and country-level variables, divided into dependent variables (risk disclosure 
levels) and independent variables, either at firm-level analysis, which includes firm risk levels (market- and 
accounting-risk measures and other firm characteristics as control variables), or at country-level analysis, 
which includes both a country‟s legal systems and its cultural values. 
Liquidity risk 
(LR) 
Control variables 
Firm-level analysis 
 Bad risk disclosure 
(BRD) 
County-level analysis 
(USA, UK, Germany) 
 Leverage 
 Risk adjusted 
return 
(RAR) 
 
 Volatility of  
standard error  
 
Unsystematic risk 
(USR) 
Market beta 
 
Systematic risk 
(SR) 
Volatility 
 
 Total risk  
(TR) 
Independent variables 
 Financial risk  
(FR) 
Sharp ratio 
Current ratio 
 
Dependent variables  
Good risk disclosure 
(GRD) 
Mandatory risk 
reporting 
(MRR) 
Voluntary risk 
reporting 
(VRR) 
Aggregated risk 
reporting 
(ARR) 
 
Risk categories 
Accounting- 
risk measures 
Risk disclosure 
types 
Risk sentences‟ 
characteristics  
Market-risk 
measures  
Risk categories 
 
Firm‟s size 
 (SE) 
 
 
 
Firm‟s growth  
(GE) 
 
 
Firm‟s 
profitability (PE) 
 
 
 
Firm‟s dividends 
(DE)  
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate 
Governance 
 (CG) 
 
Cultural values                              
Legal systems  
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Table 5.4: Summary of  variable definitions and measures 
Variable Definition  Measures 
 
ARR 
 
 
 
 
 
MRR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VRR 
 
Risk information provided by firms as a response 
to either a specific regulation or managerial 
incentives. Calculated by counting the number of  
statements that indicate risk based on the final 
list of  risk words. 
 
Risk information provided by firms as a response 
to a specific regulation. Calculated by counting 
the number of  statements that indicate risk based 
on the final risk word list and that contain at least 
one topic related to mandated topics or themes 
in the final list of  risk sentence characteristics. 
 
Risk information provided voluntarily by firms as 
a response to managerial incentives. Calculated as 
a residual of  ARR after excluding MRR. 
 
Nudist (6) 
 
 
 
 
 
Nudist (6) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nudist (6) 
 
TR 
 
Total risk is the volatility of  market returns, 
which is in turn measured by the standard 
deviation.  
 
Datastream item 009E 
 
SR 
 
Systematic risk is the volatility of  a firm‟s market 
return relative to a market index. The calculations 
are based on between 23 and 35 consecutive 
month-end prices of  US, UK and German firms 
relative to market returns of  S&P 500, FT All 
Share and FazAktien, respectively.  
 
Datastream item 897E 
 
USR 
 
Unsystematic risk is the volatility of  a firm-
specific risk, which is the standard deviation of  
the standard error of  the CAPM. 
 
Datastream item 519E 
 
FR 
 
Financing risk is the extent to which firms have 
problems related to debt, measured by leverage 
proxied as the ratio of  total debt to total equity. 
 
Worldscope item WC08231 
 
LR 
 
Liquidity risk is the extent to which firms have 
problems related to payments, measured by 
current ratio, proxied by dividing total assets to 
total liabilities. 
 
Worldscope item WC8106 
 
SE 
 
A firm‟s size, measured by the natural logarithm 
of  total assets in local currency or US dollars. 
 
Worldscope item WC 02999 
and then converted into US 
dollars  
 
PE 
 
A firm‟s profitability, measured by dividing net 
income before proffered dividends by the year 
end common equity.  
 
Worldscope item WC 08301 
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GE 
 
A firm‟s growth, measured by growth in earnings, 
or by obtaining the ratio of  net sales growth as 
(NS1-NS0/NS0). 
 
 
Datastream item E018 or 
Worldscope item WC 01001 
 
DE 
 
A firm‟s dividends, measured by the ratio of  
dividend per share or dividend payout.  
 
Worldscope item WC09502 
 
BZ 
 
The board size, measured by the natural 
logarithm of  total number of  board directors. 
 
BoardEx database 
 
PNED 
 
Expresses the proportion of  non-executive 
directors relative to board size. 
 
 
BoardEx database 
 
PINED 
 
Expresses the proportion of  independent non-
executive directors relative to board size. 
 
 
BoardEx database 
 
CEO 
duality  
 
Chief  executive officer duality is produced as a 
dummy variable with a value of  1 if  the chief  
executive officer is also chairman of  the board 
of  directors, and a value of  0 otherwise. 
 
BoardEx database 
 
LS 
 
A country‟s legal system, which is identified as a 
code or common law. 
 
 
Dummy variable 1 and 0 for 
common law (CML) and 
code law (CL) countries, 
respectively. 
Culture                 dimensions  
 
 
Hofstede‟s website  
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
 
 
PD 
 
Power distance, as defined by Hofstede (1980) 
 
40 
 
35 
 
35 
 
UA 
 
Uncertainty avoidance, as defined by Hofstede 
(1980) 
 
46 
 
35 
 
65 
 
IND 
 
Individualism, as defined by Hofstede (1980) 
 
91 
 
89 
 
67 
 
MAS 
 
Masculinity, as defined by Hofstede (1980) 
 
62 
 
66 
 
66 
 
LTO 
 
Long–term orientation, as defined by Hofstede 
(1991) 
 
29 
 
25 
 
31 
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5.8. Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter, the current study introduces its methods, which include how the researcher 
collects the data and expresses the main criteria for the sample. The proposed automated 
method is introduced to capture the firms‟ mandatory and voluntary risk reporting by 
counting the number of  statements indicating risk in their annual report narratives. A 
description of  measuring other variables is provided. 
 
The potential main associations between these variables will be examined empirically 
through three different approaches. While the first (ordinary least squares, or OLS) and the 
second (fixed effect model, or FEM) have been frequently used by prior research (e.g., 
Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004), the third, multilevel analysis (MLA) is rarely used by prior 
accounting research. These approaches will be introduced and discussed in their relevant 
contexts in the following chapters (Chapter Seven: linear mixed model; Chapters Eight and 
Nine: repeated measures multilevel analysis).  
 
In the following chapter, the pilot study is introduced in order to address the extent to 
which there are significant differences in either a firm‟s risk levels or a firm‟s risk reporting 
levels. Then, firms‟ risk levels are correlated with their risk reporting levels.  
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Chapter Six: Differences in firms’ risk levels and risk reporting levels across the 
USA, the UK and Germany: A Pilot study 
 
6.1. Overview  
 
 
This chapter determines whether there are significant differences in a firm‟s risk levels (as a 
first hypothesis) and in a firm‟s risk disclosure levels (as a second hypothesis) across the 
USA, the UK and Germany20; furthermore, the extent to which any such differences in a 
firm‟s risk levels and its risk disclosure are associated (as a third hypothesis). The 
hypotheses of  this chapter, therefore, are concerned with either the significance of  
possible differences in or between a firm‟s risk levels and a firm‟s risk disclosure levels 
across these countries. Accepting these hypotheses supports what has been argued in 
Chapters Three and Four, and moves the current study‟s main interest forward, 
investigating such arguments on a larger scale (as will be discussed in the following three 
chapters) than the one used in this chapter (15 firms from each country). 
 
The results reveal significant differences in firm risk levels and disclosure levels across the 
USA, the UK and Germany. The results indicate that these differences are statistically 
correlated, supporting the main argument of  the current study, that differences in a firm‟s 
risk levels within (nationally) and/or across (internationally) these countries should be 
reflected in their risk reporting practices. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 6 .2 discusses the pilot study‟s methods. 
Section 6 .3 reveals the empirical results. Concluding remarks are expressed in Section 6 .4. 
                                                 
 
20  The main reasons for choosing these countries have been previously provided; see, for instance, Section 
1.2.  
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6.2. The method 
 
6.2.1. The sample and data 
15 firms were randomly chosen in each country from 2007 and 2008; each year in turn is 
divided into four quarters. The data from annual reports were collected from Thomson 
One Banker, and then transformed into text files to be readable by Nudist 6 software.  
 The market data of  these 15 firms in each country were collected from Datastream.  
6.2.2. Variables: Measurement  
Firms‟ risk level variables (total, systematic, unsystematic, risk-adjusted return, financing 
and liquidity risks) and risk disclosure level variables (ARD, MRD) are defined and 
measured in Table 5.4. 
6.2.3. Statistical analysis 
To examine whether there are significant differences in firms‟ risk levels and risk disclosure 
levels between these three countries during 2007 and 2008, one-way multivariate analysis 
of  variance (MANOVA) is used; hence, the pilot study has three independent samples 
(USA, UK and Germany) in these two years. Two main underlying assumptions should be 
checked before using MANOVA. While the first concerns the extent to which the variable 
values are normally distributed, which is known as the assumption of  normality, the 
second concerns the extent to which the variance of  the variable values are homogenous, 
which is known as the assumption of  homogeneity. The null hypothesis for the former 
assumption, normality, is that a variable‟s values are normally distributed. This hypothesis 
might be statistically examined by using either Kolmogorov-Smirnov or Shapiro-Wilks. In 
both tests, the null hypothesis should be accepted if  the p-values are above one of  the 
three common acceptable significance levels of  10%, 5% or 1%. Based on these two tests, 
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the results indicate (not reported) that all variables are normally distributed. The null 
hypothesis of  the latter hypothesis, homogeneity, is that each group of  the independent 
groups (the three countries, the USA, the UK and Germany) has the same variance on 
interval dependent variables (a firm‟s risk levels and risk reporting levels). This hypothesis 
might be statistically examined by using Levene‟s test, in which the null hypothesis can be 
accepted or rejected based on either deviation from the group mean, median or adjusted 
median for the degree of  freedom for each dependent variable (e.g., total, systematic and 
unsystematic risks). If  results of  Levene‟s test are significant, then that indicates the 
variances are significantly different in different groups; the null hypothesis should therefore 
be rejected. Based on this test, the results indicate that the variances of  most firms‟ risk 
level variables and risk disclosure level variables are similar in these three countries. For any 
other variables that exhibit violation of  the assumption of  homogeneity, such as 
aggregated risk reporting in 2007 and 2008, which will be discussed in Section 6 .3.2, there 
are some other techniques (such as Tamhane test) that can be utilised to overcome such 
violation (for more details see Field, 2009). 
 
Explicitly, the MANOVA results might either suggest significant or non-significant 
differences in either a firm‟s risk levels (such as  total and systematic risks) or a firm‟s risk 
disclosure (such aggregated and mandatory risk reporting) between firms in these three 
countries. If  the results suggest significant differences in these variables among these three 
countries (together), it is essential to investigate specifically in which pair of  countries 
(USA and UK; USA and Germany; UK and Germany) these differences exist. Two other 
statistical tests can therefore be utilised, subject to the extent to which there is a violation 
of  the assumption of  homogeneity. The first is the Bonferroni test, which supposes that 
the variance of  variables under analysis in each group is equal. The Tamhane test, however, 
gives the same result if  the variance is not equal.  
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To examine whether there are any associations between a firm‟s risk levels and a firm‟s risk 
disclosures (as a third hypothesis for this chapter), correlation analysis is used (Pearson 
correlation coefficient); hence, all variables are measurable and continuous. If  the results 
suggest that there are significant associations between a firm‟s risk levels and its risk 
reporting levels across these three countries, it might help in identifying the extent to which 
firms in these three countries are motivated to provide significantly more or less risk 
information in their annual report narratives as a response to their underlying risks.  
 
6.3. Empirical results 
6.3.1. Differences in firms’ risk levels across the USA, the UK and Germany  
2007 
Panel A of  Table 6.1 indicates that there are significant differences between a firm‟s risk 
levels across the USA, the UK and Germany during the four quarters of  2007 for 
financing risk (FR), at a p-value of  0.000 for each quarter, and for liquidity risk (LR), at p-
values of  0.056, 0.044, 0.062 and 0.046 for each quarter, respectively. As well, there are 
significant differences in total risk (TR) and risk-adjusted return (RAR) between American, 
British and German firms during the first two quarters of  2007, at p-values of  0.037, 0.015 
and 0.084, respectively. All these variables exhibit similar variances across these three 
countries, confirming the assumption of  homogeneity and suggesting the use of  the 
Bonferroni test in order to identify in which pair of  countries these significant differences 
exist (e.g., USA with UK; USA with Germany) .  
 
Nevertheless, there are no significant differences between the other risks of  firms across 
the USA, the UK and Germany. In particular, there are no significant differences in the 
systematic (SR) and unsystematic risks (USR) of  firms across the USA, the UK and 
Germany. 
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Table 6.1: Results of  differences in firm risk levels in 2007 
Panel A: One-way MANOVA analysis 2007 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: The Bonferroni test (multiple comparisons) 
 
 
Dependent variable 
 
Q1/2007 Q2/2007 Q3/2007 Q4/2007 
Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. 
Total risk (TR) 0.051* 0.074* 0.619 0.795 
Systematic risk (SR) 0.588 0.302 0.444 0.454 
Unsystematic risk(USR)  0.249 0.249 0.249 0.249 
Risk-adjusted return (RAR) 0.037** 0.015** 0.102 0.172 
Financing risk (FR) 0.000*** 0.000**** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
Liquidity risk (LR) 0.056* 0.044** 0.062* 0.046** 
Dependent 
variable 
Statistical  I G2 J G2 Q1/2007 
 
Q2/2007 Q3/2007 Q4/2007 
Mean 
difference (I-
J) 
 
Mean 
difference (I-
J) 
 
Mean 
difference 
(I-J) 
 
Mean 
difference (I-
J) 
 
RAR Bonferroni USA UK 
 
0.079 
(0.988) 
-0.125 
(1.000) 
  
Germany 
 
-0.687 
(0.110) 
0.847** 
(0.039) 
  
UK 
 
 
USA -0.079 
(0.988) 
-0.125 
(1.000) 
  
Germany -0.767*** 
(0.008) 
-0.972** 
(0.018) 
  
Germany 
 
 
USA 0.687 
(0.110) 
0.847** 
(0.039) 
  
UK 0.767*** 
(0.008 
0.972** 
(0.018) 
  
FR Bonferroni USA 
 
UK -2.354*** 
(0.010) 
1.012*** 
(0.002) 
-2.399*** 
(0.003) 
-2.521*** 
(0.005) 
Germany -3.302*** 
(0.000) 
0.568*** 
(0.000) 
-3.268*** 
(0.000) 
-3.185*** 
(0.001) 
UK USA 2.354*** 
(0.010) 
-1.012*** 
(0.002) 
2.399*** 
(0.003) 
2.521*** 
(0.005) 
Germany 
-0.948 
(0.326) 
-0.444 
(0.0409) 
-0.869 
 
(0.424) 
-0.664 
 
(0.937) 
  Germany USA 3.302 
(0.000) 
-0.567*** 
(0.000) 
3.268*** 
(0.000) 
3.185*** 
(0.001) 
Germany 0.948 
(0.326) 
0.444 
(0.409) 
0.869 
(0.424) 
0.664 
(0.937) 
LR Bonferroni USA UK  1.012**  1.040** 
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This table explains differences in firms‟ risk levels (RAR, FR, LR) across the USA, the UK and Germany in 
2007‟s four quarters. *, **, *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively, All variables‟ definitions 
are shown in Table 5.4. Panel A reports any significant differences in firms‟ risk levels in 2007 across these 
three countries. Significant differences from Panel A are further analysed to identify specifically between 
which two pairs (I and J) of  countries (e.g., USA with UK; USA with Germany) the mean difference remains 
significant. 
 
To determine in which two pairs of  countries these differences exist, the Bonferroni test, 
shown in Panel B of  Table 6.1, indicates that the main differences of  FR are in US firms 
and either UK or German firms, at p-values around 0.000. Furthermore, this test reveals 
significant differences in financing risk between UK firms and US firms rather than 
German firms, which seem to have similar levels of  financing risk to UK firms.  
 
In the second and fourth quarters of  2007, the US firms significantly differed in LR from 
the UK firms rather than the German firms. For the same two quarters, there were no 
significant differences in LR between German firms and UK or US firms. 
 
The Bonferroni test indicates that there are significant differences in the risk-adjusted 
return (RAR) between German firms and both UK and US firms in the first two quarters 
of  2007, and with the US firms in the second quarter of  this year. The same statistical test 
reveals that there are no significant differences between the US firms and the UK firms in 
(RAR). For TR the results were identical with those results obtained from RAR, so the 
results of  RAR were chosen to be presented in Panel B of  Table 6.2. 
 
 
 (0.043) (0.045) 
Germany  0.56800 
(0.405) 
 0.556 
(0.464) 
UK 
 
USA  -1.012** 
(0.043) 
 -1.040** 
(0.045) 
Germany  -0.444 
(0.702) 
 -0.484 
(0.633) 
Germany 
 
USA  -0.568 
(0.405) 
 -0.556 
(0.464) 
UK  0.4440 
(0.702) 
 0.4840 
(0.633) 
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2008 
Panel A of  Table 6.2 indicates that there are significant FR differences between firms 
across these three countries. The Bonferroni test (Panel B of  Table 6.2) reveals that there 
are significant differences in FR between the US firms and the German firms during the 
four quarters of  2008. In this context, these differences between the US firms and the UK 
firms appear in all 2008 quarters except the fourth. 
 
Table 6.2: Results of  differences in firm risk levels in 2008 
 
Panel A: One-way MANOVA analysis 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable 
 
 
Q1/2008 Q2/2008 Q3/2008 Q4/2008 
Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. 
TR 0.628 0.453 0.327 0.300 
SR 0.398 0.407 0.382 0.327 
UR 0.249 0.249 0.249 0.249 
RAR 0.192 0.285 0.331 0.192 
FR   0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** .0012*** 
LR 0.155 0.143 0.103 0.453 
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Panel B: The Bonferroni test (multiple comparisons) 
This table explains differences in firms‟ risk levels across the USA, the UK and Germany in 2008‟s four 
quarters. *, **, *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. All variables‟ definitions are shown 
in Table 5.4. Panel A reports any significant differences in a firm‟s risk levels in 2008 across these three 
countries. Any significant differences (FR) from Panel A are further analysed to identify specifically in which 
two pairs of  countries these significant differences remain. 
 
 
To sum up, statistically based on MANOVA analysis, there are significant differences 
between firms‟ risk levels across the USA, the UK and Germany during 2007 and 2008. As 
a result, the first hypothesis of  this chapter can be accepted. Additionally, these differences 
are further investigated using the Boferroni test in order to determine in which pair of  
countries the differences exist. The following section identifies whether there are 
significant differences in firm risk disclosure levels across the USA, the UK and Germany. 
If  the results support the existence of  such significant differences, then the analysis will be 
developed to further associate such differences in firms‟ risk levels with those differences 
in firms‟ risk disclosure levels across the USA, the UK and Germany. 
Dependent Variable (I)  (J)  Q1/2008 Q2/2008 
 
Q3/2008 Q4/2008 
Mean 
difference 
(I-J) 
 
Mean 
difference 
(I-J) 
 
Mean 
difference 
(I-J) 
 
Mean 
difference 
(I-J) 
 
 
 
 
FR  
Bonferroni USA UK -2.436* 
(0.079) 
-3.003** 
(0.040) 
-3.049** 
(0.035) 
-2.720 
(0.162) 
Germany -3.873*** 
(0.005) 
-3.873** 
(0.008) 
-3.920*** 
(0.007) 
-4.791** 
(0.012) 
UK USA 2.436* 
(0.079) 
3.003** 
(0.040) 
3.049** 
(0.035) 
2.727 
(0.162) 
Germany -1.4370 
(0.484) 
-0.870 
(1.000) 
-0.870 
(1.000) 
-2.064 
(0.496) 
Germany USA 3.873*** 
(0.005) 
3.873*** 
(0.008) 
3.920*** 
(0.007) 
4.791** 
(0.012) 
UK 1.437 
(0.484) 
0.870 
(1.000) 
0.870 
(1.000) 
2.064 
(0.496) 
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6.3.2. Differences in firms’ risk disclosure levels across the USA, the UK and 
Germany 
To statistically examine whether there are significant differences between the US, UK and 
German firms‟ levels of  risk disclosure during 2007 and 2008, one-way MANOVA analysis 
is used. All firms‟ risk disclosure level variables meet the homogeneity assumption, except 
the aggregated risk disclosure (ARD) in 2007; hence, the variance of  ARD across these 
three countries is not equal. The Tamhane test, therefore, is used as the most appropriate 
alternative in order to follow MANOVA (e.g., Field, 2009). Any other significant 
differences in firms‟ risk disclosure levels across the USA, the UK and Germany are 
followed by the Bonferroni test, which supposes that the variance of  risk disclosure across 
these countries is equal.   
 
Panel A of  Table 6.3 illustrates that there are significant differences in ARD, bad risk 
disclosure (BRD) and mandatory risk disclosure (MRD) in 2007 and 2008 between the US, 
UK and German firms. These significant differences are followed by either Tamhane or 
Boferroni tests to identify specifically in which two pairs of  countries the differences exist, 
as shown in Panel B of  Table 6.3. 
 
Table 6.3:  Results of  differences in risk disclosure in 2007 and 2008 
 
Panel A: One-way MANOVA analysis 
 
firm’s risk disclosure 
2007 2008 
Sig. Sig. 
Aggregated risk disclosure (ARD) 0.020** 0.006*** 
Good risk disclosure (GRD) 0.019** 0.225 
Bad risk disclosure (BRD) 0.036** 0.004*** 
Mandatory risk disclosure (MRD) 0.022** 0.043** 
  
 
 
 
 133 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Multiple comparisons  
 
Dependent Variable 
(I) G2 (J) G2 2007 2008 
Mean Difference 
 (I-J) 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) 
ARD Tamhane test USA UK -0.150* 
(0.092) 
-0.176*** 
(0.007) 
Germany -0.134 
(0.116) 
-0.134** 
(0.039) 
UK USA 0.150* 
(0.092) 
0.176*** 
(0.007) 
Germany 0.016 
(0.973) 
0.042 
(1.000) 
Germany USA 0.134 
(0.116) 
0.134** 
(0.039) 
UK -0.016 
(0.973) 
-0.042 
(1.000) 
GRD Bonferroni test USA UK -0.034 
(0.390) 
 
Germany -0.055 
(0.435) 
 
UK USA 0.034 
(0.390) 
 
Germany -0.020 
(1.000) 
 
Germany USA 0.055 
(0.435) 
 
UK 0.020 
(1.000) 
 
BRD Bonferroni test USA UK -0.104*** 
(0.004) 
-0.156*** 
(0.004) 
Germany -0.074** 
(0.027) 
-0.118** 
(0.027) 
UK USA 0.104*** 
(0.004) 
0.156*** 
(0.004) 
Germany 0.029 
(1.000) 
0.037 
(1.000) 
Germany USA 0.074** 
(0.027) 
0.118** 
(0.027) 
 134 
 
UK -0.029 
(1.000) 
-0.037 
(1.000) 
MRD Bonferroni test USA UK -0.020* 
(0.060) 
-0.023* 
(0.060) 
Germany -0.022 
(0.135) 
-0.019 
(0.135) 
UK USA 0.020* 
(0.060) 
0.023* 
(0.060) 
Germany -0.001 
(1.000) 
0.003 
(1.000) 
Germany USA 0.022 
(0.135) 
0.019 
(0.135) 
UK 0.0019 
(1.000) 
-0.004 
(1.000) 
This table explains differences in firms‟ risk reporting levels across the USA, the UK and Germany in 2007 
and 2008. *, **, *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. All variables‟ definitions are shown 
in Table 5.4. Panel A reports any significant differences in firms‟ risk reporting levels in 2007 and 2008 across 
these three countries. Any significant differences from Panel A are further analysed to identify between which 
two pairs of  countries these differences remain significant. 
 
 
The Tamhane test, as shown in Panel B of  Table 6.3, reveals significant differences in 
ARD between US and UK firms in 2007 and 2008, and between US and German firms in 
2008. The result also indicates that there are no significant differences in ARD in either 
2007 or 2008 between UK and German firms. These results suggest that both UK and 
German firms disclosed similar levels of  TRD during 2007 and 2008.  
 
The Bonferroni test, as shown in Panel B of  Table 6.3, reports that the significant 
differences in BRD across these three countries during 2007 and 2008 particularly exist 
between US and UK firms and between US and German firms. The same test indicates 
that there are no significant differences in BRD between UK and German firms during 
2007 and 2009. This result is consistent with previous discussion on TRD in USA and UK.   
As can be seen from Panel B of  Table 6.3, the Bonferroni test suggests that significant 
differences in MRD exist between US and UK firms in 2007 and 2008 rather than between 
US and German firms. This result suggests that US and German firms disclose 
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significantly similar levels of  MRD. This result is consistent with the argument in Chapter 
Three that both US and German approaches require firms to provide risk information in 
their annual reports narratives mandatorily. 
 
Regarding GRD, the results from the Bonferroni test suggest, however, that there are no 
significant differences in 2007 between any pair of  countries, as shown in Panel B in Table 
6.3. It can be concluded from such result that firms across these three countries disclose 
similar levels of  GRD.   
 
To conclude, and based on all previous results, there are significant differences between the 
risk disclosure levels of  US, UK and German firms. The question arises of  whether these 
differences in firms‟ risk disclosure levels are associated with those differences in firms‟ 
risk levels across the US, the UK and Germany. It has been argued (as discussed in Chapter 
Four) that the pattern of  providing risk disclosure should be interpreted in light of  a firm‟s 
risk levels. As a result, the following section examines the relationship between these two 
variables. 
 
6.3.3. The associations between a firm’s risk levels and its risk disclosure levels 
The Pearson coefficient is used to determine whether there are any associations between a 
firm‟s risk levels and its risk disclosure levels across the USA, the UK and Germany during 
2007 and 2008. The aggregated correlation analysis, shown in Panel A of  Table 6.4, reveals 
that ARD is significantly and negatively associated with a firm‟s TR, USR and LR, at p-
values of  0.000, 0.001 and 0.000, respectively. These results are consistent with Linsley and 
Shrives‟s (2006) theoretical argument, and empirically with Marshall and Weetman (2002). 
The same panel reports that ARD in these three countries is likely to be significantly and 
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positively correlated with FR, at a p-value of  0.017. This result is consistent with what has 
been argued in Chapter Four in terms of  firms with higher levels of  risk having greater 
incentives to disclose more about their risks in order to provide details about the nature of  
such risks and how they successfully manage these risks effectively. This result is consistent 
with some prior risk research arguments (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 
2007; Rajab and Handley-Schachler, 2009) and with some prior risk reporting literature 
findings (e.g., Hassan, 2008).   
 
Table 6.4: Correlation matrix  
Panel A: Aggregated Correlation 
 
 
 
Panel B: Correlation controlled by country type 
 
Country RD/R 
TR SR USR RAR LR FR 
USA 
ARD 
-0.673***  
(0.000) 
-0.180 
(0.266) 
-0.270 
(0.092) 
-0.200 
(0.215) 
0.019 
(0.907) 
-0.295* 
(0.064) 
MRD 
-0.707*** 
(0.000) 
0.013 
(0.936) 
-0.339** 
(0.032) 
-0.142 
(0.384) 
0.099 
(0.544) 
-0.290* 
(0.070) 
GRD 
-0.727*** 
(0.000) 
-0.098 
(0.548) 
-0.342** 
(0.031) 
-0.225 
(0.162) 
0.043 
(0.790) 
-0.342** 
(0.031) 
BRD 
-0.675*** 
(0.000) 
-0.072 
(0.659) 
-0.450*** 
(0.004) 
-0.138 
(0.396) 
0.157 
(0.334) 
-0.461*** 
(0.003) 
UK 
ARD 
-0.414*** 
(0.008) 
-0.585*** 
(0.000) 
-0.166 
(0.306) 
-0.441*** 
(0.004) 
-0.574*** 
(0.000) 
0.284* 
(0.084) 
MRD 
0.040 
(0.805) 
-0.272 
(0.110) 
0.297 
(0.063) 
0.028 
(0.862) 
0.026 
(0.879) 
0.308* 
(0.060) 
GRD 
-0.267* 
(0.096) 
-0.447*** 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.999) 
-0.335** 
(0.035) 
-0.505*** 
(0.001) 
0.132 
(0.429) 
RD/R TR SR USR RAR LR FR 
ARD -0.341*** 
(0.000) 
0.101 
(0.276) 
-0.300*** 
(0.001) 
0.029 
(0.771) 
-0.449*** 
(0.000) 
0.222** 
(0.017) 
MRD -0.16 
(0.863) 
0.385*** 
(0.000) 
0.034 
(0.711) 
0.325*** 
(0.001) 
-0.258*** 
(0.005) 
0.207*** 
(0.025) 
GRD -0.385*** 
(0.000) 
0.055 
(0.551) 
-0.176* 
(0.054) 
0.067 
(0.497) 
-0.298*** 
(0.001) 
0.090 
(0.339) 
BRD -0.338*** 
(0.000) 
0.126 
(0.173) 
-.397*** 
(0.000) 
0.024 
(0.810) 
-0.409*** 
(0.000) 
0.255*** 
(0.006) 
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BRD 
-0.495*** 
(0.001) 
-0.658*** 
(0.000) 
-0.284 
(0.076) 
-0.506*** 
(0.001) 
-0.623*** 
(0.000) 
0.325** 
(0.046) 
Germany 
ARD 
0.230 
(0.153) 
0.127 
(0.447) 
0.537*** 
(0.000) 
-0.103 
(0.632) 
0.316* 
(0.053) 
0.351** 
(0.031) 
MRD 
0.670*** 
(0.000) 
0.539*** 
(0.000) 
0.850*** 
(0.000) 
0.683*** 
(0.000) 
0.457*** 
(0.004) 
-0.009 
(0.956) 
GRD 
-0.068 
(0.678) 
-0.157 
(0.347) 
-0.475*** 
(0.002) 
-0.170 
(0.428) 
0.175 
(0.294) 
0.367** 
(0.023) 
BRD 
0.432*** 
(0.005) 
0.303 
(0.065) 
0.520*** 
(0.001) 
0.284 
(0.179) 
0.431*** 
(0.007) 
0.227 
(0.171) 
This table shows the Pearson correlation coefficient between a firm‟s risk level variables and its risk 
disclosure level variables in the USA, the UK and Germany. Panel A presents the aggregated correlation 
between these variables across these three countries together. Panel B, however, shows such correlations 
between these variables in each country separately. *, **, *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Table 5.4. 
 
 
The correlation analysis reveals that the US, UK and German firms tend to provide 
significantly higher levels of  MRD as a response to their higher levels of  SR, FR and LR, 
at p-values of  0.000, 0.025 and 0.005, respectively. These results suggest that providing risk 
information mandatorily is more sensitive to a firm‟s risk levels across these three 
countries. The Pearson correlation, however, indicates that such risk disclosure is negatively 
correlated to RAR, at a p-value of  0.001. 
 
 Panel A of  Table 6.4 reports that GRD is significantly and negatively associated with a 
firm‟s TR and USR, at p-values of  0.000 and 0.054, respectively. That relation is positive on 
liquidity risk, at a p-value of  0.001. This result suggests that US, UK and German firms 
tend to provide significantly little information about their potential opportunities (GRD) 
when they have higher levels TR and USR.  
 
Providing BRD is significantly associated with FR, TR, USR and LR, at p-values of  0.006, 
0.000, 0.000 and 0.000, respectively. The trend of  such associations is positive on LR but 
negative on the other significant risks. This suggests that US, UK and German firms are 
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more sensitive to disclosing significant levels of  BRD in their annual report narratives as a 
response to underlying risks. Such results are consistent with what has been argued in 
previous chapters (e.g., Chapters Three and Four), since firms should reflect their high 
levels of  risk by disclosing more risk information in an attempt to reduce conflict between 
managers and investors. These firms, however, tend to provide significantly less 
information about their risks even if  they have significantly higher levels of  risk; namely, 
TR and USR. The results, therefore, support accepting the third hypothesis, in which firms 
tend to provide different levels of  risk disclosure subject to the different levels of  risks 
they face. The following analysis distinguishes previous associations within each country as 
presented in Panel B of  Table 6.4.  
 
US firms 
Correlation analysis indicates that ARD is either negatively associated with TR or positively 
associated with FR, at p-values of  0.000 and 0.064, respectively. This result suggests that 
US firms tend to provide relatively lower and higher levels of  risk disclosure as a response 
to total and financing risks, respectively. US firms tend to provide lower (higher) levels of  
MRD subject to higher (lower) levels of  TR, USR and (FR), at p-values of  0.000, 0.032 and 
(0.072), respectively. This result also indicates that US firms are more sensitive to reflecting 
their underlying risks through MRD than through ARD. These results are consistent with 
what has been argued in Chapter Four as well as the main results provided in Chapter 
Eight. 
 
GRD and BRD are found to be negatively correlated with TR and USR, at p-values of  
0.000 and 0.031. These two types of  risk disclosure are also found to be negatively 
correlated with FR, at a p-value of  0.03. Such results suggest that the American firms are 
 139 
 
responding in the same way to their underlying risks (TR, USR and FR) by disclosing either 
BRD or GRD.  
 
UK firms  
ARD is significantly and negatively correlated to TR, SR and FR, at p-values of  0.008, 
0.000 and 0.084, respectively. These results suggest that UK firms tend to provide 
significantly lower levels of  risk information even if  they have significantly higher levels of  
TR, SR and FR. The results report that TRD is significantly and positively associated with 
RAR and LR, at p-values of  0.004 and 0.000, respectively. From the same panel, the 
correlation analysis documents that MRD is only influenced by financing risk, at a p-value 
of  0.060. This result is consistent with prior expectations that UK firms tend to be more 
sensitive to underlying risk through TRD than through MRR. These results are also 
supported by Chapter Eight‟s main findings.  
 
As shown in the same panel, both GRD and BRD are significantly influenced by TR, SR, 
RDR, LR and FR. Similar to the US results, the trends of  these associations are identical 
for both types of  risks (GRD and BRD) with all significant underlying risks.  
 
German firms  
As can be seen from Panel A of  Table 6.4, ARD is significantly and positively associated 
with USR, at a p-value of  0.000. Providing this type of  risk information is significantly and 
negatively associated with LR and FR, at p-values of  0.053 and 0.031, respectively. MRD is 
significantly and positively related to TR, SR and USR, at a p-value of  0.000 for each type 
of  risk. These results suggest that German firms are likely to be motivated to provide 
higher levels of  MRD relative to their higher levels of  TR, SR and USR. Such results are 
consistent with both Chapter Four‟s main arguments and Chapter Eight‟s main findings. 
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MRD, however, is significantly and negatively associated with RAR and LR, at p-values of  
0.000 and 0.004, respectively. These results suggest that German firms tend to provide 
lower levels of  risk information mandatorily, while these firms have significantly higher 
levels of  liquidity and financing risks. Such results support the argument in Chapter Four 
that German firms have a better ability to convey their significant underlying risk through 
their MRD than through ARD.  
 
As shown in Panel B of  Table 6.4, GRD is significantly and negatively associated with USR 
and FR, at p-values of  0.002 and 0.023, respectively. BRD is significantly and positively 
correlated with both TR and USR, at p-values of  0.005 and 0.001, respectively. BRD, 
however, is found to be significantly and negatively associated with LR, at a p-value of  
0.007. These results suggest that German firms are more likely to respond to their 
underlying risks through disclosing significantly more BRD than GRD.  
 
Unlike the previous two markets, the German market does distinguish between the trends 
of  good and bad risk disclosure relative to a firm‟s underlying risk levels. 
 
6.4. Concluding remarks 
 
 
The main conclusion of  pilot study is that there are significant differences between the US, 
UK and German firms‟ risk levels. Additionally, there are significant differences between 
the US, UK and German firms‟ risk disclosure levels. Since it has been argued in this and 
previous chapters that differences between US, UK and German firms should be 
attributed to the differences between these firms‟ levels of  risks, the results provide initial 
empirical evidence which supports such argument. The results suggest that there are 
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significant associations between a firm‟s risk levels and its risk disclosure levels in these 
three countries.  
 
In particular, the differences in ARD between US, UK and German firms are found to be 
significantly derived from the differences in those firms‟ risk levels. Specifically, the 
associations between ARD and TR, USR, LR and FR are significant. In this regard, SR and 
RAR are found to be insignificant in influencing firms to provide risk information in their 
annual report narratives. These results are consistent with the main arguments provided in 
Chapter Four and the main empirical findings in Chapter Eight.   
 
From a comparable perspective, ARD, on the one hand, is more sensitive to being 
influenced by a firm‟s risk levels in the UK and the USA than in Germany. MRD, on the 
other hand, is more sensitive to being influenced by a firm‟s risk levels in both Germany 
and the USA than the UK. Providing GRD and BRD in these markets is also significantly 
correlated with a firm‟s risk levels in these countries. The results explain that the German 
market has a greater ability to differentiate the trend of  the observed GRD from BRD 
relative to underlying significant risks than the other two markets.  
 
These results contribute to prior research in three ways. Firstly, they provide clear empirical 
evidence that a firm‟s risk disclosure levels are likely to be influenced by its risk levels. 
Secondly, this is the first study investigating such relations across these countries. Thirdly, 
measuring risk disclosure by automated content analysis at these levels of  analysis (across 
three countries) can be considered as the first attempt to generate risk disclosure scores by 
an automated method. 
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To analyse risk/risk disclosure associations on a larger scale of  observation, these 
associations are investigated first within a UK context, implementing a new econometric 
method (linear mixed model). This is in contrast to conventional approaches, such as 
ordinary least squares, which have been frequently utilised within prior research (e.g., 
Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Abraham and Cox, 2007). This is discussed in the following 
chapter. As an extension of  the following chapter, two other chapters will consider either 
the single or the pooled regressions within these three countries, utilising repeated 
measures multilevel analysis, which is an extension of  LMM, after adjusting the unit of  
analysis from sectors over years to firms across countries over years. 
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Chapter Seven: Empirical Evidence (1): The Case of the UK: 
Aggregated, voluntary and mandatory risk disclosure incentives: Evidence from UK 
FTSE all share  
 
 
7.1. Overview 
 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in three distinct respects. Firstly, previous 
work has applied manual content analysis to a one-year period to examine the impact of  a 
firm‟s industry and a firm‟s size on issues such as quantity and quality of  risk reporting 
(Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004); the association between aggregated risk disclosure and firm 
size, firm risk and risk sentence characteristics, such as good, bad, past and future risk 
disclosures (Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 2006); and the association between corporate 
governance characteristics and business, financial and internal risk reporting (Abraham and 
Cox, 2007). The present chapter investigates risk disclosure as a function of  risk levels by 
text-searching a large scale sample of  annual reports over a four-year period scale (1160 
firm-years of  non-financial firms of  the FTSE all share index over 2005-2008). The 
current study is thus of  a much larger scale than previous work.  
 
Secondly, the present chapter explores the impact of  risk levels on three different risk 
disclosure types (aggregated, voluntary and mandatory), controlling for four other firm 
characteristics (firm size, profitability, growth and dividends). While prior risk reporting 
literature provides mixed empirical evidence on firm size, no previous work has examined 
the other three effects.  
 
Thirdly, this chapter uses three methods to examine the association between the main 
variables: ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effect model (FEM) and linear mixed model 
(LMM). The first two approaches have been used frequently in prior research to mitigate 
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problems caused by cross-sectional data (heteroskedasticity) and/or time series data (auto-
correlation). However, this chapter introduces LMM, which accounts for the problem of  
residual dependency, which is frequently neglected in market-based accounting research 
(see Bernard, 1987; Gow et al., 2010). 
 
The results demonstrate that both aggregated and voluntary risk disclosure are positively 
influenced by systematic and financing risks, risk-adjusted return, and both firm size and 
profitability. Additionally, both aggregated and voluntary risk disclosure are negatively 
influenced by total and liquidity risks. The results also indicate that mandatory risk 
disclosure is positively influenced by risk-adjusted return, financing risk and firm size.  
 
The remainder of  the chapter is structured as follows. The following section discusses the 
research methods, including data collection and sample selection, the measurement and 
description of  variables and the empirical model. The results are discussed in Section 7.3. 
Section 7.4 provides conclusions, discusses limitations and suggests areas for future 
research. 
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7.2. Methods 
 
7.2.1. Data collection and sample selection 
 
The researcher collects annual reports for 339 non-financial firms of  FTSE all share 
(based on the main criteria explained in Chapter Five) via either Thomson One Banker or, 
if  unavailable, the company‟s website, for financial years ending within the period 30 June 
2005 to 30 June 2009. The available data at the time of  running the analysis for this 
chapter and the following two chapters, however, considered data from 30 June 2005 to 30 
June 2010. The research focuses on annual reports since these remain a primary source of  
information for investors; there is increasing usage of  such reports, indicating their value 
relevance to investors (e.g., Beattie et al., 2004, 2008). This period is chosen because it 
includes the recent economic and financial crisis, which commenced in 2007, and because 
IFRSs became mandatory for UK listed companies in 2005. Any firm without a complete 
time series is excluded; this reduces the sample from 1356 firm-years (339 firms) to 1216 
firm-years (304 firms).  
 
All annual reports were converted to text files so as to be readable by Nudist 6, with the 
exception of  14 annual reports which could not be converted to text files. Consequently, 
the total size of  the sample is 1190 firm-years (290 firms). In order to minimise the effect 
of  outliers, the researcher transformed the data to natural logarithms21, which also 
improved the distribution of  variables. 
 
                                                 
 
21 Such transformation does not affect the original pattern of  these variables; the researcher checked the 
results of  the OLS regression model before and after the data transformation and the results were almost 
identical (for more details see Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson 2009). 
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Table 7.1 provides information about the number of  observations (percentages in 
parentheses) in the final sample per year, sorted by industry type. Panel A shows the 
sample divided into eight main sectors. Industrial firms represent the highest number and 
percentage, with 103 firms (35.5%). Telecommunication firms, on the other hand, account 
for only five firms (1.7%). To avoid effects from the dissimilar sizes of  the eight sectors, 
the researcher merges these into four larger sectors based on the similarity of  these sectors. 
These are shown in Panel B.         
 
                                   
Table 7.1: Final sample  
 
Panel A: Final sample by industry type        
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry  Frequency (%) 
 
Industry 103 (35.5) 
Service 81 (27.9) 
Consumer 34 (11.7) 
Health 16 (5.5) 
Material 18 (6.3) 
Utilities 9 (3.1) 
Telecommunication 5 (1.7) 
Technology 24 (8.3) 
Total 290 (100) 
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Panel B: Final sample by merged industry type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table provides information about the sample distribution. Panel A gives information about the eight 
sectors of the study; Panel B gives information about the sample after merging sectors based on their 
similarities. 
 
7.2.3. Variables: Measurement and description  
Table 7.2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables22. The essential point to note is 
that, in the case of  the dependent variables, the aggregated risk disclosure (ARD) exhibits 
the highest mean (2.378), and mandatory risk disclosure (MRD) the lowest (1.428). This 
suggests that UK firms tend to disclose voluntarily approximately 40% more risk 
information than what is mandated. This is consistent with Deumes and Knechel (2008), 
who find that managers in low regulation environments are highly motivated to provide 
more voluntary risk information in response to economic incentives.                              
           
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
22 Table 3 may also be used to confirm the extent to which the current study‟s variables are normally 
distributed. Comparing the mean with the median and shape of  each variable distribution through both 
Kurtosis and Skewness suggests that all variables are normally distributed. Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Shapiro-Wilks tests are used to investigate this. 
Industry  Frequency (%) 
Material & Industry (M_I) 
 
121 (41.7) 
Health & Service (H_S) 
 
97 (33.5) 
Consumer & Utilities (C_U) 
 
43 (14.8) 
 
Telecommunication & Technology (T_Tec) 
 
29 (10) 
Total 290 (100) 
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Table 7.2: Descriptive statistics for dependent, independent and control variables 
ARD is aggregated risk disclosure, measured by the natural  logarithm of  the total number of  risk sentences 
in the firm‟s annual report narratives; VRD is the voluntary risk disclosure, measured by the natural  
logarithm of  the total number of  risk sentences revealed voluntarily; MRD is the mandatory risk disclosure, 
measured by the natural  logarithm for the total number of  risk sentences revealed mandatorily; TR is the 
total risk, measured by the natural  logarithm of  standard deviation (volatility) of  the firm‟s market returns 
during the year; SR is the systematic risk, measured by the natural  logarithm for the covariance-variance 
(beta) of  the firm‟s returns around the market returns; Un-SR is the unsystematic risk, measured by the 
natural  logarithm of  the volatility of  the standard error of  CAPM during the year; RAR is risk-adjusted 
return, measured by the natural logarithm of  the Sharp ratio, which in turn is the firm‟s risk premium divided 
by a unit of  the firm‟s risk; FR is the financing risk, measured by the natural  logarithm of  the leverage, which 
in turn is the total debt divided by the total equity; LR is the liquidity risk, measured by the natural  logarithm 
of  the current ratio, which in turn is the total current assets divided by the total liabilities; SE is the firm‟s size 
effect, measured by the natural  logarithm of  the total assets; PE is the firm‟s profitability effect, measured by 
the natural logarithm of  the firm‟s Return on Equity (ROE); GE is the firm‟s growth effect, measured by the 
natural logarithm of  earnings growth; and DE is the firm‟s dividends effect, measured by the natural 
logarithm of  the firm‟s dividends. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
variables Mean Median 25% 75% Skewness Kurtosis Observations 
ARD 2.378 
 
2.386 2.243 2.505 .-0.064 0.210 1160 
VRD 2.321 
 
2.330 2.187 2.445 -0.166 1.356 1160 
MRD 1.428 
 
1.454 1.255 1.623 -0.438 0.362 1160 
TR -0.513 -0.528 0.425 1.303 -0.626 -0.428 1140 
SR -0.0237 0.000 -0.722 3.102 -0.1674 0.1335 1119 
USR -1.775 -1.698 0.290 -0.679 -2.000 -1.698 1152 
RAR 1.415 1.385 0.430 0.192 1.078 1.724 1160 
FR 1.650 1.784 -1.105 2.313 1.390 2.061 1014 
LR 0.1083 0.1038 0.479 2.982 -0.041 0.232 1140 
SE 5.800 5.800 -.286 1.063 5.338 6.277 1147 
PE 1.300 1.300 -.454 5.788 1.100 1.50 992 
GE 2.210 2.270 -1.502 7.117 2.100 2.310 1160 
DE 0.944 0.968 -0.349 0.404 0.677 1.217 1024 
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7.2.4. The empirical model 
 
Three main models are used to examine the association between risk levels and risk 
disclosure.  
 
OLS regression model 
 
The researcher regresses six explanatory variables representing firm risk levels, considering 
four control variables on aggregated, voluntary and mandatory risk disclosure, using cross-
sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) model as follows: 
   1 ' ( , , _ , , , ) '' , , , )ijt ijtijt ijtRD TR SR Un R RAR FR LR SE PE GE DE                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                    (7.1) 
Where RD is the aggregated, voluntary and mandatory risk disclosure scores for firm i in 
sector j in year t, β1 is the intercept, and β‟ and β‟‟ are the slope coefficients for the 
predictors and control variables, respectively. TR, SR, Un_R, RAR, FR and LR are the 
total, systematic and unsystematic risks, risk-adjusted return, financing risk and liquidity 
risk, respectively, for firm i in sector j in year t. SE, PE, GE and DE are firm size, 
profitability, growth and dividends effects, respectively, for firm i in sector j in year t. ε is 
the standard error of  residual for firm i in sector j in year t. 
 
To account for heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation problems, the researcher examines 
whether these problems exist by conducting R2 change and Durbin-Watson tests, 
respectively. To control for these two problems partially or entirely, the current study 
employs the second empirical model. 
 
 
 
 150 
 
FEM regression  
 
The Fixed Effect Model (FEM) considers differences between industries (cross-sectional) 
and/or years (time series) effects by producing dummy variables for industries and/or 
years. Three different empirical models are provided after explaining the general equation 
of  this model, as follows: 
 
The general equation 
 
Where all variables have the same definition as in equation (1), in addition to (β1+µ1) to 
reflect the coefficients of  the dummy variables for industry and/or year, as follows. 
     1 1 ' ( , , _ , , , ) '' , , , )ijt ijtijtRD TR SR Un R RAR FR LR SE PE GE CGE ijt          
                                                                                                (7.2) 
Industry-fixed effect: intercepts varying across industries 
     1 2 3 4_ _ _ ' ( , , _ , , , ) '' , , , )ijt ijtijt ijtRD M I H S C U TR SR Un R RAR FR LR SE PE GE CGE                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
                                                                                         (7.3) 
Year-fixed effect: intercepts varying across years 
     1 2 3 42006 2007 2008 '' ( , , _ , , , ) '' , , , )ijt ijtijt ijtRD TR SR Un R RAR FR LR SE PE GE CGE              
 
(7.4) 
Industry- and year-fixed effects: intercepts varying across industries and years 
     1 2 3 4 2 3 4_ _ _ 2006 2007 2008 ' ( , , _ , , , ) '' , , , )ijt ijtijt ijtRD M I H S C U TR SR Un R RAR FR LR SE PE GE CGE                                                                                                                        
                                                       (7.5) 
Where all variables have the same definition as in equation (7.2). Additionally, the 
researcher uses six dummies, M_I (material and industry), H_S (health and service), C_U 
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(consumer and utilities), 2006, 2007 and 2008, to interact with industries and/or years, 
respectively.  
 
Nevertheless, after permitting the intercepts to vary across industries and/or years, FEM 
does not consider either the interaction of  the intercepts and slopes of  risk levels and the 
control variable slopes across industries and years, or the residual dependency. To 
overcome these problems, the current study utilises the following empirical model. 
 
LMM regression  
 
The third model is the Linear Mixed Model (LMM), which this chapter uses to further 
examine whether firms‟ risk disclosure levels are affected by their risk levels, given the 
limitations of  the OLS and FEM models. Using this model is essential to considering 
either the interaction of  the intercepts and slopes of  risk levels and the control variables 
across industries over years with risk disclosures, or residual dependency, by declaring both 
industry and year (level 2‟s grouping unit) as random factors to adjust the risk disclosure of  
each firm (level 1‟s unit). 
 
 There are many structures for each level‟s error (e.g., first-order autoregressive structure, 
AR (1); first order autoregressive moving average structure, ARMA (1)) (e.g., Field, 2009; 
Gelman and Hill, 2009; Hox, 2010). These problems are encountered frequently when 
using other statistical approaches which assume complete independency among 
observations (e.g., ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed effect model (FEM); see Gow et 
al., 2010). LMM is employed in two consecutive stages. The first stage is the null, or 
unconditional random effect, model. At this stage, the researcher measures the impact of  
industry and year separately on the aggregated, voluntary and mandatory risk disclosures. 
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This model, therefore, is used as a baseline or null model to evaluate explicitly the extent to 
which all independent variables improve the model. The full, or conditional, model (FM) 
could interpret risk disclosure variations across industries over years, as a second stage. 
These stages can be described as follows:  
 
The null model: unconditional or one-way ANOVA with random effect model 
   1 2 _ , _ , _ , _ , 2005,2006,2007,2008ijt ijtRD M I H S C U T Tec        
                                                                                                             (7.6) 
All variables have the same definitions as presented in the equations above, while (T_Tec) 
is technology and telecommunication sectors, and β2 is the slope coefficient of  both 
industry and year impact.  
 
The full model: conditional model  
   1 1 2' ( , , _ , , , ) '' , , , )ijt ijtijt ijtRD TR SR Un R RAR FR LR SE PE GE DE            
                                                                                               (7.7) 
Where all variables have the same definitions as in the previous model, while (β‟+µ2), 
(β‟‟+µ1) are the slopes of  the independent and control variables, respectively, which are 
allowed to vary across industries and years. 
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7.3. Correlation analysis, empirical results and further analysis  
 
7.3.1. Correlation analysis 
Table 7.3 provides univariate analysis implementing Pearson correlation coefficients to 
measure the strength and direction for the linear association between any pair of  
variables.23 All risk disclosure types are statistically correlated with all exploratory variables 
(except mandatory risk disclosure and profitability).  
 
It is noteworthy that voluntary risk disclosure is significantly and positively associated with 
mandatory risk disclosure (p<0.01). Therefore, UK firms, which exhibit higher levels of  
mandatory risk disclosure, are more likely to disclose risk information voluntarily. This 
result supports Dye (1986) and is consistent with Gigler and Hemmer (1999), Marshall and 
Weetman (2002) and Deumes and Knechel (2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
23 Additionally, the coefficients among both independent and control variables can be used as an initial 
diagnosis of  multi-collinearity, which in turn explains that no variables exhibit collinearity problems. To 
examine that statistically, the principal rule among the regressors is that the higher the inter-correlation of  
these regressors, the higher the possibilities for the tolerance coefficients to approach zero, and have the 
problem of  collinearity. If  the tolerance of  any of  the predicted variables is less than 0.1 (alternatively, if  the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is more than 10), this suggests multi-collinearity problems (Field, 2009). Both 
these tests (not reported) indicate that no regressors exhibit this problem. 
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Table 7.3 : Correlation matrix (Pearson coefficient) 
Dependent Variables                          Independent Variables                                     Control Variables 
Table 7.3 shows the correlation analysis between all variables; the numbers represent the linear Pearson 
coefficients, while p-values are given in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, 
respectively (all one-tailed except when sign is not predicted or mixed). The definitions for all variables are 
the same as in the previous table.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 VRD MRD TR SR USR RAR FR LR SE PE GE DE 
ARD 0.982*** 
(0.000) 
0.757** 
(0.000) 
-0.141*** 
(0.000) 
0.056* 
(0.06) 
-0.120*** 
(0.000) 
0.082*** 
(0.000) 
0.217*** 
(0.000) 
-0.087*** 
(0.003) 
0.536*** 
(0.000) 
0.080** 
(0.011) 
-0.080*** 
(0.007) 
0.227*** 
(0.000) 
VRD  0.663*** 
(0.000) 
-0.132*** 
(0.000) 
0.063** 
(0.036) 
-0.120*** 
(0.000) 
-0.071** 
(0.015) 
0.207*** 
(0.000) 
-0.087*** 
(0.003) 
0.531*** 
(0.000)  
0.088*** 
(0.005) 
-0.078*** 
(0.008) 
0.226*** 
(0.000) 
MRD   -0.098*** 
(0.001) 
0.040** 
(0.0184) 
-0.120*** 
(0.000) 
-0.103*** 
(0.000) 
0.193*** 
(0.000) 
-0.056* 
(0.057) 
0.401*** 
(0.000) 
0.030 
(0.347) 
-0.083*** 
(0.005) 
0.159*** 
(0.000) 
TR    0.521*** 
(0.000) 
0.296*** 
(0.000) 
-0.420*** 
(0.000) 
-0.201*** 
(0.000) 
0.156*** 
(0.000) 
-0.279*** 
(0.000) 
-0.131*** 
(0.000) 
-0.411*** 
(0.000) 
-0.148*** 
(0.000) 
SR     0.156*** 
(0.000) 
-0.333*** 
(0.000) 
-0.039 
(0.224) 
0.099*** 
(0.001) 
-0.590** 
(0.049) 
-0.048 
(0.137) 
-0.147*** 
(0.000) 
-0.121*** 
(0.000) 
USR      -0.023 
(0.427) 
-0.168*** 
(0.0000) 
0.170*** 
(0.000) 
-0.248*** 
(0.000) 
-0.161*** 
(0.000) 
-0.198*** 
(0.000) 
0.013 
(0.649) 
RAR       -0.340 
(0.281) 
0.032 
(0.279) 
-0.006 
(0.845) 
0.116*** 
(0.000) 
0.163*** 
(0.000) 
0.378*** 
(0.000) 
FR        -0.361*** 
(0.000) 
0.265*** 
(0.000) 
0.177*** 
(0.000) 
0.138*** 
(0.000) 
-0.080** 
(0.011) 
LR         -0.292*** 
(0.000) 
-0.098*** 
(0.002) 
-0.024 
(0.445) 
0.018 
(0.540) 
SE          0.100*** 
(0.002) 
-0.041 
(0.167) 
0.417*** 
(0.000) 
PE           0.162*** 
(0.000) 
0.132*** 
(0.000) 
GE            0.036 
(0.246) 
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7.3.2. Empirical results 
In this section, the researcher presents the results of  this chapter‟s three regression models. 
Table 7.4 shows the results from the pooled models (OLS) and (FEM). Table 7.5 shows 
panel regressions using the Linear Mixed Model (LMM). 
OLS regression 
 
Panel A of  Table 7.4 exhibits results for the OLS model, in addition to the cross-sectional 
OLS for 2005-2008. The researcher first discusses the pooled OLS and then the results for 
each year, concentrating on the aggregated and voluntary risk disclosure first, followed by 
mandatory risk disclosure.   
Aggregated and voluntary risk disclosure 
 
The current study finds both aggregated and voluntary disclosure are significantly and 
positively associated with two market-risk measures (beta and Sharp ratio, for systematic 
risk and risk adjusted return, respectively), and with one accounting-risk measure (leverage, 
for financing risk). The coefficients on SR, RAR and FR for the aggregated (voluntary) risk 
disclosure model are 0.073 (0.073), 0.029 (0.022) and 0.03 (0.028) at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels of  significance. These two types of  risk disclosure are found to be significantly and 
negatively correlated with total and liquidity risks at the 1% significance level. The 
coefficients on TR and LR for aggregated (voluntary) risk disclosure are 0.02 (0.206) and 
0.105 (0.103), respectively. 
 
These results suggest that firms with higher systematic, unsystematic, financing and risk-
adjusted return risks are more likely to disclose more about their risk voluntarily.  
 
The results are consistent with the researcher‟s a priori expectations based on managers‟ 
incentive theories and empirical research. Capital needs theory suggests that firms with 
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higher risk exposure will disclose more risk information in order to reduce uncertainty 
about cash flows, leading to a decrease in investors‟ required rate of  return. Agency theory 
suggests that managers of  high-risk firms may have greater incentives to reduce agency 
and monitoring costs by disclosing more voluntary information, thus reducing information 
asymmetry. Similarly, signalling theory suggests that managers who manage risks 
successfully will disclose more voluntary risk information to distinguish themselves from 
those who do not. The results are also consistent with previous empirical research 
(Abraham and Cox, 2007; Vandemaele et al., 2009).  
 
Nevertheless, this chapter‟s empirical evidence suggests that firms characterised by high 
total risk levels (high volatility of  market returns) or lower levels of  liquidity appear less 
willing to provide voluntary risk information. One possible explanation, based on capital 
needs theory, is that managers may consider that disclosing risk information impacts 
negatively on their market reaction indicators (e.g., stock market returns). Those managers 
may suspect the market‟s ability to react appropriately to voluntary risk disclosures. This is 
consistent with the theoretical arguments in Linsley and Shrives (2006) and with the 
empirical findings in Marshall and Weetman (2002, 2007). The researcher therefore accepts 
H2, H4 and H5, rejecting H1, H6 (due to the direction of  results) and H3 (due to 
insignificant results).  
 
The results generally, however, suggest that UK firms respond positively to their risk levels 
when providing risk information in their annual report narratives. Disclosed risk 
information may correct firms‟ market risk exposure. The provision of  voluntary risk 
disclosures by UK firms provides some support for the current UK approach of  having 
limited mandatory regulation in this area, reinforced by professional (e.g., ICAEW) 
recommendations. The evidence, however, also suggests that the extant UK regulatory 
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regime allows sub-optimal risk disclosure by some UK firms regarding certain (total and 
liquidity) risks.  
 
In terms of  the control variables, the coefficients for aggregated (voluntary) risk disclosure 
on SE, PE and GE are 0.170 (0.171), 0.028 (0.033) and 0.046 (0.055) at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels of  significance, respectively. The directions of  these coefficients are positive on 
SE and PE for both aggregated and voluntary disclosures, and negative on GE. The 
coefficients on DE are insignificant. 
 
These results are consistent with signalling theory, which suggests that managers in larger 
and more profitable firms have greater incentives, relative to smaller and less profitable 
firms, to provide risk information in order to signal their greater ability to identify and 
manage their risk to the market. The results for firm size are consistent with prior research 
(Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007). Firms with low-earnings growth, 
however, disclose significantly higher levels of  voluntary risk information in their annual 
report narratives. Managers could have incentives to reassure investors about their growth 
by providing reasons to justify the decline in their earnings growth and to suggest 
prospective future earnings. Considering low-earnings growth as bad news, which could be 
a risk indicator, managers might voluntarily disclose more information to avoid legal costs 
(stockholder lawsuits) and reputational costs (imposed costs by investors to compensate 
firms holding bad news) (Skinner, 1994). This result is also consistent with the results 
regarding the impact of  variability of  earnings (less volatile firms) on firm incentives to 
disclose more risk information (H1).  
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Mandatory risk disclosure 
 
As far as mandatory risk disclosure is concerned, the coefficients of  mandatory risk 
disclosure on RAR and FR are significant and positive at 5% and 1% respectively, as shown 
in Panel A of  Table 7.4. The coefficient on LR is significant and negative at 1%. These 
results are consistent with those for both aggregated and voluntary risk disclosures. Firm 
size is the only control variable that influences mandatory disclosure significantly and 
positively.  
 
This result may be rationalised on the basis that managers in large firms may exhibit 
greater information asymmetry and may intend to reduce this by providing more risk 
information in their annual reports. Reporting information is a costly decision, hence 
managers of  larger firms have a greater ability to collect and prepare information at a 
lower cost relative to smaller firms (Verrecchia, 2001). These results therefore support 
Dobler‟s (2008) theoretical argument that even within regulated regimes managers still have 
incentives to disclose more risk information. 
 
In summary, the results show that risk levels do influence mandatory risk disclosure, albeit 
at less significant levels than for aggregated and voluntary risk disclosures. Based on these 
findings, the researcher accepts H4 and H5 regarding mandatory disclosure, and rejects 
the other hypotheses. 
 
For the 2005-2008 period, the current study runs cross-sectional OLS regression for each 
disclosure type, as shown in Panel A of  Table 7.4, demonstrating that all three types of  risk 
information are significantly influenced by three main variables: risk-adjusted return, 
liquidity risk and firm size. The direction of  this association is positive in relation to risk- 
adjusted return and firm size, while negatively related to liquidity risk. The significance of  
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the other main or control variables differs subject to risk disclosure type and year. These 
results are consistent with what was predicted and explored by the pooled OLS24. All the 
regression models shown in Panel A of  Table 7.4 are statistically significant (p<0.01)25. In 
addition, all adjusted R2 indicate that the explanatory power of  the predictors (exploratory 
variables) is acceptable.  
 
In order to incorporate the cross-sectional and year effects, the Fixed Effect Model is 
constructed to re-examine the association between risk disclosure level and risk level after 
controlling for several firm characteristics. This is discussed in the following sub-section. 
 
FEM regression 
 
Panel B of  Table 7.4 explains the association between the same variables involving industry 
as a cross-sectional effect and/or year as a time series effect. Panel B shows the three 
different risk disclosure types under three main conditions, incorporating, respectively, 
industry, year and both industry and year as dummy variables. 
 
Overall, inserting the dummy variables improves the significance levels of  the coefficient 
estimates for both risk types and control variables. The results are also consistent with the 
OLS results. When the researcher controls for cross-sectional effects, however, mandatory 
risk disclosure becomes more sensitive to risk level in terms of  the impact of  firm sector 
on compliance with UK risk regulations.  
                                                 
 
24
  In 2008, the year most associated with the recent financial crisis, aggregated and voluntary risk disclosure 
are substantially associated with firm size rather than with other risk and control variables. The same applies 
to mandatory risk disclosure, with one difference: firms with higher levels of  unsystematic risk are more 
likely to significantly reveal lower levels of  mandatory risk information.  
 
25 Additionally, the Durbin-Watson regression diagnostic is used to examine the independence of  each 
regression model‟s residual errors (auto-correlation). The results indicate that all Durbin-Watson values are 
approximately equal to two, which is the acceptable benchmark. 
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Considering industry and year increases the explanatory power of  each regression model: 
adjusted R2s are progressively increased.26 Consequently, the sensitivity of  risk disclosure to 
risk levels increases significantly. The main weaknesses of  this model are that it only 
permits the intercepts of  FEM variables to vary across group or time rather than 
predictors‟ slopes, and that it assumes complete independence across observations. To 
address these limitations, the current study implements the LMM, as discussed in the 
following sub-section. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
26 Durbin-Watson values increase marginally under these three conditions (industry, year or both) for each 
risk disclosure type. The value is around two once the impact of  time (auto-correlated errors) is accounted 
for. 
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Table 7.4: Regression analysis  
Panel A: Pooled OLS and each year regression model 
 
In/
De  
Pooled regression ARD VRD MRD 
 ES ARD ES VRD ES MRD 2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Intercepts ? 
 
1.376*** 
(0.000) 
? 
 
1.325*** 
(0.000) 
? 
 
.407*** 
(0.005) 
1.605*** 
(0.000) 
1.543*** 
(0.000) 
1.262*** 
(0.000) 
1.29*** 
(0.000) 
1.501*** 
(0.000) 
1.490*** 
(0.000) 
1.230*** 
(0.000) 
1.290*** 
(0.000) 
0.969*** 
(0.004) 
0.699*** 
(0.007) 
0.169 
(0.466) 
-0.163 
(0.637) 
TR + 
 
-0.2*** 
(0.000) 
+ 
 
-0.206*** 
(0.000) 
+ 
 
-0.105 
(0.231) 
-0.179 
(0.161) 
-0.190* 
(0.076) 
-0.128 
(0.243) 
-0.001 
(0.990) 
-0.147 
(0.237) 
-0.175* 
(0.100) 
-0.110 
(0.312) 
-0.018 
(0.851) 
-0.349 
(0.134) 
-0.194 
(0.250) 
-0.17 
(0.301) 
0.183 
(0.303) 
SR + 
 
 
0.073*** 
(0.000) 
+ 
 
 
0.079*** 
(0.001) 
+ 
 
 
0.059 
(0.135) 
0.037 
(0.551) 
0.001 
(0.980) 
0.054 
(0.266) 
0.043 
(0.322) 
0.014 
(0.821) 
0.005 
(0.914) 
0.053 
(0.271) 
0.053 
(0.221) 
0.177 
(0.120) 
0.038 
(0.578) 
0.104 
(0.148) 
-0.042 
(0.607) 
USR + 
 
0.021 
(0.497) 
+ 
 
0.027 
(0.395) 
+ 
 
-0.009 
(0.858) 
0.025 
(0.695) 
0.066 
(0.255) 
0.009 
(0.870) 
-0.039 
(0.515) 
-0.006 
(0.919) 
0.093 
(0.114) 
0.016 
(0.783) 
-0.026 
(0.666) 
0.188 
(0.105) 
0.102 
(0.264) 
-0.171** 
(0.046) 
 
-0.197* 
(0.078) 
RAR - 
 
-0.029** 
(0.034) 
- 
 
-0.022* 
(0.100) 
- 
 
-0.044** 
(0.041) 
-0.056* 
(0.095) 
-0.106*** 
(0.000) 
-0.057** 
(0.046) 
0.001 
(0.950) 
-0.071** 
(0.032) 
-0.083*** 
(0.004) 
-0.054* 
(0.057) 
0.002 
(0.911) 
0.012 
(0.847) 
-0.136*** 
(0.002) 
-0.070* 
(0.100) 
0.002 
(0.953) 
FR + 
 
0.030*** 
(0.002) 
+ 
 
0.028*** 
(0.004) 
+ 
 
0.044*** 
(0.004) 
0.024 
(0.276) 
0.033* 
(0.057) 
0.048*** 
(0.005) 
0.012 
(0.514) 
0.031 
(0.148) 
0.023 
(0.198) 
0.045*** 
(0.008) 
0.011 
(0.519) 
-0.004 
(0.920) 
0.081*** 
(0.003) 
0.087*** 
(0.001) 
0.013 
(0.698) 
LR - 
 
0.105*** 
(0.000) 
- 
 
0.103*** 
(0.000) 
- 
 
0.126*** 
(0.004) 
0.168*** 
(0.003) 
0.188*** 
(0.010) 
0.144*** 
(0.003) 
0.009 
(0.866) 
0.183*** 
(0.001) 
0.105** 
(0.04) 
0.14*** 
(0.004) 
0.010 
(0.850) 
0.092 
(0.371) 
0.155** 
(0.050) 
0.221** 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.988) 
SE + 
 
0.170*** 
(0.000) 
+ 
 
0.171*** 
(0.000) 
+ 
 
0.176*** 
(0.000) 
0.172*** 
(0.000) 
0.152*** 
(0.000) 
0.165*** 
(0.000) 
0.178*** 
(0.000) 
0.167*** 
(0.000) 
.169*** 
(0.000) 
0.165*** 
(0.000) 
.173*** 
(0.000) 
0.186*** 
(0.000) 
0.15*** 
(0.000) 
0.127** 
(0.000) 
0.22** 
(0.000) 
PE + 
 
0.028* 
(0.067) 
+ 
 
0.033** 
(0.035) 
+ 
 
0.015 
(0.541) 
0.038 
(0.193) 
0.041 
(0.188) 
0.036 
(0.256) 
0.002 
(0.937) 
0.029 
(0.304) 
0.065** 
(0.044) 
0.041 
(0.188) 
0.004 
(0.868) 
0.096* 
(0.072) 
-0.027 
(0.587) 
-0.017 
(0.712) 
-0.019 
(0.688) 
GE + 
 
-0.046* 
(0.067) 
+ 
 
-0.055** 
(0.033) 
+ 
 
-0.054 
(0.179) 
-0.175*** 
(0.001) 
-0.010 
(0.836) 
0.052 
(0.329) 
0.006 
(0.898) 
-0.16*** 
(0.003) 
0.047 
(0.355) 
0.048 
(0.358) 
0.001 
(0.976) 
0.269*** 
(0.007) 
-0.024 
(0.754) 
0.062 
(0.432) 
0.031 
(0.707) 
DE + 
 
-0.011 
(0.482) 
+ 
 
-0.013 
(0.407) 
+ 
 
0.003 
(0.893) 
-0.013 
(0.698) 
0.021 
(0.511) 
-0.043 
(0.184) 
-0.009 
(0.745) 
-0.011 
(0.737) 
0.012 
(0.720) 
-0.044 
(0.168) 
-0.008 
(0.753) 
-0.011 
(0.865) 
0.057 
(0.251) 
-0.036 
(0.454) 
-0.011 
(0.829) 
D_W 1.744 1.676 2.048 1.709 1.945 2.122 1.903 1.695 1.932 2.065 1.921 1.967 2.202 2.099 1.871 
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Panel B: FEM   
In/De ARD VRD MRD 
ES Industry Dummy Year 
Dummy 
Industry and 
Year Dummies 
ES 
 
Industry 
Dummy 
Year Dummy Industry and Year 
Dummies 
ES Industry Dummy Year Dummy Industry and Year 
Dummies 
Intercepts  ? 
 
1.397*** 
(0.000) 
1.341*** 
(0.000) 
1.33*** 
(0.000) 
? 
 
1.345*** 
(0.000) 
1.248*** 
(0.000) 
1.261*** 
(0.000) 
? 
 
0.442*** 
(0.003) 
0.412*** 
(0.004) 
0.446*** 
(0.003) 
TR + 
 
-0.209*** 
(0.000) 
-0.098* 
(0.062) 
-0.108** 
(0.039) 
+ 
 
-0.216*** 
(0.000) 
-0.091* 
(0.082) 
-0.101* 
(0.052) 
+ 
 
-0.113 
(0.193) 
-0.085 
(0.343) 
-0.093 
(0.298) 
SR + 
 
 
0.073*** 
(0.004) 
0.042* 
(0.074) 
0.044* 
(0.062) 
+ 
 
 
0.079*** 
(0.003) 
0.043* 
(0.065) 
0.043* 
(0.068) 
+ 
 
 
0.07* 
(0.081) 
0.055 
(0.165) 
0.067* 
(0.10) 
USR + 
 
0.027 
(0.386) 
0.008 
(0.781) 
0.014 
(0.633) 
+ 
 
0.032 
(0.306) 
0.011 
(0.698) 
0.017 
(0.565) 
+ 
 
-0.001 
(.992) 
-0.01 
(0.84) 
-0.002 
(0.973) 
RAR - 
 
-0.031** 
(0.021) 
-0.045*** 
(0.000) 
-0.048*** 
(0.000) 
- 
 
-0.024* 
(0.072) 
-0.041*** 
(0.001) 
-0.044*** 
(0.001) 
- 
 
-.049** 
(0.024) 
-0.047** 
(0.031) 
-0.052** 
(0.017) 
FR + 
 
0.032*** 
(0.001) 
0.03*** 
(0.001) 
0.031*** 
(0.001) 
+ 
 
0.03*** 
(0.002) 
0.028*** 
(0.002) 
0.03*** 
(0.001) 
+ 
 
0.046*** 
 
0.044*** 
(0.005) 
0.046*** 
(0.003) 
LR - 
 
0.079*** 
(0.005) 
0.115*** 
(0.000) 
0.087*** 
(0.001) 
- 
 
0.08*** 
(0.005) 
0.114*** 
(0.000) 
0.088*** 
(0.001) 
- 
 
0.087* 
(0.056) 
0.129*** 
(0.003) 
0.09** 
(0.048) 
SE + 
 
0.173*** 
(0.000) 
0.171*** 
(0.000) 
0.174*** 
(0.000) 
+ 
 
0.175*** 
(0.000) 
0.172*** 
(0.000) 
0.176*** 
(0.000) 
+ 
 
0.178*** 
(0.000) 
0.176*** 
(0.000) 
0.178*** 
(0.000) 
PE + 
 
0.028* 
(0.069) 
0.029** 
(0.045) 
0.029** 
(0.045) 
+ 
 
0.032** 
(0.036) 
0.033** 
(0.022) 
0.033** 
(0.022) 
+ 
 
0.015 
(0.534) 
0.017 
(0.488) 
0.017 
(0.479) 
Adjusted 
R2% 
35.90 35.40 18.50 38.80 42.00 37.40 34.10 41.30 42.00 37.20 33.50 16.90 28.70 22.60 17.20 
ANOVA 45.80*** 
(0.000) 
45.10*** 
(0.000) 
20.40*** 
(0.000) 
13.62*** 
(0.000) 
15.76*** 
(0.000) 
13.85** 
(0.000) 
10.80*** 
(0.000) 
14.41*** 
(0.000) 
15.76*** 
(0.000) 
13.74*** 
(0.000) 
10.56*** 
(0.000) 
4.88*** 
(0.000) 
8.22*** 
(0.000) 
7.28*** 
(0.000) 
4.9*** 
(0.000) 
Ob 804 804 804 192 205 216 191 192 205 216 191 192 205 216 191 
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GE + 
 
-0.045* 
(0.071) 
-0.041* 
(0.089) 
-0.039* 
(0.098) 
+ 
 
-0.054** 
(0.034) 
-0.047** 
(0.048) 
-0.046** 
(0.05) 
+ 
 
-0.051 
(0.201) 
-0.056 
(0.166) 
-0.053 
(0.188) 
DE + 
 
-0.016 
(0.331) 
-0.009 
(0.534) 
-0.015 
(0.31) 
+ 
 
-0.17 
(0.298) 
-0.011 
(0.453) 
-0.017 
(0.27) 
+ 
 
-0.005 
(0.833) 
0.004 
(0.886) 
-0.006 
(0.831) 
Industry-fixed effects 
 
include exclude include exclude include include include exclude include 
Year -fixed effects exclude include include exclude include include exclude include include 
D_ W 1.734 1.937 1.93 1.667 1.925 1.92 2.042 2.053 2.047 
Adjusted R2% 36.9 42.9 43.9 36.4 44.7 45.7 20.3 18.4 20.3 
ANOVA 37.1*** 
(0.000) 
47.38*** 
(0.000) 
40.29*** 
(0.000) 
36.35*** 
(0.000) 
50.99*** 
(0.000) 
43.188*** 
(0.000) 
16.77*** 
(0.000) 
15.86*** 
(0.000) 
13.74*** 
(0.000) 
Ob 804 804 804 804 804 804 804 804 804 
Panel A provides pooled OLS regression for each level of  risk disclosure type. *, **, *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively (all one-tailed except when sign is not 
predicted or mixed). Variables‟ definitions are the same as in Table 7.2. Additionally, D_W is the Durbin-Watson to test auto-correlation, adjusted R2s in percentages, ANOVA tests 
for the validity of  regression model, F values are given in parentheses and Ob is the number of  observations for firm-years. 
 
Panel B provides FEM for each level of  risk disclosure type. *, **, *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively (all one-tailed except when sign is not predicted or 
mixed). Variables‟ definitions are the same as in Table 7.2. Additionally, fixed effect for both industry and year is inserted, D_W is the Durbin-Watson to test auto-correlation, 
adjusted R2 in percentages, ANOVA tests for the validity of  regression model, F values are given in parentheses and Ob is the number of  observations. 
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Linear mixed model (LMM) 
Both firm risk and control variables are regressed on aggregated, voluntary and mandatory 
risk disclosure using the LMM. The results are shown in Table 7.5 under two main models. 
The first, baseline, model is used to evaluate the improvements of  the second, full or 
conditional, model, which incorporates all the variables. All coefficients in the two models 
are assessed using the Wald test. 
 
For both aggregated and voluntary risk disclosures, the baseline model indicates that with 
95% level of  confidence, the intercepts are different from zero for both types of  risk 
disclosure under the fixed effect. The random effect, however, indicates that the variances 
of  aggregated and voluntary risk disclosure are primarily within or between industries and 
years. Overall, based on the Wald test and as reported in Table 7.5, the variances of  the 
aggregated and voluntary risk disclosure are significant within firms or between industries 
and years.   
 
To investigate these results further, the intra-class correlation coefficients27 (ICC) are 
calculated, which explain the proportion of  aggregated or voluntary risk disclosures caused 
by variances within and between firms. The results indicate that 7.5% of  the variation of  
aggregated risk disclosure is caused by industry and year; the remainder (92.5%) reflects 
within firms‟ variations. In the case of  voluntary disclosure, 10% of  the total variation is 
explained by industry and year. This confirms the importance of  sector and time effects 
and is consistent with general disclosure studies (e.g., Beattie et al., 2004, 2008) as well as 
                                                 
 
27 The ICC for residual may be calculated as variance of  estimate residual/(variance of  estimate residual + 
variance of  estimate for industries and years). In order to get ICC for the random factor, reflecting the 
effects of  the cross-sectional (industries) and time series (years), the current study replaces the denominator 
by the variance of  estimate for industries and years.  
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with prior risk disclosure literature highlighting industry impact (e.g., Beretta and Bozzolan, 
2004). 
 
In order to identify factors which explain these aggregated and voluntary risk disclosure 
variations, the researcher runs the full, or conditional, model. Table 7.5 indicates that 
aggregated and voluntary risk disclosures are significantly and positively influenced by 
systematic risk, financing risk and risk-adjusted return.28 While the t-statistics for 
aggregated risk disclosure on these variables are 0.042, 0.032 and -0.045, at p-values of  
0.073, 0.000 and 0.003, respectively, the T test coefficients for voluntary risk disclosure on 
these variables are 0.04, 0.03 and -0.042, at p-values of  0.087, 0.001 and 0.007, respectively. 
Furthermore, the results suggest that higher variability in market returns or lower liquidity 
have a significant negative impact on aggregated (voluntary) risk disclosure; hence, the 
coefficients on these variables are -0.108 (-0.105) and 0.086 (0.089), at p-values of  0.035 
(0.04) and 0.041 (0.017), respectively.  
 
These results suggest that firms with higher systematic, financing and risk-adjusted return 
risks are more likely to disclose more voluntary risk information. These results are 
consistent with the theoretical and empirical arguments for the associations between risk-
risk disclosures as explained in previous discussions. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
28
 To assess the goodness of  fit of  this model, the principal rule is that if  the differences of  -2 Log 
Likelihood (-2LL) decrease, the full model is improved. In order to examine such improvements statistically, 
change chi-square should be conducted. Accordingly, if  the difference between the -2LL for the full and the 
baseline models is greater than the value of  the change chi-square (the critical or cut-off  point of  the chi-
square distribution), the model fits. On that basis, the full model for ARD, VRD and MRD indicates a 
significant improvement. 
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Table 7.5: LMM results of  the impact of  risk levels on ARD, VRD and MRD 
This table provides LMM for each type of  risk disclosure. *, **, *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, 
respectively (all one-tailed except when sign is not predicted or mixed). Variables‟ definitions are the same as 
in Table 7.2. This table contains four main parts. The first gives the coefficients of  each parameter using T 
test. The second part assesses the overall model‟s parameters using both fixed effect, which statistically 
examines the intercept of  the baseline model using F test, and the random effect, which additionally provides 
the ICC between the residual and intercept, using the Wald Z test. The third appraises the model; -2LL is 
implemented and change chi-square is used to test such significance statistically. The fourth gives the number 
of  observations (Ob). T, F, Wald Z and change chi-square values are given in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
   In/De 
 
 
 
 
         
 ARD VRD MRD 
ES  BM 
 
 FM BM 
 
FM BM FM 
Intercept ? 
 
 1.39*** 
(0.000) 
 1.34*** 
(0.000) 
 0.39*** 
(0.006) 
TR +  -0.108** 
(0.035) 
 -.105** 
(0.04) 
 -0.0873 
(0.313) 
SR + 
 
 
 0.043* 
(0.073) 
 0.04* 
(0.087) 
 0.0548 
(0.165) 
USR + 
 
 0.019 
(0.497) 
 0.021 
(0.449) 
 -0.0029 
(0.952) 
RAR - 
 
 -0.045*** 
(0.003) 
 -0.042*** 
(0.007) 
 -0.045** 
(0.039) 
FR + 
 
 0.032*** 
(0.000) 
 0.03*** 
(0.001) 
 0.045*** 
(0.003) 
LR - 
 
 0.086** 
(0.041) 
 0.089** 
(0.017) 
 0.1032 
(0.135) 
SE + 
 
 0.172*** 
(0.000) 
 0.174*** 
(0.000) 
 0.178*** 
(0.000) 
PE + 
 
 0.028** 
(0.045) 
 0.033** 
(0.019) 
 0.0133 
(0.582) 
GE + 
 
 -0.030 
(0.215) 
 -0.040* 
(0.098) 
 -.040 
(0.304) 
DE + 
 
 -0.014 
(0.328) 
 -0.015 
(0.293) 
 -0.001 
(0.997) 
1-Fixed effect 
Intercept (F value) 
 
2-Random effect 
(1) Variance Estimate: 
 Residual 
 Intercept (industry/year) 
 
  (2)   Wald Z: 
 Residual 
 Intercept (industry/year) 
  
212227.6*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.037 
0.003 
 
 
18.868*** 
(0.000) 
2.184** 
(0.029) 
  
16464.5*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.037 
0.004 
 
 
18.866*** 
(0.000) 
2.295** 
(0.022) 
  
20268.4*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.083 
0.000 
 
 
20.05*** 
(0.000) 
0.230** 
(0.040) 
 
Changes -2 LL   
(Change chi-square) 
 406.78*** 
(0.000) 
 408.7*** 
(0.000) 
 258.24*** 
(0.000) 
 
Ob  804  804  804  
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In the case of  mandatory risk disclosure, Table 7.5 shows that the baseline model indicates 
the intercept as being significantly different from zero. Variances of  the intercept within 
and between industries and years are significant. The ICC, however, shows that all 
variations of  mandatory risk disclosure reflect variance within firms rather than across 
industries or years. The conditional model indicates that mandatory risk disclosure is 
significantly and positively influenced by risk-adjusted return and financing risk. Firm size 
is the only control variable that statistically and positively affects the information the firms 
provide mandatorily.                               
 
In summary, this chapter concludes that the relations of  both aggregated and voluntary 
risk disclosure with both independent and control variables are very similar under these 
three models. However, the corresponding relations in the case of  mandatory risk differ 
slightly with each model. Table 7.6 presents a summary of  the results of  the main 
hypotheses under each model.          
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Table 7.6: Summary of  hypotheses tests 
 
ARD, VRD and MRD are aggregated, voluntary and mandatory risk disclosure. A means acceptance that 
there is significant association, R means rejection that there is significant association, + means positive 
direction, - means negative direction, +/- means mixed result from prior research, and ? means no prior 
research, to the best of  the researcher‟s knowledge, has been conducted on this variable.
Risk reporting studies  ES  Hypotheses Regression  models 
ARD VRD MRD Pooled OLS FEM LMM 
ARD VRD MR
D 
ARD VRD MR
D 
AR
D 
VRD MR
D 
+/- +/- ? + 
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
H1 Total risk  
 
A 
- 
A 
- 
R 
- 
A 
- 
A 
- 
R 
- 
A 
- 
A 
- 
R 
- 
+/- +/- ? + H2 Systematic risk 
 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
R 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
R 
+ 
? ? ? + H3 Unsystematic risk   R 
+ 
R 
+ 
R 
+ 
R 
+ 
R 
+ 
R 
+ 
R 
+ 
R 
+ 
R 
+ 
? ? ? + H4 Risk-adjusted 
return  
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
+/- +/- ? + H5 Financing risk 
 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
? +/- +/- + H6 Liquidity risk 
 
A 
- 
A 
- 
A 
- 
A 
- 
A 
- 
A 
- 
A 
- 
A 
- 
R 
- 
+/- +/- + + 
  
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
 Size effect 
 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
? ? ? + Profitability effect  A 
+ 
A 
+ 
R 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
R 
+ 
A 
+ 
A 
+ 
R 
+ 
? ? ? + Growth effect 
 
A 
- 
A 
- 
R 
- 
A 
- 
A 
- 
R 
- 
R 
- 
A 
- 
R 
- 
? ? ? + Dividends effect   R 
- 
R 
- 
R 
- 
R 
- 
R 
- 
R 
- 
R 
- 
R 
- 
R 
- 
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7.3.3. Further analysis 
Corporate Governance (CG) effects 
 
As previously discussed in Section 4.3.3 based on agency theory and relevant prior 
research, several proxies can be utilised to identify the impact of  CG on risk disclosure. 
Specifically, these proxies are board size (BZ), proportion of  non-executive directors 
(PNED), proportion of  independent non-executive directors (PINED) and chief  
executive officer (CEO) duality29. 
 
Table 7.7 indicates the effect of  these corporate governance variables on aggregated, 
voluntary and mandatory disclosure. The researcher finds that firms with high PINED; 
PNED and large BZ are more likely to disclose significantly higher levels of  voluntary risk 
information, at p-values of  0.006, 0.086 and 0.000, respectively. Mandatory risk disclosure 
is influenced significantly by BZ, at a p-value of  0.000. Table 7.7 indicates that CEO 
duality affects neither voluntary nor mandatory disclosure significantly.   
         
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
29 These variables are manually collected from the BoardEx database over the period 2005-2008. The 
descriptive statistics (not tabulated) indicate that 1035 (88.2%) of  1069 firm-years are not characterised by 
CEO duality. In these 1069 firm-years, there are 13,666 directors, 1489 EDs (approximately 11%) and 12,177 
NEDs (approximately 89%). Of  these NEDs, 9443 (77.6%) may be described as independent. The 
correlation matrix indicates significant and positive (negative) impact of  BZ (PNED) on voluntary and 
mandatory disclosures at p-value 0.000 (0.049). Pearson correlation coefficients, however, document 
insignificant differences (associations) between firms in terms of  CEO duality (PINED) relative to (and) 
voluntary and mandatory risk disclosure. Pearson coefficients indicate potential multi-collinearity between 
ED and NED (0.950 at p-value 0.000) and this is confirmed by VIF (15.8). ED is excluded, therefore, from 
LMM.  
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Table 7.7: LMM results of  the impact of  risk levels on ARD, VRD and MRD after 
considering CG effects 
The table provides LMM for each type of  risk disclosure after including CG effects. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively (all one-tailed except when sign is not predicted or mixed). 
Variables‟ definitions are the same as in Table 7.2. In addition, CG variables appear; specifically, BZ, 
In/De       ES ARD VRD MRD 
BM 
 
FM 
 
BM FM 
 
BM 
 
FM 
 
Intercept ? 
 
 -2.288*** 
(0.000) 
 -2.527*** 
(0.000) 
 1.31** 
(0.037) 
TR +  -0.120* 
(0.090) 
 -0.116* 
(0.100) 
 -0.091 
(0.442) 
SR + 
 
 
 0.955** 
(0.024) 
 0.910** 
(0.031) 
 1.054 
(0.132) 
USR + 
 
 6.420 
(0.720) 
 8.480 
(0.642) 
 -1.446 
(0.700) 
RAR - 
 
 -0.825** 
(0.024) 
 -0.856** 
(0.018) 
 -0.957 
(0.126) 
FR + 
 
 0.049*** 
(0.003) 
 0.047*** 
(0.004) 
 0.062** 
(0.030) 
LR - 
 
 0.486*** 
(0.004) 
 0.498*** 
(0.003) 
 0.533 
(0.186) 
SE + 
 
 0.123*** 
(0.000) 
 0.123*** 
(0.000) 
 0.121*** 
(0.000) 
PE + 
 
 0.048 
(0.420) 
 0.061 
(0.808) 
 0.064 
(0.884) 
GE + 
 
 -0.026 
(0.442) 
 -0.005 
(0.479) 
 0.003 
(0.875) 
DE + 
 
 -0.038 
(0.277) 
 -0.035 
(0.316) 
 -0.037 
(0.530) 
BZ 
 
 
?  0.327*** 
(0.000) 
 0.324*** 
(0.000) 
 0.320*** 
(0.001) 
PNED ?  0.168*** 
(0.006) 
 0.160*** 
(0.009) 
 0.196 
(0.066) 
 
PINED ?  0.046* 
(0.086) 
 0.044* 
(0.096) 
 0.064 
(0.160) 
CEO duality  ?  -0.042 
(0.914) 
 -.051 
(0.903) 
 -0.061 
(0.943) 
1-Fixed effect 
         Intercept (F value) 
2-Random effect 
(1) Variance Estimate: 
 Residual 
 Intercept (industry/year) 
   (2)   Wald Z: 
 Residual 
 Intercept (industry/year) 
 
19853.7*** 
(0.000) 
 
           0.024 
0.004 
 
16.599*** 
(0.000) 
2.150** 
(0.032) 
  
15082.01*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.025 
0.006 
 
     16.664*** 
(0.000) 
2.288** 
(0.022) 
  
20268.4*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.073 
0.002 
 
  16.703*** 
(0.000) 
0.932 
(0.351) 
 
Changes -2 LL   
(Change chi-square) 
155.26*** 
(0.000) 
 172.11*** 
(0.000) 
 148.90*** 
(0.000) 
 
Ob 795  795  795  
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measured by the natural logarithm of  the total number of  board directors, PNED, expressing the proportion 
of  non-executives, PINED, expressing the proportion of  independent non-executives relative to the BZ, and 
CEO as a dummy variable with a value of  1 if  the chief  executive officer is also chairman of  the board of  
directors and a value of  0 otherwise. This table contains four main parts. The first gives the coefficients of  
each parameter using T test. The second part assesses the overall model‟s parameters using both the fixed 
effect model, which statistically examines the intercept of  the baseline model using F test, and the random 
effect model, which additionally provides the ICC between the residual and intercept, using Wald Z test. The 
third appraises the model; -2LL is implemented and change chi-square is used to test such significance 
statistically. The fourth gives the number of  observations (Ob). T, F, Wald Z, and change chi-square values 
are given in parentheses. 
 
 
The main consideration of  corporate governance effects leaves the researcher‟s principal 
conclusions about the extent to which firm risk levels motivate firms to provide voluntary 
and mandatory risk disclosure unaffected. 
 
High- and low-risk firms 
 
LMM for the same variables was run after discriminating between high- and low-risk firms. 
Beta is used to highlight such differentiation; if  a firm‟s beta is more (less) than one, the 
firm will be classified as high- (low-) risk.  
 
Firstly, Table 7.8 indicates that the results for high-risk firms, in terms of  aggregated and 
voluntary risk disclosure, are the same as the LMM for the entire sample. Firm size is the 
only control variable that (significantly and positively) influences voluntary disclosure. Firm 
size and firm profitability are the only control variables that (significantly and positively) 
influence mandatory risk disclosure. 
 
Secondly, the results for low-risk firms indicate that aggregated and voluntary risk 
disclosures are associated negatively with total and liquidity risks and positively with risk-
adjusted return. Mandatory risk disclosure is not associated with risk levels but is 
significantly and positively influenced by size and profitability. 
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To conclude, the results suggest that high-risk firms appear more likely to disclose both 
mandatory and voluntary risk information relative to their risk levels than low-risk firms.  
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Table 7.8: LMM results for low- and high-risk firms of  the impact of  risk levels on ARD, VRD and MRD 
In/De 
 
ES Low-risk firms High-risk firms 
ARD 
 
 
VRD MRD ARD VRD MRD 
BM FM BM FM BM FM BM 
 
FM BM 
 
FM BM 
 
FM 
Intercept ? 
 
 
 
1.467*** 
(0.000) 
 1.430*** 
(0.000) 
 0.3299* 
(0.079) 
 1.254*** 
(0.000) 
 1.71*** 
(0.000) 
 0.453** 
(0.039) 
TR +  
 
-.183*** 
(0.008) 
 -.176** 
(0.011) 
 -0.162 
(0.170) 
 -0.100 
(0.231) 
 -0.113 
(0.173) 
 -0.012 
(0.931) 
SR + 
 
 
 
 
-0.004 
(0.882) 
 -0.014 
(0.638) 
 0.050 
(0.844) 
 
 0.151** 
(0.047) 
 .158** 
(0.035) 
 0.161 
(0.203) 
USR + 
 
 
 
-0.043 
(0.988) 
 -0.005 
(0.886) 
 0.021 
(0.753) 
 0.0061 
(0.885) 
 0.015 
(0.709) 
 0.044 
(0.534) 
RAR - 
 
 
 
-0.437*** 
(0.006) 
 -0.046*** 
(0.004) 
 -0.028 
(0.288) 
 -0.031 
(0.238) 
 -0.018 
(0.508) 
 -0.051 
(0.135) 
FR + 
 
 
 
0.007 
(0.530) 
 0.0098 
(0.423) 
 0.003 
(0.846) 
 0.060*** 
(0.000) 
 0.055*** 
(0.000) 
 0.085*** 
(0.000) 
LR - 
 
 
 
0.099* 
(0.064) 
 0.105** 
(0.032) 
 0.078 
(0.424) 
 0.096** 
(0.021) 
 0.087** 
(0.034) 
 0.130** 
(0.052) 
SE + 
 
 
 
0.164*** 
(0.000) 
 0.161*** 
(0.000) 
 0.191*** 
(0.000) 
 0.176*** 
(0.000) 
 0.183*** 
(0.000) 
 0.159*** 
(0.000) 
PE + 
 
 
 
0.041** 
(0.023) 
 0.035* 
(0.052) 
 0.080** 
(0.011) 
 0.004 
(0.832) 
 0.022 
(0.337) 
 -0.073** 
(0.052) 
GE + 
 
 
 
-0.072** 
(0.029) 
 -0.072** 
(0.031) 
 -0.073 
(0.186) 
 -0.010 
(0.750) 
 -0.025 
(0.445) 
 -0.025 
(0.656) 
DE +  
 
-0.021 
(0.262) 
 -0.024 
(0.201) 
 0.008 
(0.793) 
 -0.007 
(0.765) 
 -0.014 
(0.568) 
 0.0142 
(0.710) 
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The table provides LMM for each type of  risk disclosure under both low- and high-risk firms. *, **, *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively (all one-tailed except 
when sign is not predicted or mixed). Variables‟ definitions are the same as in Table 7.2. This table contains four main parts. The first gives the coefficients of  each parameter using 
T test. The second part assesses the overall model‟s parameters using both the fixed effect model, which statistically examines the intercept of  the baseline model using F test, and 
the random effect model, which additionally provides the ICC between residual and intercept, using Wald Z test. The third appraises the model; -2LL is implemented and change 
chi-square is used to test such significance statistically. The fourth gives the number of  observations (Ob). T, F, Wald Z and change chi-square values are given in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1-Fixed effect 
Intercept (F value) 
 
2-Random effect 
(1) Variance Estimate: 
 Residual 
 Intercept (industry/year) 
 
 (2)  Wald Z: 
 Residual 
 Intercept (industry/year) 
 
 
 
 
15773.4*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.037 
0.004 
 
 
                     16.72*** 
(0.000) 
2.04** 
(0.041) 
 
 
12488.280*** 
(0.000) 
 
                                                        
0.0388 
0.005 
 
 
                 16.722*** 
(0.000)                             
2.136** 
(0.033) 
 
4936.18*** 
(0.000) 
 
 0.079 
0.002 
 
 
              14.393*** 
(0.000) 
1.311 
(0.190) 
 
19487.4*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.037 
0.003 
 
                                   
16.471*** 
(0.000) 
2.017** 
(0.044) 
 
1518.282*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.037 
0.004 
 
    16.468*** 
(0.000) 
                       2.195** 
(0.028) 
 
91616.162*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.082 
0.000 
 
13.565*** 
(0.000) 
 
-- 
 
                 
 
 
 
 Changes -2 LL   
 
(Change chi-square) 
 
 
201*** 
 
(0.000) 
216*** 
 
(0.000) 
117.5*** 
 
(0.000) 
90.4*** 
 
(0.000) 
91.8*** 
 
(0.000) 
78*** 
 
(0.000) 
Ob 575 575 575 557 557 557 
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Sensitivity analysis 
 
To examine the extent to which the results are sensitive to using different models, the FEM 
regression was run for high- and low-risk firms respectively for aggregated, voluntary and 
mandatory risk disclosure. The results (not tabulated), compared with the results obtained 
for aggregated, voluntary and mandatory risk disclosure, give identical results for low-risk 
firms and very similar results for high-risk firms.  
 
7.4. Concluding remarks  
 
This chapter empirically investigates the main incentives for aggregated, voluntary and 
mandatory risk disclosure, and is the first to comprehensively investigate the relation 
between these three types of  disclosure and risk levels for a large sample of  the UK all 
share index over an extended time period using automated content analysis.  
 
This chapter examines the extent to which different firm risk levels (namely, total, 
systematic, unsystematic, risk-adjusted return, financing and liquidity risks) influence 
corporate risk reporting. The results demonstrate that both aggregated and voluntary risk 
disclosures are significantly and positively associated with risk-adjusted return and both 
systematic and financing risks. These results are consistent with both managers‟ incentives 
theories, suggesting that managers are motivated to provide higher levels of  risk 
information voluntarily to reduce both information asymmetry and agency costs, and some 
prior empirical literature (e.g., Abraham and Cox, 2007; Kothari et al., 2009). 
 
The results also exhibit, however, significant negative associations between aggregated and 
voluntary risk disclosures and total and liquidity risks, suggesting that firms with higher 
  
176 
 
total risk or lower liquidity levels are less likely to provide risk information in their annual 
report narratives. Whilst this result conflicts with prior theory, it is consistent with some 
empirical literature (e.g., Marshall and Weetman, 2002, 2007).  
 
This chapter also finds significant and positive associations between aggregated and 
voluntary risk reporting and firm size and profitability. These results are consistent both 
with agency theory and prior empirical research (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham 
and Cox, 2007). There is a significant negative association between these two risk 
disclosure types and firm growth. 
 
In contrast with both aggregated and voluntary risk disclosures, mandatory risk disclosure 
is found to be unrelated to firm risk levels. The results suggest that mandatory risk 
disclosure is significantly and positively responsive to firm size.  
 
Methodologically, the results are reinforced by the use of  three different regression models, 
namely, OLS, FEM and LMM. The study is the first to use LMM to examine these 
relations, in order to overcome the problems resulting from reliance on the more common 
OLS and FEM approaches. Under LMM, the associations between risk disclosure levels 
and risk levels are explored by combining cross-sectional and time series effects. Most 
importantly, this method considers the residuals dependency problem, which has been 
largely neglected in market-based accounting research (e.g. Bernard, 1987; Gow et al., 
2010).  
 
These results have implications for the regulation of  risk reporting, particularly within the 
UK. In general terms, they reinforce support for encouraging (by means of  non-
mandatory initiatives such as those of  the ICAEW) UK firms to provide risk information 
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voluntarily rather than mandatorily. The evidence, however, also signals that firms may 
provide less risk information than what would constitute an appropriate response to their 
underlying risk levels. The study also provides the first evidence confirming that the 
variability of  aggregated and voluntary risk disclosure of  UK firms is associated with the 
variability of  firm risk. 
 
This chapter has some limitations. Further research may deal with these by extending the 
present research design. Additional variables might be applied to the study of  the risk-risk 
disclosure relations, which are the focus of  the present chapter. Such variables might focus 
on both finance (e.g., listing status, dual listing and capital structure) and corporate 
governance (e.g., ownership structure; internal and external audit characteristics). Risk 
disclosure may be measured on the basis of  sources other than annual reports (e.g., 
financial releases, financial newspapers; see e.g., Kothari et al., 2009). Further research 
might also usefully explore risk reporting incentives across countries which are subject to 
differing regulatory regimes (as discussed in Section 2.5). This will be investigated in the 
following two chapters. 
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Chapter Eight: Empirical Evidence (2): Within-country Evidence  
Do risk level variations drive mandatory and voluntary risk reporting variations 
within and between firms? Evidence from the USA, the UK and Germany 
 
 
 
8.1. Overview 
 
 
This chapter contributes to risk reporting research by using repeated measures multilevel 
analysis and computer-based content analysis to examine the main incentives for 
mandatory and voluntary risk reporting (MRR and VRR) within and between firms in the 
USA, the UK and Germany. This chapter addresses two major questions; the first concerns 
the extent to which firm risk levels explain MRR and VRR variations within and between 
firms in the three countries. The second concerns the extent to which specific categories 
of  risk influence MRR and VRR in each country.  
 
The results show that incorporating firm risk levels with other firm characteristics 
improves the models‟ ability to express explained against unexplained MRR and VRR 
variations within and between firms in each country. 
 
The results report that US firms characterised by high volatile market returns, systematic 
risk, high liquidity risk, large size, low profitability and high growth exhibit significantly 
higher levels of  MRR in their 10-K narratives. US firms characterised by low liquidity, large 
size and low profitability, however, are more likely to exhibit significantly higher levels of  
VRR. 
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In the case of  the UK, the results show that MRR is dominated significantly and positively 
by firm size rather than by risk levels. By way of  contrast, however, UK firms characterised 
by high systematic risk, low liquidity risk, large size and high profitability are more 
motivated to disclose significantly higher levels of  VRR in their annual report narratives. 
 
Finally, the results document that both MRR and VRR by German firms are sensitive to 
risk levels. Specifically, firms characterised by lower market returns volatility, higher 
systematic risk, lower liquidity risk and larger size are more likely to disclose higher levels 
of  MRR in their annual report narratives. German firms, however, which are characterised 
by lower volatility, lower unsystematic risk, higher systematic risk, higher financing risk and 
larger size, have incentives for disclosing significantly higher levels of  VRR.  
 
These results suggest that, in the US, MRR is more sensitive to firm risk levels (total, 
systematic and liquidity risks) than VRR, which is more correlated to other firm 
characteristics. The UK results suggest that VRR is more sensitive to firm risk levels 
(systematic and liquidity risks) than MRR, which is dominated by firm size, among other 
firm characteristics. In Germany, however, both MRR and VRR are significantly related to 
risk levels (total, systematic, un-systematic, financing and liquidity risks). These results have 
many implications and support the respective regulatory approach adopted within each 
country.    
 
The remainder of  the chapter is organised as follows. The following section explains the 
research methods, including data collection and sample selection, the measurement and 
description of  variables and the empirical model. The results are discussed in Section 8.3. 
Section 8.4 provides conclusions, discusses limitations and suggests areas for future 
research. 
  
180 
 
8.2. Method  
8.2.1. Data collection and sample selection 
The main detailed criteria used to identify this chapter‟s sample are the same as those 
introduced in the methodology chapter (Chapter Five). Hence, these criteria yield a list of  
320, 339 and 219 US, UK and German firms, respectively. The researcher collects annual 
reports for the UK and German firms from either Thomson One Banker or the 
company‟s website, and collects 10-Ks from the US firms from historical SEC EDGAR. 
All these collections are for financial years ending within the period 30 June 2005 to 30 
June 2010. All annual reports are converted to text files so as to be readable by Nudist 6. 
Consequently, the total size of  the sample is 1270, 1410 and 1005 firm-years for the USA, 
the UK and Germany, respectively.  
 
8.2.2. Variables: Measurement and description  
This chapter uses firm characteristics variables that are defined in Table 5.3.  
8.2.3. Empirical model  
Repeated measures multilevel analysis is utilised to associate firm risk levels and other firm 
characteristics with variations in MRR and VRR within each firm over a repeated period of  
time from 2005 to 2009, which expresses level 1, and between each firm to another, which 
expresses level 2 (in the UK, the USA and Germany between 2005 and 2009). In level 1, 
variations in MRR and VRR are measured within each firm over 2005 to 2009 in the USA, 
the UK and Germany, as in the following equation 
2
0 1 2ti i i ti i ti tiRR Z Z                                                                          
                                                                                                                                   (8.1) 
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Where RR is risk reporting (MRR and VRR) of firm i in year t; Β0i is the intercept of firm i; 
β1 and β2i are the slopes of time-varying variables with firm i. Zti and Z
2
ti are both linear and 
quadratic components of time of firm i at time t during 2005 to 2009, which are the main 
parameters at level 1 (shown under the null Model), each of which is given according to 
polynomial curves. Coding time is essential at this level to be consistent with the main 
requirements of these curves. Most importantly, these codes affect the model‟s intercept 
interpretations.30  
In level 2, the variations in MRR and VRR amongst all US, UK and German firms (β pi) are 
measured through explanatory variables that are a firm‟s risk levels (shown under Model 1) 
and other characteristics (control variables, shown under Model 2), as in the following 
equation. 
0
1 1
pi p rq qi oq qi i
Qr Qo
Xfl Xfl r
q q
       
 
                                                  
                                                                                                                                      (8.2) 
Where Xfl qi is firm-level analysis of specific characteristics of firm i, which is a function of 
firm risk levels (namely, total, systematic, unsystematic, financing and liquidity risks) and 
other control variables (namely, a firm‟s size, profitability, growth and dividends). βrq and 
βoq represent the effect of firm-level characteristics (Xfl qi) on both linear and quadratic 
components of time of growth rate of MRR and VRR. ε ti  is the standard error of firm i at 
time t between 2005 to 2009. 
                                                 
 
30 The interpretation of  the model‟s intercept depends on the way the time is coded over the period under 
analysis. For instance, if  the time in yearly intervals commencing from 0 is coded, then the intercept is 
called a true or an initial trajectory of  VRR or MRR of  firm i at country j at time point 0. Therefore, the 
intercept serves as a baseline to appraise the subsequent model‟s variables. There are some other situations 
in which the intercept can stand for the middle or the end status if  the middle or the end year is considered. 
Hox (2010) argues that coding time as such appropriates the repeated measures of  polynomial curves that 
can identify changes within and between firms by estimating the standard linear modelling procedures.  
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These two equations can be aggregated in the following equation: 
 
2
0 1 2
1 1
Qr
ti i i ti i ti rq qi oq qi ti i
q
Qo
RR Z Z Xfl Xfl r
q
     

      

            
                                                                                                                                     (8.3) 
 
All the variables in equation (8.3) have the same definitions as in equation (8. 1) and 
equation (8. 2). It is essential to consider error structure at either level 1(εt) or level 2 (ri) in 
all the above equations. The error or the residual of  level 1 is the variability between the 
estimated and the actual values of  MRR/VRR within firms over time. If  the data under 
analysis have a common trend towards rising or declining between two points in time, as is 
common in time series data, the AR (1) or the first order autoregressive structure with 
homogenous variance will be the most appropriate form for structuring this level‟s error 
(Heck et al., 2010). AR (1) admits, as an underlying assumption, that there is a correlation 
between residuals which will be stronger in successive than in non-successive points in 
time.31 The error structure of  level 2 (ri), however, can be explicitly reflected through 
random effect at that level, which, in turn, might contain random intercept, random linear 
slope and covariance between the intercept and the linear slope. 
8.3. Empirical results 
8.3.1. Primary results 
Figure 8.1 gives the developments on average of  MRR, VRR, and market- and accounting-
risk measures (volatility, beta and volatility of  standard error of  CAPM; leverage and 
                                                 
 
31 There are other forms of  errors structure (e.g., the scale identity and the first order autoregressive moving 
average structure (ARMA)). For more details see Heck et al., 2010. 
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current ratio, respectively) in each country. The figure shows that, on average, the US firms 
tend to provide higher levels of  MRR than VRR between 2005 and 2009 by approximately 
60 mandated statements of  risk disclosure on average. Conversely, the UK and German 
firms, on average, provided higher levels of  VRR than MRR between 2005 and 2009 by 
around 280 and 100 mandated statements, respectively. Furthermore, over this period, both 
USR and LR were more stable. Other risks (namely, TR, SR and FR), however, fluctuated 
on average between 2005 and 2009. 
 
Consistent with these conclusions, Panels A, B and C of  Table 8.1 report descriptive 
statistics of  main variables in the USA, the UK and Germany, respectively. Panel A 
indicates that US firms exhibit, on average, 16% more MRR than VRR. The fluctuations in 
MRR, as indicated from standard division among the US firms, therefore, are double of  
those VRR. Panel B indicates that UK firms disclose, on average, 86% more VRR than 
MRR. This is similar to German firms, which disclose; on average, more VRR than they do 
MRR by 50%, as is shown in Panel C. Consequently, among the UK and German firms, 
the fluctuations in VRR are higher than those in MRR. 
 
US firms exhibit the highest level, on average, of  MRR compared with the disclosures 
revealed by UK and German firms. US firms reveal 86% more than the UK firms‟ MRR 
and 53% more than the German firms‟ MRR. In contrast, the UK firms exhibit 20 % of  
their VRR more than US firms, and 9% more than German firms. These results suggest 
that in all these three distinctive approaches to risk reporting, managers have incentives to 
explain more about their risks by providing more risk information voluntarily, along with 
exhibiting high levels of  compliance with risk reporting regulations. One main reason 
might be that managers are compromising voluntary with mandatory risk reporting to 
optimise their risk reporting levels. Among other variables, these panels report that 
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leverage, as a proxy for financing risk, is the highest fluctuating variable in the UK, 
Germany and the USA. 
 
Identifying the extent to which there is significant association between each pair of  our 
variables, Panel A, Panel B and Panel C of  Table 8.2 report Pearson coefficients in the 
USA, the UK and Germany, respectively. The results reveal the significant associations 
between MRR and VRR in each of  these countries, indicating that firms that reveal 
mandated risk disclosure have the incentive to voluntarily disclose information about their 
risks in these countries; all the p-values are 0.000. These results also indicate that the 
automated method for scoring firm disclosure in each country is valid. Consistent with 
prior research, the coefficients of  MRR and VRR as dependent variables on the one hand, 
and other variables such as firm risk levels and control variables as explanatory variables, 
on the other hand, indicate significant relations, with p-values of  0.000 for most of  these 
variables. 
 
The consistency of  the coefficients on MRR and VRR as dependent variables, on the one 
hand, and a firm‟s risk levels and control variable as explanatory variables, on the other 
hand, with prior research indicates validity of  the automated method for scoring risk 
reporting in each country, as was argued in Chapter Five.    
 
  In the following sections, the current study statistically examines the extent to which 
MRR and VRR within and between firms in these countries can be attributed to firm risk 
levels. 
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Figure 8.1: The average of  firm risk reporting and firm risk levels in the USA, the UK and 
Germany 
This figure explains the mean of  firms‟ risk reporting levels that are captured by both MRR and VRR. 
Additionally, the figure explains the mean of  firms‟ risk levels that are compromised (?) both market-risk 
measures, which are volatility, beta and volatility of  standard error of  CAPM as proxies of  TR, SR and USR, 
respectively, and accounting-risk measures, which are current ratio and leverage as proxies of  LR and FR, 
respectively. All these variables are defined in previous tables. To accurately identify the main trends in these 
variables, all these variables‟ scales are based on their original values, without any transformation. Specifically, 
a firm‟s risk reporting levels (MRR and VRR) are measured by the number of  statements that indicate risk, a 
firm‟s risk levels are measured by market-risk measures that are volatility, beta and volatility of  standard error 
of  CAPM, and by accounting-risk measures that are current ratio and leverage. 
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Table 8.1: Descriptive Statistics  
Panel A: USA 
 
Panel B: UK 
 
 
Panel C: Germany 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for all variables, which have the same definitions as in Table 5.3. All 
statistical measures are calculated based on these variables‟ original data, without any transformation.  
 
 
 
 Mean Standard 
division 
25% Median 75% N 
MRR 236.7 147.573 143.000 225.000 310.750 1392 
VRR 197.23 74.245 150.25 191.00 235.00 1392 
TR 0.544 0.208 0.379 0.519 0.676 1361 
SR 1.151 0.790 0.641 1.085 1.585 1358 
USR 0.029 0.013 0.020 0.027 0.037 1379 
FR 28.182 121.832 0.000 4.74 41.80 1368 
LR 3.711 4.366 1.560 2.430 4.350 1375 
SE 5.328 0.730 4.829 5.237 5.696 1331 
PE -13.958 127.583 -14.207 5.450 15.592 1308 
GE -0.265 6.754 -0.029 0.079 0.184 1341 
DE 4.611 14.030 0.000 3.56 5.821 1261 
 Mean Standard 
division 
25% Median 75% N 
MRR 33.590 21.492 18.00 28.00 43.00 1400 
VRR 242.33 122.11 160.00 225.00 290.00 1398 
TR 0.344 0.156 0.242 0.308 0.388 1432 
SR 1.127 0.868 0.680 1.000 1.400 1431 
USR 0.018 0.009 0.010 0.020 0.020 1447 
FR 71.199 158.55 10.640 51.640 104.365 1441 
LR 1.582 1.840 0.900 1.280 1.710 1431 
SE 6.122 0.720 5.575 6.019 6.607 1420 
PE 26.908 91.542 7.995 17.310 27.865 1381 
GE -0.213 1.360 -0.186 0.131 0.289 1408 
DE 38.338 24.045 23.120 40.080 53.340 1203 
 Mean Standard 
division 
25% Median 75% N 
MRR 110.16 81.498 51.00 96.00 156.00 932 
VRR 221.86 135.598 140.00 188.00 268.00 931 
TR 0.439 0.180 0.309 0.407 0.531 1008 
SR 0.783 0.522 0.448 0.749 1.077 1008 
USR 0.021 0.015 0.014 0.018 0.025 1025 
FR 67.985 133.070 5.575 33.370 84.480 1013 
LR 2.128 1.691 1.190 1.710 2.360 1006 
SE 5.675 0.995 4.932 5.465 6.240 1020 
PE 8.144 38.139 3.932 10.985 18.997 1002 
GE -0.035 1.130 -0.030 0.0546 0.123 1019 
DE 26.790 27.139 0.000 25.935 44.540 936 
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Table 8.2: Correlation matrix (Pearson) 
 
Panel A: USA 
                                     
 
 
Panel B: UK 
                                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 VRR TR SR USR FR LR SE PE GE DE 
MRR 0.300*** 
(0.000) 
0.142*** 
(0.000) 
0.249*** 
(0.000) 
0.071*** 
(0.008) 
-.0600** 
(0.027) 
0.136*** 
(0.000) 
0.076*** 
(0.000) 
-0.233*** 
(0.000) 
0.147*** 
(0.000) 
-0.192*** 
(0.000) 
VRR  0.134*** 
(0.000) 
0.179*** 
(0.000) 
0.047* 
(0.08) 
-0.069** 
(0.011) 
-0.071*** 
(0.009) 
0.191*** 
(0.000) 
-0.241*** 
(0.000) 
0.010 
(0.712) 
-0.156*** 
(0.000) 
TR   0.390*** 
(0.000) 
0.294*** 
(0.000) 
-0.146*** 
(0.000) 
0.096*** 
(0.000) 
-0.412*** 
(0.000) 
-0.350*** 
(0.000) 
-0.009 
(0749) 
-0.364*** 
(0.000) 
SR    0.139*** 
(0.000) 
-0.110*** 
(0.000) 
0.080*** 
(0.003) 
0.090*** 
(0.001) 
-0.240*** 
(0.000) 
-0.030 
(0.268) 
-0.195*** 
(0.000) 
USR     -0.017 
(0.521) 
0.052* 
(0.055) 
-0.266*** 
(0.000) 
-0.368*** 
(0.000) 
-0.086*** 
(0.002) 
-0.224*** 
(0.000) 
FR      -.345*** 
(0.000) 
0.168*** 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.955) 
-0.029 
(0.282) 
0.093*** 
(0.001) 
LR       -0.164*** 
(0.000) 
-0.141*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005 
(0.844) 
-0.129*** 
(0.000) 
SE        0.263*** 
(0.000) 
0.052* 
(0.060) 
0.211*** 
(0.000) 
PE         0.208*** 
(0.000) 
0.341*** 
(0.000) 
GE          -0.009 
(0.746) 
 VRR TR SR USR FR LR SE PE GE DE 
MRR 0.653*** 
(0.000) 
-0.137*** 
(0.000) 
0.029 
(0.284) 
-0.132*** 
(0.000) 
0.192*** 
(0.000) 
-0.090*** 
(0.000) 
0.516*** 
(0.000) 
0.026 
(0.348) 
-0.007 
(0.783) 
0.133*** 
(0.000) 
VRR  -0.142*** 
(0.000) 
0.064** 
(0.018) 
-0.096** 
(0.000) 
0.188*** 
(0.000) 
-0.074*** 
(0.006) 
0.565*** 
(0.000) 
0.047* 
(0.086) 
-0.24 
(0.386) 
0.058** 
(0.047) 
TR   0.548*** 
(0.000) 
0.325*** 
(0.000) 
-0.212*** 
(0.000) 
0.152*** 
(0.000) 
-0.293*** 
(0.000) 
-0.246*** 
(0.000) 
0.234*** 
(0.000) 
-0.347*** 
(0.000) 
SR    0.186*** 
(0.000) 
-0.043 
(0.106) 
0.090*** 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.928) 
-0.139*** 
(0.000) 
0.070*** 
(0.000) 
-0.206*** 
(0.000) 
USR     -0.170*** 
(0.000) 
0.158*** 
(0.000) 
-0.214*** 
(0.000) 
-0.243*** 
(0.000) 
-0.007 
(0.786) 
-0.179*** 
(0.000) 
FR      -0.315*** 
(0.000) 
0.367*** 
(0.000) 
0.60** 
(0.026) 
-0.055** 
(0.039) 
0.127*** 
(0.000) 
LR       -0.226*** 
(0.000) 
-0.088*** 
(0.001) 
0.081*** 
(0.002) 
-0.136*** 
(0.000) 
SE        0.073*** 
(0.007) 
-0.011 
(0.688) 
0.157*** 
(0.000) 
PE         0.048 
(0.079) 
0.140*** 
(0.000) 
GE          -0.127*** 
(0.000) 
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Panel C: Germany 
 
This table shows the correlation analysis between risk reporting and all firm characteristics using Pearson 
coefficients; the p-values are given in parentheses. *, **, *** are significant at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively 
(all two-tailed). The definitions for all variables are the same as in Table 5.3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MRR 0.537*** 
(0.000) 
-0.197*** 
(0.000) 
0.224*** 
(0.000) 
-0.140 
(0.000) 
0.247*** 
(0.000) 
-0.225*** 
(0.000) 
0.351*** 
(0.000) 
-0.023 
(0.480) 
-0.167*** 
(0.000) 
0.099*** 
(0.004) 
VRR  -0.277*** 
(0.000) 
0.124*** 
(0.000) 
-0.195*** 
(0.000) 
0.304*** 
(0.000) 
-0.228*** 
(0.000) 
0.383*** 
(0.000) 
0.026 
(0.433) 
-0.042 
(0.200) 
0.144*** 
(0.000) 
TR   0.489*** 
(0.000) 
0.349*** 
(0.000) 
-0.202*** 
(0.000) 
0.140*** 
(0.000) 
-0.247*** 
(0.000) 
-0.121*** 
(0.000) 
0.037 
(0.246) 
-0.384*** 
(0.000) 
SR    0.081** 
(0.010) 
-0.085* 
(0.066) 
0.009 
(0.778) 
0.076** 
(0.016) 
-0.058* 
(0.070) 
-0.008 
(0.792) 
0.090*** 
(0.006) 
USR     -0.045 
(0.155) 
0.117*** 
(0.000) 
-0.236*** 
(0.000) 
-0.220*** 
(0.000) 
-0.054* 
(0.083) 
-0.302*** 
(0.000) 
FR      -0.644*** 
(0.000) 
0.394*** 
(0.000) 
-0.022 
(0.492) 
-0.119*** 
(0.000) 
-0.012 
(0.710) 
LR       -0.307*** 
(0.000) 
-0.045* 
(0.089) 
0.048 
(0.131) 
0.015 
(0.650) 
SE        0.111*** 
(0.000) 
-0.049 
(0.118) 
0.132*** 
(0.000) 
PE         0.326*** 
(0.000) 
0.369*** 
(0.000) 
GE          0.009 
(0.788) 
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8.3.2. MRR and VRR variations and firm risk levels in the USA, the UK and 
Germany 
The following section provides the empirical results of  the extent to which changes in a 
firm‟s risk levels can explain variations in MRR and VRR within and between firms in the 
three distinctive contexts of  the USA, the UK and Germany. The results are presented into 
two main panels (A and B) in Tables 8.3 and 8.4.  
 
Panel A gives information about the significance of  and the value for the coefficients of  all 
explanatory variables under three models. The first model is known as the null Model and 
provides variations in MRR and VRR over the period of  study (2005 to 2009) without 
using any explanatory variables or any predictors, so this model serves as a baseline model 
in appraising the subsequent models (1 and 2). The second is known as Model 1, which 
concerns variations in MRR and VRR subject to a firm‟s risk level variables (TR, SR, USR, 
LR and FR). The third is known as Model 2, and incorporates the null Model‟s and Model 
1‟s variables with other firm characteristics as control variables (firm size, profitability, 
growth and dividends) to investigate the impacts of  all these variables on variations in 
MRR and VRR, so this model is  known as a full Model. 
 
Panel B provides overall information about the models‟ ability to explain the variations in 
risk reporting through interpreting the variance of  level 1 and level 2. These variances 
indicate how much risk reporting variations exist at each level (based on inter-class 
correlation or ICC). The ICC32 is the proportion of  variability (variance) in either MRR or 
VRR at level 1 (within each firm over 2005 to 2009) and at level 2 (between firm to another 
in each country) (e.g., Sinjder and Bosker, 1999; Heck et al., 2010; Hoax, 2010).  The 
                                                 
 
32  ICC can be calculated at each level; for level 1, for instance, σ2 level 1/ (σ2   of  level 1+ σ2 of  level 2). To 
calculate ICC at level 2, replacing the denominator by the variance of  level 2 is therefore required. 
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significance of  these variances indicates potential possibilities to reduce the unexplained 
variance through including the model with each model‟s explanatory variables. In order to 
identify how much of  the variances in MRR and VRR can be explained by each model‟s 
explanatory variables, R2 can be calculated at either level 1 or level 2 as the  proportional 
reduction in variances of  either Model 1 or Model 2.33 
 
To assess the overall improvement of  either Model 1 or Model 2, the differences of  -2 Log 
Likelihood (-2LL) between each model and the null Model should be considered. If  such 
differences decrease, the main conclusion suggests that this model is improved. To 
examine such improvements statistically, change chi-square should be used to examine a 
null hypothesis of  no variations in risk reporting within and between firms over 2005 to 
2009 in each country. If  the difference between the -2LL for Model 2 (the full Model) and 
the null Model (the baseline model) is greater than the value of  the change chi-square, 
Model 2 is then statistically acceptable. Based on this structure, the empirical results are 
discussed in the following subsections.  
 MRR variations and firm risk levels in the USA, the UK and Germany 
USA 
 
Panel B of  Table 8.3 indicates that, under the null Model, 43% (39% in the intercept and 
4% in the time) of  MRR variations are significant between firms. The rest of  the MRR 
variations (57%) are within each firm over 2005 to 2009. The significance of  these 
variations at p-values of  0.000 suggest that there are still some significant variations to be 
explained at level 1 (within each US firm over 2005 to 2009) and level 2 (between firms) by 
including Model 1‟s (a firm‟s risk levels) and Model 2‟s (both a firm‟s risk levels and its 
other characteristics, such as size) predictors.  
                                                 
 
33  R2 of  Model 1 instantly at level 2 can be calculated as σ2null Model- σ2of  Model 2/ σ2 null Model.  
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In Panel A of  Table 8.3, Model 1, which expresses firm risk levels, shows that MRR 
variations of  the US firms are significantly influenced by variations in these firms‟ total, 
systematic and liquidity risks, at p-values of  0.011, 0.088 and 0.001, with t-statistics (not 
tabulated) of  2.53, 1.71 and 3.42, respectively. The results suggest that highly volatile, high-
beta and highly liquid US firms have higher incentives to disclose more about their risks 
mandatorily. US regulations do not set a maximum limit of  risk information that should be 
included in firms‟ narratives sections; on the contrary, these regulations, as has been argued 
by regulatory theory, only provide minimum requirements. These results support Dobler‟s 
(2008) theoretical argument in which he calls for further research even within highly 
regulated countries, as even within such countries investigating the incentives for risk 
reporting is important. In essence, this chapter‟s evidence suggests that managers of  US 
firms could have some incentives to disclose more about their mandated risks, which in 
turn results in some variations in MRR among those firms.  
 
These results, therefore, are consistent with managers‟ incentives theories. Specifically, and 
based on capital needs theory, if  firms have significantly high risk levels (total and 
systematic risks), investors could therefore require higher desired rates on their 
investments, and they may overestimate such rates if  they do not have sufficient 
information about risks related to their investments (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Deumes and 
Knechel, 2008). As a result, managers could provide more risk information to reduce any 
overestimations, which would help investors to reduce their uncertainty and adjust the 
overestimated desired rate, which in turn would reduce the cost of  capital (Botosan and 
Harris, 2000; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002).  
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Managers at highly liquid US firms, based on signalling theory, might have high incentives 
to disclose more about their mandated risk to inform their investors of  how they 
successfully manage their firms‟ liquidity, aiming to distinguish themselves from managers 
who cannot, or only less effectively, manage their liquidity. This result is consistent 
empirically with Marshall and Weetman (2007). 
 
 As shown in Panel B of  Table 8.3, extending the null Model by including a firm‟s risk 
levels (Model 1) improves the model‟s ability to express MRR variations between the US 
firms by 24% (as R2).34 The same panel reports that 33% of  MRR variations are between 
US firms whereas 62% of  such variations are within US firms between 2005 and 2009. 
This result, however, suggests that the explained variations in the observed MRR variations 
increase when including the null Model with a firm‟s risk level variables against the increase 
of  unexplained variations in the observed MRR within the US firms over 2005 to 2009. 
The significance of  MRR variations indicates the potential possibilities to include other 
predictors (such as in Model 2) to those in Model 1, which may reduce the unexplained 
variations in MRR within and between the US firms.  
 
In Panel A of  Table 8.3, Model 2, which includes other firm characteristics along with firm 
risk levels, documents that US firms characterised by high liquidity, highly volatile market 
returns and high covariance of  these firms‟ market returns relative to the market index are 
more likely to exhibit significantly higher MRR variations, at p-values of  0.010, 0.041 and 
0.0001, respectively. These results are consistent with both the theoretical basis and 
empirical prior research, as explained in Model 1. 
 
                                                 
 
34  Based on our previous notice and based on data in Panel B of  Table 8.3, R2 = 6753.2-5159.13/6753.2 
*100 = 24%.  
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The results in Panel A of  Table 8.3 also suggest that large, less profitable, high growth and 
low paying dividends US firms exhibit significantly higher MRR variations, at p-values of  
0.002, 0.000, 0.000 and 0.011, at t-statistics (not tabulated) of  0.15, -4.60, 4.19 and -2.60, 
respectively. Based on these results, managers in these firms have greater abilities to collect 
and prepare information at a lower average cost (e.g., Verrecchia, 2001). Managers in such 
firms might have higher incentives to reveal more mandated risk information to distinguish 
themselves from managers that exhibit low compliance with the SEC‟s risk regulations. 
Therefore, as far as MRR variations in the USA are concerned, this chapter accepts H1 and 
H2 and rejects H3, H5 and H6. 
 
Panel B of  Table 8.3 suggests that a firm‟s risk levels and other characteristics explain 46% 
(as R2) of  the observed MRR variations between the US firms. From the same panel it can 
be seen, at a p-value of  0.000, 30% of  MRR variations are between US firms, whereas 70% 
of  MRR variations are within US firms during 2005 to 2009.  
UK 
 
Panel B of  Table 8.3 shows that, under the null Model, 58% of  MRR variability (56% in 
the intercept and 2% in the time) is between UK firms. The rest of  the MRR variations are 
within UK firms between 2005 and 2009 (variations within each firm over 2005 to 2009). 
The significance of  these variations, at p-values of  0.000, suggests that there are still 
considerable variations to be explained by extending the null Model by including a firm‟s 
risk level variables, shown in Model 1. 
 
Model 1, which expresses a firm‟s risk levels, in Panel A of  Table 8.3, suggests that total, 
systematic and financing risks are likely to significantly influence MRR variations in UK 
firms‟ annual report narratives, at p-values of  0.045, 0.064 and 0.078, respectively. The 
results indicate, on the one hand, that UK firms with higher levels of  systematic and 
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financing risks are highly motivated to exhibit higher levels of  risk information 
mandatorily. On the other hand, those firms tend to provide lower levels of  risk 
information as a response to their highly volatile market returns. 
 
These results are consistent with theoretical arguments that suggest that firms with high 
risk levels provide more risk information in order to reduce the cost of  capital by reducing 
investor uncertainty caused by a lack of  information about risk, and signal their quality 
performance. Empirically, these results are consistent with Linsley and Shrives (2006) and 
Abraham and Cox (2007). 
 
To assess the extent to which Model 1‟s variables explain variations in MRR, Panel B of  
Table 8.3 suggests that around 12% (as R2) of  MRR variations between British firms can 
be explained by variations in their risk levels. Due to adding a firm‟s risk levels as 
exploratory variables, the variations in MRR between UK firms steadily decrease to 
compare to the null Model (56%). The result indicates, nevertheless, that there are still 
significant variations of  MRR that can be explained by further including in Model 1 some 
other variables at a p-value of  0.000, as are be explained in Model 2. 
 
Model 2 in Panel A of  Table 8.3 considers other firm characteristics; the results report that 
providing MRR is significantly dominated by a firm‟s size rather than other variables, at a 
p-value of  0.000 (t-statistic = 12.37, not tabulated). This result suggests that managers in 
large UK firms exhibit higher MRR diversification than those in small UK firms, relative to 
their risks. Managers at those larger firms have greater abilities to collect and prepare 
information at a relatively lower average cost than small firms, resulting in encouragement 
for managers to signal their high compliance with UK risk initiatives and regulations in 
order to distinguish themselves from others who exhibit low compliance of  risk reporting. 
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As far as MRR variations in the UK are concerned, this chapter, therefore, rejects its 
hypotheses (from H1 to H6) suggesting that within the UK context, MRR variations are 
not significantly associated with firm risk levels, consistent with what has been argued and 
found in Chapter Seven. It is also consistent with some prior risk reporting research (e.g., 
Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 2006). 
 
Under Model 2 in Panel B of  Table 8.3, therefore, the MRR variations between firms (level 
2) significantly declined to 29%, from 50% in Model 1. Consequently, incorporating a 
firm‟s risk levels and other characteristics explains 60% of  MRR between the UK firms (as 
R2).  
Germany 
 
The null Model in Panel B of  Table 8.3 documents that 47% of  MRR variations (46% in 
the intercept and 1% in the time) are between German firms(level 2), whereas the 
remainder of  MRR variations are within German firms between 2005 and 2009(level 1), all 
at p-values of  0.000. At both levels, the results indicate that significant variations remain 
and can be explained by including in the null Model either a firm‟s risk levels (Model 1) or 
other characteristics (Model 2).  
 
A firm‟s risk levels, as shown under Model 1 in Panel A of  Table 8.3, explain that German 
firms‟ MRR variations are significantly influenced by their total, systematic and liquidity 
risks, at p-values of  0.000, 0.000 and 0.003, respectively. These results suggest that 
variations in the MRR of  German firms are significantly associated with these firms‟ high 
beta, lower liquidity and lower volatility. These results, which suggest that the high 
variability of  MRR is a function of  these firms‟ risk level variations, are consistent with 
both theory and prior research, as discussed with reference to MRR in the USA and the 
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UK. To assess the extent to which including a firm‟s risk levels in Model 1 improves the 
overall explanations of  MRR variations, Panel B of  Table 8.3 reports that firms‟ risk levels 
explain 33% of  MRR variations between these firms. Consequently, the MRR variations 
between German firms significantly decreased to 40%, at a p-value of  0.000, compared 
with the null Model (46%). The significance of  these variations, however, suggests that the 
model can be expanded to include some other variables to reduce the unexplained 
variations in MRR either within or between German firms. This is explained through 
Model 2.  
 
Panel A of  Table 8.3 reports under Model 2 that, in addition to total, systematic and 
liquidity risks, a firm‟s size is the only factor (among the control variables) that significantly 
affects the MRR of  German firms, at a p-value of  0.000. 
 
Model 2 in Panel B of  Table 8.3 explains that risk level variables, together with other firm 
characteristics, explain 41% of  MRR variations between firms, at a p-value of  0.000. This 
result indicates that there are significant variations to be explained by seeking some other 
indicators at either level 1 or level 2. As far as MRR variations in Germany are concerned, 
this chapter, therefore, accepts H2 and H5 and reject the other hypotheses. 
 
To sum up, changes in firm risk levels are the main indicators that explain variations in 
MRR and VRR in the USA, the UK and Germany. Although including the model of  the 
other firm characteristics (the control variables) improves the model‟s ability to explain why 
MRR varies across firms, the significance of  firm risk levels varies from complete 
domination of  a firm‟s size in the case of  the UK firms to having a substantial impact, as 
in the USA and Germany. 
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Table 8.3: Mandatory risk reporting variations  
Panel A: Estimates of  fixed effects (MRR_T) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 USA UK Germany 
Null Model Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Null 
Model 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
  
Null 
Model 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Intercept 194.57*** 
(0.000) 
117.12*** 
(0.000) 
95.11*** 
(0.001) 
33.88*** 
(0.000) 
33.31*** 
(0.000) 
14.65*** 
(0.000) 
86.63*** 
(0.000) 
112.73*** 
(0.000) 
83.38*** 
(0.000) 
TR  0.44** 
(0.029) 
0.53*** 
(0.010) 
 -4.97** 
(0.045) 
-1.52 
(0.546) 
 -68.37*** 
(0.000) 
-57.90*** 
(0.000) 
SR  0.36** 
(0.019) 
0.26** 
(0.041) 
 4.26* 
(0.064) 
3.20 
(0.152) 
 79.87*** 
(0.000) 
74.11*** 
(0.000) 
USR  -0.00 
(0.989) 
-0.03 
(0.731) 
 -2.54 
(0.305) 
-0.84 
(0.721) 
 -22.01* 
(0.088) 
-10.71 
(0.407) 
FR  0.09 
(0.643) 
-0.01 
(0.952) 
 4.00** 
(0.049) 
.0415 
(0.815) 
 15.56 
(0.267) 
-0.76 
(0.957) 
LR  0.52*** 
(0.006) 
0.63*** 
(0.001) 
 1.23 
(0.567) 
2.37 
(0.248) 
 -42.90*** 
(0.002) 
-39.11*** 
(0.003) 
SE   0.72*** 
(0.002) 
  37.07*** 
(0.000) 
  62.98*** 
(0.000) 
PE   -0.75*** 
(0.000) 
  -0.40 
(0.843) 
  2.43 
(0.809) 
GE   0.51*** 
(0.000) 
  -1.33 
(0.403) 
  -10.97 
(0.219) 
DE   -0.079** 
(0.010) 
  3.35 
(0.134) 
  3.55 
(0.741) 
Time 34.28*** 
(0.000) 
42.31*** 
(0.000) 
38.02*** 
(0.000) 
-3.45*** 
(0.000) 
-4.46*** 
(0.000) 
-5.74*** 
(0.000) 
0.85 
(0.846) 
  
Time 
quadratic 
-5.94*** 
(0.000) 
-7.66*** 
(0.000) 
-6.28*** 
(0.000) 
1.13*** 
(0.000) 
1.38*** 
(0.000) 
1.54*** 
(0.000) 
3.93*** 
(0.000) 
2.99*** 
(0.000) 
2.78*** 
(0.000) 
N-S 
Ob 
254 
1270 
254 
1270 
254 
1270 
282 
1410 
282 
1410 
282 
1410 
201 
1005 
201 
1005 
201 
1005 
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Panel B: Estimates of  covariance (MRR_T) 
Panel A provides the estimates of  the predictors through three models for each country. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively (all one-tailed except when sign is not predicted or mixed). The 
null Model presents the impact of  the (non-)linear component of  time on MRR_T. The successive models 
provide how the predictive variables can express variation in MRR_T within and between firms. Therefore, 
Model 1 explores the impact of  a firm‟s risk levels on its MRR_T variations. Model 2 provides the impact of  
firm risk level and four other characteristics; namely, size, profitability, growth and dividends effects, 
respectively. T-statistics are given in parentheses, N-S is the number of  Subjects under analysis, and Ob is the 
number of  Observations for firm-years. The definitions for all variables are the same as defined in Table 5.4. 
 
Panel B provides estimates of  variance of  each level of  the analysis. The variance of  repeated measures 
(VRM) expresses the variance of  MRR_T that can be attributed to variation within firms over five years (our 
time series), the variance of  intercepts (VI) expresses the variance of  MRR_T that can be attributed to 
variation between firms, and the variance of  time (VT) expresses the variance of  MRR_T that can be 
attributed to variation between firms over time. The ICC is the intra-class correlation, which can be 
calculated at each level; for level 1, for instance, σ2 level 1/ (σ2 of  level1+ σ2 of  level 2). R2 explains the extent 
to which the overall model‟s predictors can implicitly explain changes in MRR, which can be calculated as (σ2 
M1- σ2 M2/ σ2 M1); hence, M1 is the null Model variance component, whereas M2 refers to the current 
model‟s predictors. While change of  -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) is employed to assess each model‟s 
improvements, change chi-square is used to examine such improvements statistically. Wald Z statistics are 
given in parentheses. 
 
 
 
                                                
 
 
 
 
USA UK Germany 
Null Model Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Null 
Model 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Null Model Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
V RM 
(within 
firms) 
9762.08*** 
(0.000) 
9801.40*** 
(0.000) 
10149.35*** 
(0.000) 
179.17*** 
(0.000) 
201.55*** 
(0.000) 
223.21*** 
(0.000) 
3052.48*** 
(0.000) 
2657.37*** 
(0.000) 
2690.72*** 
(0.000) 
V I 
(between 
firms) 
6753.20*** 
(0.000) 
5159.13*** 
(0.000) 
3656.66*** 
(0.005) 
239.92*** 
(0.000) 
210.54*** 
(0.000) 
94.79*** 
(0.000) 
2655.70*** 
(0.000) 
1772.94*** 
(0.000) 
1578.56*** 
(0.000) 
VT 
(between 
firms) 
722.48*** 
(0.000) 
752.39*** 
(0.000) 
669.87*** 
(0.000) 
10.55*** 
(0.000) 
6.66* 
(0.59) 
3.08 
(0.237) 
68.42 
(0.105) 
8.59*** 
(0.002) 
7.75*** 
(0.000) 
ICC 
(VRM) 
57% 62% 70% 42% 48% 69% 53% 60% 63% 
ICC (VI) 39% 33% 25% 56% 50% 29% 46% 40% 37% 
ICC 
(VT) 
4% 5% 5% 2% 2% 2% 1% - - 
R2(VI) --- 24% 46% --- 12% 60% ---- 33% 41% 
Changes 
-2LL 
Change 
chi-
square 
 15.730*** 
(0.000) 
30.68*** 
(0.000) 
 2539.84*** 
(0.000) 
134.63*** 
(0.000) 
 129.53*** 
(0.000) 
49.03*** 
(0.000) 
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VRR Variations and firm risk levels in the USA, the UK and Germany 
 
USA 
 
The null Model in Panel B of  Table 8.4 reports that 71% (70% in the intercept + 1% in 
time) of  VRR variations are between US firms; 29% of  such variations were within US 
firms between 2005 and 2009. The variations at both levels (within each US firm over 2005 
to 2009, known as level 1, and between US firms, known as level 2, are statistically 
significant at a p-value of  0.000, which in turn expresses the importance of  exploring 
factors that may cause these variations, as will be explained by Model 1 and Model 2. 
 
Firm‟s risk levels in Model 1 in Panel A of  Table 8.4 show that the VRR variations of  the 
US firms are significantly and positively influenced by their total and liquidity risks, at p-
values of  0.001 and 0.004, with t-statistics (not tabulated) of  2.51 and -1.71, respectively. 
Highly volatile and low liquidity firms are highly motivated to provide significantly higher 
risk information voluntarily in their annual report narratives. Looking at the same model in 
Panel B of  the same table shows that these firm risk level variables have significant 
explanatory power to explain 2% of  VRR variability between US firms. The significance of  
variations in VRR expresses the model‟s ability to include other variables, which can 
improve our ability to explain the variations in the observed VRR within and between the 
US firms, as will be explained by Model 2. 
 
It is apparent from Model 2 in Panel A of  Table 8.4 that, in addition to a firm‟s risk levels, 
both a firm‟s size and its profitability are more likely to affect it to significantly and 
voluntarily provide risk information. The results document that large, less profitable firms 
have higher incentives to disclose risk information voluntarily to the stock market. 
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Involving a firm‟s other characteristics along with its risk levels in model 2 therefore 
reduces the unexplained variations in VRR between firms by 3% (69% - 66% Model 1 and 
2 respectively). These variables explain 14% of  VRR variations between US firms. The 
significance of  the VRR variations within and between firms suggests further research is 
needed to look at some other explanatory variables to decrease the unexplained variations 
in the observed VRR between 2005 and 2009. As far as VRR variations in USA are 
concerned, H1 and H5 are accepted and the other hypotheses (H2, H3 and H6) are 
rejected.   
UK 
 
The null Model in Panel B of  Table 8.4 reports that 71% (69% in the intercept + 2% in 
time) of  VRR variations are significant between the UK firms, whereas 29% of  VRR 
variations are within firms from 2005 to 2009, at a p-value of  0.000 for each of  these two 
levels (Wald Z statistics of  9.47 and 13.03, not tabulated). These results show that there are 
significant variations to be explained by the subsequent models‟ variables (firm risk levels 
in Model 1, and other firm characteristics in Model 2). 
  
Model 1 in Panel A of  the same table explains that both systematic and liquidity risks are 
significantly associated with variations of  VRR, at p-values of  0.010 and 0.031, respectively. 
The result indicates that high-covariate and high liquidity UK firms have a high incentive 
to disclose significantly more information about their risk voluntarily. As a consequence of  
adding a firm‟s risk levels, as shown under Model 1 in Panel B, the VRR variations between 
the UK firms significantly declined, reflecting great improvements (6%) in the model‟s 
explanatory power. At the same time, the result indicates that significant variations of  VRR 
remain at both levels, at a p-value of  0.000, suggesting potential possibilities to extend 
Model 1 by including other firm characteristics, as shown under Model 2. 
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Model 2 in Panel A of  Table 8.4 shows that UK firms characterised by high covariance, 
high liquidity, large size and high profitability are more likely to exhibit significantly higher 
levels of  VRR, at p-values of  0.000, 0.031, 0.000 and 0.067, respectively. As far as VRR 
variations in the UK are concerned, H2 is accepted and the other hypotheses (H1, H3, H5 
and H6) are rejected. 
 
Incorporating a firm‟s risk levels with its other characteristics, as shown in Model 2 in Panel 
B, explains 54% of  VRR variations between the UK firms. 
 
Germany 
 
The statistics in Panel B of  Table 8.4 under the null Model report that more than half  
(57%, which includes both 56% in intercept and 1% in time) of  VRR variations are 
between firm, whereas the rest (43%) of  VRR variations are within German firms over 
2005 to 2009. The significance of  these variations in VRR at these two levels suggests 
opportunities to explain such variations by expanding the null Model to include predicted 
variables, as in Model 1 and Model 2.  
 
Specifically, as can be seen from Panel A from the same table under Model 1, the variations 
in VRR in German firms are more likely to be significantly influenced as a full function of  
their risk levels (except liquidity risk), with a range of  p-values between 0.000 and 0.015. In 
particular, German firms, on the one hand, significantly disclose voluntary risk information 
when they have higher levels of  systematic and financing risks, at p-values of  0.000 and 
0.014, respectively. On the other hand, these firms have higher incentives to disclose 
significantly less risk information voluntarily if  they have high volatility on both market 
returns and standard errors of  their CAPM, at p-values of  0.000 and 0.015, respectively. 
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Thus, under Model 1, 34% of  VRR variability between German firms can be explained by 
their levels of  risk, which leads to a significant decrease in VRR variations between firms, 
to 45%. The result shows, nevertheless, that a significant proportion of  VRR variations 
either within or between firms remains unexplained, which in turn suggests investigating 
other factors which may reduce such variations, as shown under Model 2.  
 
Model 2 in Panel A of  Table 8.4 documents that German firms characterised by low 
volatility, low standard error of  CAPM, high covariance, high leverage, large size and high-
paying dividends are highly motivated to provide significantly higher levels of  risk 
information voluntarily. As far as VRR variations in Germany are concerned, H1 and H6 
are accepted and the other hypotheses are rejected. 
 
Owing to combining firms‟ risk level with their firm characteristics, 40% of  VRR 
variability between German firms can be explained by this model‟s variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
203 
 
Table 8.4: VRR variations  
Panel A:  Estimates of  fixed effects (Dependent variable = VRR) 
Panel B: Estimates of  covariance (Dependent variable = VRR) 
This table provides the repeated measures of  two multilevel analyses of  voluntary risk reporting (VRR) in the 
USA, the UK and Germany. All other variables interpretations are introduced in the previous table. 
 
 
 USA UK Germany 
Null 
Model 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Null 
Model 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Null 
Model 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Intercept 185.40*** 
(0.000) 
190.13*** 
(0.000) 
185.95*** 
(0.000) 
187.97*** 
(0.000) 
166.75*** 
(0.000) 
52.09*** 
(0.005) 
197.43*** 
(0.000) 
227.19*** 
(0.000) 
167.84*** 
(0.000) 
TR  0.19** 
(0.026) 
0.22*** 
(0.010) 
 -13.34 
(0.273) 
-3.46 
(0.779) 
 -98.97*** 
(0.000) 
-84.00*** 
(0.000) 
SR  0.06 
(0.324) 
0.03 
(0.566) 
 27.34*** 
(0.001) 
27.65*** 
(0.000) 
 78.76*** 
(0.000) 
74.60*** 
(0.000) 
USR  -0.17 
 (0.220) 
-0.15 
(0.273) 
 -7.94 
(0.525) 
6.23 
(0.598) 
 -82.84*** 
(0.001) 
-58.19** 
(0.015) 
FR  -0.013 
(0..888) 
-.006 
(0.44) 
 30.41*** 
(0.000) 
12.638 
(0.249) 
 84.62*** 
(0.000) 
58.47*** 
(0.010) 
LR  -0.16** 
(0.050) 
-.015*** 
(0.004) 
 8.35 
(0.435) 
18.42** 
(0.031) 
 -14.89 
(0.511) 
-12.30 
(0.582) 
SE   0.395*** 
(0.002) 
  211.54*** 
(0.000) 
  106.48*** 
(0.000) 
PE   -0.27*** 
(.000) 
  18.40* 
(0.067) 
  -18.644 
(0.221) 
GE   .009 
(0.852) 
  8.13 
(0.302) 
  -6.259 
(0.645) 
DE   -0.025 
(0.249) 
  -13.24 
(0.233) 
  28.60* 
(0.087) 
Time 6.37** 
(0.023) 
4.83*** 
(0.000) 
4.03*** 
(0.000) 
42.40*** 
(0.000) 
38.57*** 
(0.000) 
33.01*** 
(0.000) 
25.15*** 
(0.000) 
18.95*** 
(0.007) 
20.20*** 
(0.005) 
Time 
quadratic 
-0.46 
(0.474) 
  -4.54*** 
(0.000) 
-3.91*** 
(0.002) 
-2.89** 
(0.026) 
-4.64*** 
(0.000) 
-4.58*** 
(0.005) 
-5.34*** 
(0.002) 
N-S 
Ob 
254 
1270 
254 
1270 
254 
1270 
282 
1410 
282 
1410 
282 
1410 
201 
1005 
201 
1005 
201 
2005 
 
 
USA UK Germany 
Null 
Model 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Null 
Model 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Null-
Model 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
V RM 
(within 
firms) 
1506.59*** 
(0.000) 
1512.39*** 
(0.000) 
1596.42*** 
(0.000) 
3526.29*** 
(0.000) 
3562.12*** 
(0.000) 
3714.65*** 
(0.000) 
7241.48*** 
(0.000) 
7307.17*** 
(0.000) 
7128.70*** 
(0.000) 
V I 
(between 
firms) 
3636.21*** 
(0.000) 
3565.85*** 
(0.000) 
3145.08*** 
(0.000) 
8414.11*** 
(0.000) 
7891.74*** 
(0.000) 
3863.77*** 
(0.000) 
9494.60*** 
(0.000) 
6258.95*** 
(0.000) 
5657.35*** 
(0.000) 
VT 
(between 
firms) 
67.33** 
(0.026) 
60.44** 
(0.41) 
44.84 
(0.126) 
328.83*** 
(0.000) 
323.73*** 
(0.000) 
291.78*** 
(0.000) 
178.98 
(0.118) 
211.09** 
(0.050) 
210.61** 
(0.43) 
ICC (VRM) 29% 29% 33% 29% 30% 47% 43% 53% 55% 
ICC (VI) 70% 69% 66% 69% 67% 49% 56% 45% 44% 
ICC (VT) 1% 2% 1% 2% 3% 4% 1% 2% 1% 
R2(VI) ---- 2% 14% --- 6% 54% -- 34% 40% 
Changes of  
-2LL 
Change chi-
square 
 20.06*** 
(0.000) 
43.68*** 
(0.000) 
 47.96*** 
(0.000) 
167.88*** 
(0.000) 
 112.10*** 
(0.000) 
51.85*** 
(0.000) 
  
204 
 
MRR verses VRR relative to firm risk levels: A summary  
 
USA 
 
Both MRR and VRR variations are significantly sensitive to firm risk levels, after 
controlling for other firm characteristics. While MRR variations are significantly attributed 
to total, systematic and liquidity risks, VRR variations are significantly attributed to total 
and liquidity risks. The explanatory power of  firm risk levels to explain MRR variations is 
higher than their explanatory power to explain VRR variations.  
UK 
 
Variations in VRR rather than variations in MRR are significantly correlated with firm risk 
levels, namely systematic and liquidity risks, with a control for other firm characteristics. 
The explanatory power of  risk levels along with other characteristics to explain MRR 
variations is higher than their explanatory power to explain VRR variations. 
Germany 
 
Variations in either MRR or VRR are significantly associated with German firms‟ risk 
levels, with a control for other firm characteristics. VRR variations, however, are more 
sensitive to risk levels, namely total, systematic, unsystematic and financing risks, than MRR 
variations, which are significantly influenced by total, systematic and liquidity risks. The 
explanatory power of  risk levels along with control variables to explain MRR is equal to 
that of  VRR. Table 8.5 summarises, therefore, all hypotheses for MRR and VRR in each 
country.  
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Table 8.5: Summary of  results of  MRR and VRR variations (as shown under Model 2) 
 
This table summarises the results of  how firm characteristics (risk levels and control variables) influence firm 
MRR and VRR in the USA, the UK and Germany. ES means the expected sign, + means positive direction, S 
means significant and NS means non-significant. All variables‟ definitions are shown in Table 5.3.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ES MRR VRR 
USA UK Germany USA UK Germany 
F
ir
m
s‟
 c
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s 
F
ir
m
s‟
 r
is
k
 l
ev
el
s 
TR + S (+) NS S (-) S(+) NS S (-) 
SR + S (+) NS S (+) NS  S (+) S (+) 
UNR + NS NS NS NS  NS  S (-) 
FR + NS NS NS NS  NS  S (+) 
LR + S (-) NS S (+) S (+) S (-) NS  
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
va
ri
ab
le
s 
SE + S (+) S (+) S (+) S (+) S (+) S (+) 
PE + S (-) NS NS S (-) S (+) NS 
GE + S (+) NS NS NS NS NS 
DE + S(-) NS NS NS NS NS 
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8.4. Robustness tests 
 
 
To ensure the validity of  these results, this chapter further analyses its results in several 
ways. First, the researcher increases the dependent and some of  the independent variables 
by 10% in order to observe how previous conclusions are sensitive to such changes in the 
pattern of  associations between these variables. Specifically, the researcher increases both 
MRR and VRR and all firm risk levels variables within each country. After doing so, the 
researcher obtained identical conclusions to those obtained from the main analysis. 
 
Second, the researcher further uses some other proxies for firm size, profitability and 
dividends by using market capitalisation (Worldscope item WC08001), return on asset 
(Worldscope item WC08326) and dividends per share (Datastream item 512E) instead of  
using total assets, return on equity and dividend payout, respectively; the results are 
identical to the previous results.  
 
Third, the researcher omits some of  the main variables. Principally, the researcher omits 
volatility and then beta with volatility of  standard error of  CAPM, and then runs the 
analysis on the remaining variables. It draws similar conclusions about how firm risk levels 
can influence providing MRR and/or VRR. 
 
Fourth, the researcher examines the effects of  considering some corporate governance 
variables within the UK context (specifically, this chapter added board size (BZ), 
proportion of  non-executive directors (PNED), proportion of  independent non-executive 
directors (PINED) and chief  executive officer (CEO) duality). Based on the results, the 
researcher concludes that including CG variables in the model does not affect the main 
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conclusions about the extent to which firm risk levels can motivate firms to provide either 
MRR or VRR. 
 
8.5. Concluding remarks  
 
 
Motivated by conflicting theoretical arguments and empirical results on the extent to which 
firm risk levels can influence firms to provide risk reporting voluntarily and/or 
mandatorily in their annual report narratives, the current study investigates such 
associations in three different approaches towards risk reporting within three different 
countries. While the first, the UK approach, encourages more voluntary risk reporting 
above imposing risk rules, the second, the German approach, formally requires firms to 
provide risk information in a certain section in their annual report narratives, and the third, 
the US approach, is a compromise between these two approaches; hence, it requires and 
encourages firms to provide more information about their risks mandatorily and/or 
voluntarily, respectively. 
 
A firm‟s risk reporting levels are measured by utilising a computerised based approach in 
which a number of  sentences indicating risk, based on developing a unique word list of  
risk, are counted. Such scores are manually and statistically validated to ensure their 
reliability. The current study distinguishes between voluntary and mandatory risk 
disclosures to observe the pattern of  associations for each type of  risk disclosure.   
Knowing the pattern of  how the US, the UK and German firms respond to their risk 
levels can help identify which type of  risks these firms are more sensitive to, by disclosing 
either more or less risk information voluntarily and/or mandatorily. Based on managers‟ 
incentives theories and prior empirical research, the current study posits positive plausible 
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associations between market- and accounting-risk measures and mandatory and voluntary 
risk reporting within each country. 
 
To correlate differences in firm risk levels to variations in MRR and VRR within and 
between firms in each country, repeated measures multilevel analysis is used to intersect 
cross-sectional with time series data and account for the residual dependency.  
 
For the USA, the results indicate that firms are more sensitive to providing their MRR and 
VRR as a function of  their risk levels, along with their other characteristics. Specifically, in 
large, less profitable US firms, providing VRR is significantly influenced by volatility and 
current ratio. Furthermore, the results report that in large, less profitable and high growth 
US firms, providing MRR is significantly associated with volatility, beta and current ratio. 
The results indicate that firm risk levels, along with other firm characteristics, have 
significantly higher abilities to reduce the systematic unexplained variations between firms‟ 
MRR than they do with VRR. The results indicate that the US market pays close attention 
to volatility, beta and current ratio as proxies for total, systematic and liquidity risks by 
disclosing significantly more risk information mandatorily and/or voluntarily, with an 
exception in the latter case of  liquidity risk. 
 
These results have theoretical and practical implications. First, this chapter‟s evidence 
supports and warrants risk reporting research. It supports Dobler‟s (2008) theoretical 
argument that studying risk reporting incentives is crucial even within highly regulated 
countries like the USA. This chapter‟s evidence significantly adds to disclosure literature by 
emphasising the importance of  widening this research scope to pay more attention to 
variations above the mandated requirements (e.g., IFRS adoption), which provide a 
minimum of  information to investors, as argued through regulatory theory (e.g., Leftwich, 
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1980; Cooper and Keim, 1983; Fields et al., 2001; Ogus, 2001). This chapter‟s findings do 
not support those studies that do not distinguish voluntary from mandatory risk reporting 
(e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2000, 2005, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007) when studying the 
incentives for risk reporting. Therefore, the study documents different conjectures between 
the observed trend of  MRR and firm risk levels compared to the observed trend of  VRR.  
 
Practically, this result supports the regulatory trend within the USA; hence, the study finds 
that firms providing more risk information either mandatorily and/or voluntarily are 
subject to significant underlying risks. US firms trust the market‟s ability to correct any 
overestimations of  these firms‟ uncertainties by disclosing more risk information. The 
theoretical expansion for this argument is the extent to which investors can understand risk 
information in annual report narratives, as was addressed within the US market by Li 
(2008), who uses a text search for the words risk and uncertainty in the 10-K as a direct 
measure of  risk information content. This is in comparison with prior risk disclosure 
research, which uses indirect measures for the usefulness of  risk disclosures (e.g., Rajgopal, 
1999; Hodder and McAnally, 2001; Jorion; 2002; Linsmeier et al., 2002). Li‟s (2008) findings 
support investors becoming more familiar with risk information as time passes (one-year 
ahead).  
 
For the UK firms, providing risk information voluntarily is significantly subject to firm risk 
levels, specifically systematic and liquidity risks rather than other risk types. Significantly, in 
those firms, providing risk information mandatorily is only determined by firm size.  
 
This result indicates that firm risk levels, along with other firm characteristics, have 
significantly higher abilities to reduce the systematic unexplained variations between firms 
in either MRR or VRR. The result indicates that UK firms paid closer attention to beta and 
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current ratio as proxies for systematic and liquidity risks than they paid to other risks by 
disclosing significantly high levels of  risk information voluntarily. The UK firms, however, 
did not pay any attention to their risks when providing mandated risk reporting. These 
results have theoretical and practical implications. 
 
The theoretical implications are consistent with those discussed with reference to the USA; 
the practical implications stem from supporting the current trend of  UK regulation, which 
encourages firms to disclose information voluntarily about their risks rather than making 
such disclosure compulsory.  
 
For German firms, providing risk information mandatorily and/or voluntarily is a function 
of  their risks. This result supports the fact that even in highly mandated risk-reporting 
markets, there are still managerial incentives to disclose voluntarily further risk 
information. 
 
The results indicate that firm risk levels, along with other firm characteristics, have 
significantly higher abilities to reduce the systematic unexplained variations between firms 
in either MRR or VRR. The results indicate that German firms paid closer attention to 
volatility, beta and current ratio as proxies for systematic and liquidity risks than they paid 
to other risks, by disclosing significantly high levels of  risk information mandatorily. The 
German firms, however, paid closer attention to all their risks (except liquidity risk) when 
providing voluntary risk reporting. 
  
These results have theoretical and practical implications. The theoretical implications are 
consistent with those discussed with reference to the USA and the UK; the practical 
implications are consistent with those discussed within the US context. The results signal 
  
211 
 
that organising risk reporting by formally implementing an accounting standard 
significantly improves the disclosure environment by encouraging the provision of  more 
risk information either mandatorily or voluntarily, most importantly as a response to firm 
risk levels.  
 
Further research could be useful by including some other explanatory variables in the 
model, which might decrease the unsystematic (idiosyncratic) unexplained variations in 
MRR and VRR within firms between 2005 and 2009. It could be useful to consider some 
recent trends in disclosure literature that look at unsystematic (idiosyncratic) demographic 
characteristics of  managers as an essential driver for idiosyncratic voluntary disclosure 
variations (Bamber et al., 2010). 
 
Incorporating both a firm‟s characteristics variables with a country‟s characteristics 
variables is another area of  interest in how to observe the impact of  these characteristics 
on either general disclosure studies or risk reporting studies. In general disclosure studies, 
the debate is how international accounting studies statistically examine the impact of  firm 
and country factors on financial disclosure; for more details see Dong and Stettler, 2011. In 
risk reporting studies, no prior risk reporting research investigates such impacts on 
variations in MRR and VRR. That will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Nine: Empirical Evidence (3): Cross-country Evidence: 
Incentives for mandatory and voluntary risk reporting variations  
within and between firms across the USA, the UK and Germany 
  
9.1. Overview 
 
 
Looking more closely at mandatory and voluntary risk reporting (MRR and VRR) 
variations within and between firms in each nation from 2005 to 2009 is useful to clearly 
identify the extent to which support for regulators either relies intensely on regulations 
(USA and Germany) or on voluntary disclosure (UK). This chapter investigates the main 
incentives for MRR and VRR variations within and between firms across the USA, the UK 
and Germany. This chapter answers two major questions. The first question deals with 
firm-level analysis and examines the extent to which firm risk levels can explain such 
variations after considering other firm characteristics that might affect corporate 
disclosure. The second question deals with country-level analysis and examines the extent 
to which a country‟s legal system and its cultural values can explain MRR and VRR 
variations within and between American, British and German firms. 
 
The results suggest significant variations in both MRR and VRR within and between firms 
from 2005 to 2009 across the USA, the UK and Germany. It is found that a country‟s legal 
system and its cultural values have significantly high abilities to explain MRR variations. 
The present chapter finds that a country‟s legal system and its cultural values are more 
likely to react with firm characteristics as complements rather than substitutes to explain 
variation in MRR. Conversely, the results suggest that both legal and cultural characteristics 
are less essential in explaining VRR variations between firms across countries. These 
results suggest that differences in VRR between firms across the USA, the UK and 
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Germany are more likely to be statistically correlated with firm characteristics that are 
derived hypothetically based on managers‟ incentives theories. 
 
This chapter contributes to existing research in two ways. This chapter provides the first 
empirical evidence as to how corporate risk reporting varies under three distinctive 
approaches to risk disclosure in the USA, the UK and Germany. The observed patterns of  
VRR diversifications within and between firms across these countries differ from those of  
MRR. Such conclusions have theoretical and practical implications. 
 
Theoretically, either general disclosure research or risk reporting research might usefully 
distinguish the trend of  mandatory from voluntary risk reporting to avoid any 
misinterpretation of  relying on aggregated disclosure scores to draw conclusions about 
either voluntary or mandatory risk reporting rather than directly observing the trend of  
each type separately. This chapter is the first to compare the main incentives for mandatory 
and voluntary risk reporting within and between firms across the USA, the UK and 
Germany over the period of  2005 to 2009. Consequently, this chapter is able to look at 
whether risk disclosure incentives vary within and between firms in these countries and, 
most importantly, over time.  
 
Practically, the higher ability of  legal and cultural values to express MRR variations across 
countries than VRR variations, which, in turn, are significantly more closely correlated to 
firm characteristics, gives signals to the IASB regarding its current efforts for international 
convergence. In essence, specific rules for mandating risk reporting should be weighted 
within each country‟s legal system and its cultural values to reduce any potential differences 
in risk reporting across countries.  
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Secondly, repeated measures multilevel analysis is preformed to mitigate problems that 
arise from relying on controversial methods used in prior research, such as OLS and FEM, 
by utilising direct interactions between firm-level analysis variables (firm risk levels and 
other firm characteristics) and country-level analysis variables (legal systems and cultural 
values). Most importantly, this method accounts for the problem of  residual dependency, 
which is neither ignored nor corrected by using some other methods to correct the bias of  
residual (Gow et al., 2010). It is therefore recommended that future research in disclosure 
studies generally, and in cross-country disclosure studies particularly, employs this method 
to directly interact both firm and country characteristics. 
 
The remainder of  this chapter is organised as follows. The following section explains the 
research methods, including data collection and sample selection, the measurement and 
description of  variables and the empirical model. The results are discussed in Section 9.3. 
Section 9.4 provides conclusions, highlights theoretical and practical implications, discusses 
limitations and suggests areas for future research. 
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9.2. Method 
9.2.1. Data collection and sample selection 
The total size of  the sample is 1270, 1410 and 1005 firm-years for the USA, the UK and 
Germany, respectively. The main criteria of  this selection are explained in previous 
chapters.  
9.2.2. Variables: Measurement and description  
Rank transformation is utilised for all variables among firm characteristics proxied by ratios 
to improve the distribution of  these ratio variables, as suggested by prior research (e.g., 
Iman and Conover, 1979; Conover and Iman, 1980; Kane and Meade, 1998) and as in prior 
accounting literature (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Baginski and Wahlen, 2003). 
  
As seen from Table 9.1, firms across the USA, the UK and Germany voluntarily disclose 
approximately twice as much as they mandatorily disclose. This suggests that, on average, 
managers that mandatorily reveal risk information are more willing to reveal more risk 
information voluntarily. This result is consistent with the main findings of  Chapters Seven 
and Eight, as will be explained further in the next section while interpreting the correlation 
between MRR and VRR. As can be indicated, relying on the standard deviation from the 
same table, MRR, VRR, FR, PE and DE fluctuate greatly between firms across these 
countries from 2005 to 2009 (standard deviations of  these variables are 137.53, 122.76, 
421.53, 98.08 and 26.31, respectively). There are limited fluctuations in market-risk 
measures between these firms and across these countries from 2005 to 2009. 
 
 
 
 
  
216 
 
Table 9.1: Descriptive statistics on risk reporting and firm characteristics variables 
 
This table provides descriptive information on variables. All variables are defined in Table 5.4. Ob is the 
number of  observations for firm-years. The scale of  both MRR and VRR is the number of  statements that 
indicates risk; other variables are scaled by ratios, except SE, which is scaled by the natural logarithm of  US 
dollar of  total assets.   
 Mean Standard 
deviation  
25% Median 75% Ob 
MRR 128.690 137.530 65.250 113.780 198.000 3724 
VRR 220.160 112.760 150.000 210.030 164.000 3721 
TR 0.441 0.201 0.290 0.388 0.556 3801 
SR 1.044 0.201 0.290 0.388 0.556 3796 
USR 0.033 0.013 0.015 0.020 0.300 3851 
FR 31.776 421.539 0.570 28.085 81.562 3822 
LR 2.494 3.144 1.140 1.630 2.670 3812 
SE 5.721 0.876 5.099 5.625 6.265 3771 
PE 7.603 98.081 1.590 11.500 20.990 3691 
GE 0.183 4.156 0.052 0.078 0.204 3768 
DE 12.650 26.317 5.660 11.745 22.35 3400 
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9.2.3. Empirical models: A repeated measures multilevel analysis 
A repeated measures multilevel technique is used to measure variations in MRR and VRR 
within and between firms across the USA, the UK and Germany according to the 
following aggregate equation: 
2
0 1 2
1 1 1
tij ij ij tij ij tij rq qij oq qij qij tij ij
Qr Qo Qc
RR Z Z Xfl Xfl Xcl r
cq
q q q
               
                                                                                                 
 
                                                                         (9.1) 
This aggregate equation combines level 1 and 2, which are as follows: 
Level 1 concerns risk reporting variations within firms over 2005 to 2009 as a function of  
time and standard error, as follows: 
2
0 1 2tij ij ij tij ij tij tijRR Z Z                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                     (9.2) 
  
                                                                                                  
Level 2 concerns risk reporting variations between firms through observing the direct 
impact of  between firms‟ indicators on intercept and growth rate, which can be described 
as follows: 
 
0
1 1 1
pij p j rq qij oq qij qij ij
Qr Qo Qc
Xfl Xfl Xcl r
cq
q q q
          
                                        
                                                                                                                                      (9.3) 
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where, in all the above equations, RRtij  is risk reporting (MRR or VRR) of  firm i in country 
j in year t. β035 ij is the intercept of  firm i in country j. β1 and β2 are the slopes of  time 
varying variables with firm i in country j. Ztij, and Z
2
tij are the linear and quadratic 
components of  time of  firm i in country j at time t during 2005 to 2009. These are the 
main parameters of  level 1, each of  which is determined according to polynomial curves. 
Coding the time period (2005 to 2009) is essential at this level because these codes affect 
the model‟s intercept interpretations. 
 
The following parameters capture level 2 of  repeated measures. Xfl qij is a function of  a 
firm‟s risk level characteristics; namely, total, systematic, unsystematic, financing and 
liquidity risks, and other characteristics or control variables; namely, firm size, profitability, 
growth and dividends. Xcl qij is a function of  a country‟s characteristics, which include a 
country‟s legal system and its cultural values. βrq, and  βoq represent the effect of  Xfl qij, Xfl qij 
on both linear and quadratic components of  time of  MRR and VRR growth rates. βcq 
stands for the effect of  Xcl qij in code law and low cultural score countries relative to 
common law and high cultural score countries (as reference groups) on linear and 
quadratic components of  time of  MRR and VRR growth rates. Furthermore, ε tij is the 
standard error.  
 
The error structure is essential to consider at either level 1(ε tij) or level 2 (rij). At the former 
level, the error or the residual is the variability in measuring MRR/VRR within firms over 
time. In other words, it is the difference between the estimated and the true value of  
                                                 
 
35 Econometrically, if  the empirical model includes intercept and there are dummy variables, attention should 
be paid for whether each dummy has two or more than two categories. While the legal system has two 
categories (code and common law countries), each cultural dimension has more than two categories (scores 
for the USA, the UK and Germany). The results, therefore, report code law relative to common law 
countries and low scored countries in each cultural dimension relative to high scored countries (see, for 
instance, Heck et al., 2010; Gujarati, 2004). 
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MRR/VRR. Theoretically, in repeated measures designs, the most appropriate choice for 
the error structure36 is the first order autoregressive structure with homogenous variance 
AR (1), as was argued by Heck et al. (2010), since this kind of  data has a common trend, 
such as a decrease or increase according to how far away from each other they are in time. 
AR (1) assumes that the residual in 2005 is more likely to be less similar to the residual in 
2009 than either would be to the residual in 2006. 
 
Furthermore, in level 2, error structure is also considered, which can be reflected through 
random effects at that level, subject to the dimensionality of  both residual variance and 
covariance matrix. The components may be random intercept, random linear slope and 
covariance between the intercept and the linear slope. 
 
 
9.3. Empirical results 
 
9.3.1. Correlation analysis 
Table 9.2 provides Pearson and Spearman37 correlation coefficients (assuming linear and 
non-linear associations, respectively). The associations between MRR and VRR based on 
parametric and nonparametric coefficients indicate a significant relation, at a p-value of 
0.000. This result suggests that managers who exhibit high compliance with risk reporting 
                                                 
 
36 There are many other error structure forms, ranging from lower (e.g., the scale identity) to higher 
sophistication (e.g., the first order autoregressive moving average structure (ARMA)) error structures (Heck 
et al., 2010; Hox, 2010). 
 
37
  Multi-collinearity is initially checked through checking the coefficients among independent variables, and it 
is found that no variables exhibit collinearity problems (all coefficients are below 0.7, see Gujarati, 2004). To 
examine that statistically, the researcher calculated the condition index, which is the square root of  maximum 
eigenvalue divided by minimum eigenvalue. If  this index is more than 30, the variable has a severe muti-
collinearity problem (e.g., Gujarati, 2004). The researcher checked this and did not find that any of the 
explanatory variables had this problem.  
 
  
220 
 
regulations in the USA, the UK and Germany have higher incentives to exhibit high levels 
of voluntary risk disclosure. This result supports the descriptive findings discussed in the 
previous section. This result is consistent with Chapter Seven‟s findings. More generally, it 
is consistent with Dye (1986). The significant associations between these two variables, on 
the one hand, and other variables, on the other, are consistent with prior empirical research 
(e.g., Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007) that, 
in turn, validates this chapter‟s MRR and VRR scores. 
The patterns of MRR over exploratory variables (TR, USR, FR, LR, PE and DE) differ 
from those of VRR. As a result, this supports arguments for the importance of treating 
MRR and VRR separately, to observe the main incentives for each risk type rather than 
correlating exploratory variables as main drivers for such incentive to aggregate scores to 
draw either conclusions for a specific risk disclosure type or conclusions for general risk 
disclosure. For more interactive associations to examine the current study hypotheses, the 
main results from the regression models are discussed in the following section.      
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  Table 9.2 : Correlation matrix (Pearson above diagonal and Spearman below) 
                                   
This table shows the correlation analysis between risk reporting and firm characteristics. The numbers above the diagonal represent the linear Pearson coefficients; the numbers 
below the diagonal represent Spearman coefficients, while p-values are given in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively (all two-tailed). The 
definitions for all variables are the same as in the previous table
 MRR VRR TR SR USR FR LR SE PE GE DE 
MRR  0.111*** 
(0.000) 
0.327*** 
(0.000) 
0.176*** 
(0.000) 
0.262*** 
(0.000) 
-0.182*** 
(0.000) 
0.299*** 
(0.000) 
0.165*** 
(0.000) 
-0.305*** 
(0.00) 
0.025 
(0.133) 
-0.419*** 
(0.000) 
VRR 0.211*** 
(0.000) 
 -.0.173*** 
(0.000) 
0.093*** 
(0.000) 
-0.154*** 
(0.000) 
0.199*** 
(0.000) 
-0.182*** 
(0.000) 
0.415*** 
(0.000) 
0.031* 
(0.065) 
-0.020 
(0.226) 
0.149*** 
(0.000) 
TR 0.333*** 
(0.000) 
-0.145*** 
(0.000) 
 0.408*** 
(0.000) 
0.433*** 
(0.000) 
-0.293*** 
(0.000) 
0.3000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.450*** 
(0.000) 
-0.362*** 
(0.000) 
0.058*** 
(0.000) 
-0.558*** 
(0.000) 
SR 0.132*** 
(0.000) 
0.136*** 
(0.000) 
0.408*** 
(0.000) 
 0.152*** 
(0.000) 
-0.090*** 
(0.000) 
0.069*** 
(0.000) 
0.570** 
(0.000) 
-0.142*** 
(0.000) 
0.031* 
(0.059) 
-0.172*** 
(0.000) 
USR 0.252*** 
(0.000) 
-0.14*** 
(0.000) 
0.433*** 
(0.000) 
0.152*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.188*** 
(0.0000) 
0.257*** 
(0.000) 
-0.356*** 
(0.000) 
-0.358*** 
(0.000) 
-0.054*** 
(0.001) 
-0.415*** 
(0.000) 
FR -0.174*** 
(0.000) 
0.188*** 
(0.000) 
-0.293*** 
(0.000) 
-
0.090*** 
(0.000) 
-0.188*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.492*** 
(0.000) 
0.394*** 
(0.000) 
0.120*** 
(0.000) 
-0.040** 
(0.014) 
-0.244** 
(0.000) 
LR 0.317*** 
(0.000) 
-0.174*** 
(0.000) 
0.300*** 
(0.000) 
0.069*** 
(0.000) 
0.257*** 
(0.000) 
-0.492*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.369*** 
(0.000) 
-0.233*** 
(0.000) 
0.016 
(0.342) 
-0.320*** 
(0.000) 
SE 0.154*** 
(0.000) 
0.419*** 
(0.000) 
-0.450*** 
(0.000) 
0.057*** 
(0.000) 
-0.355*** 
(0.000) 
0.394*** 
(0.000) 
-0.369*** 
(0.000) 
 0.274*** 
(0.000) 
0.024 
(0.138) 
0.373*** 
(0.000) 
PE -0.314*** 
(0.000) 
0.004 
(0.797) 
-0.362*** 
(0.000) 
-
0.142*** 
(0.000) 
-0.358*** 
(0.000) 
0.120*** 
(0.000) 
-0.234*** 
(0.000) 
0.274*** 
(0.000) 
 0.173*** 
(0.000) 
0.442*** 
(0.000) 
GE -0.021 
(0.209) 
-0.024 
(0.144) 
0.058*** 
(0.000) 
0.030* 
(0.063) 
-0.054** 
(0.001) 
-0.040** 
(0.013) 
0.015 
(0.345) 
0.024 
(0.139) 
0.173*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.020 
(0.245) 
DE -0.445*** 
(0.000) 
0.166*** 
(0.000) 
-0.558*** 
(0.000) 
-
0.173*** 
(0.000) 
-0.416*** 
(0.000) 
0.244*** 
(0.000) 
-0.322*** 
(0.000) 
0.372*** 
(0.000) 
0.433*** 
(0.000) 
-0.020*** 
(0.000) 
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9.3.2. Repeated measures multilevel analysis results 
 In this section, the main findings of  MRR and VRR variations across the USA, the UK 
and Germany over 2005 to 2009 are introduced. Interoperations are introduced through a 
general structure for Panel A, which examines firm-level hypotheses, and Panel B, which 
examines country-level hypotheses, of  Table 9.3 and 9.4. Panel A of  Table 9.3 and 9.4 
presents the coefficients of  random effects of  both firm- and country-level variables, 
which are essential to write the aggregate equation or each level‟s equation. 
 
Panel B of  Table 9.3 and 9.4 explains the variance of  the random intercept of  level 1 and 
both the random intercept and the random error of  level 2. Such variance indicates how 
much variability in MRR/VRR remains at each level. Particularly, level 1 explains the 
variability in MMR/VRR within firms over 2005 to 2009 through the residual, which also 
reflects the population variability in firms‟ MRR/VRR average growth around their true 
trajectories. These errors are unobserved, so some assumptions about their distributions 
should be considered. There are two key parameters at level 1 to consider. The first 
parameter is the intercept that describes the firms‟ MRR/VRR changes at a specific point 
in time, which is 2005, so this intercept can be called the initial, or true, trajectory. The 
second parameter is the change rate, which describes the rate at which the MRR/VRR 
changed between 2005 and 2009. The Wald Z test is used to examine whether there are 
remaining residual outcomes to be explained by other variables at either level 1 or 2.  
 
Additionally, this panel gives overall information about each model and its parameters, 
commencing with the null Model and passing through those models that reflect both a 
firm‟s and a country‟s characteristics. The main aims of  using the null Model are: (1) to get 
a baseline to assess subsequent models; and (2) to get the total variations in MRR/VRR 
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within and between firms over time without any predictors. To assess the overall 
improvement of  a model, change chi-square should be conducted38 to examine a null 
hypothesis that there is no variation of  MRR/VRR within and between firms over time 
within the population. If  we reject this hypothesis, we should then explore in subsequent 
models (1-7) which predictors can anticipate variations in MRR/VRR.  
 
Incentives for MRR variations: firm- and country-level analyses 
 
Under the null Model from Panel B of  Table 9.3, there is significant variation in MRR 
within firms over 2005 to 2009 (level 1), whereas there are considerable variations in 
intercept and slope between firms across countries (level 2), each of  which is significant at 
a p-value of  0.000. The current study therefore rejects the null hypothesis that MRR 
variations within firms over 2005 to 2009 and between firms across the USA, the UK and 
Germany are 0. Particularly, the result reveals that 68%39 of  total MRR variations are 
between firms across the USA, the UK and Germany (Wald Z = 14.44, not tabulated), 
whereas just 3% of  such variations are between these firms over 2005 to 2009 (Wald Z = 
7.12, not tabulated). The remainder of  MRR variations, which is 29% with Wald Z = 14.65 
at p-values of  0.000, can then be attributed to within firms over 2005 to 2009. Under the 
same model, the result shows that there is a possibility to explain such variations by 
including the model with firm (firm‟s risk level under Model 1 and control factors under 
                                                 
 
38
 Decreasing the differences of  -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) means that the full model is improved. By using 
change chi-square, it is possible to examine such improvements statistically. The main rule is that the model 
fits if  the difference between the -2LL for the full model and baseline model is greater than the value of  the 
change chi-square (the critical point or the cut point of  the chi-square distribution) (Field, 2009). All the 
models from 1-7 are statistically significant, indicating the higher ability of  each model‟s predictors to 
improve its overall explanations and predictions.  
 
39  This expresses the intra-class correlation (ICC), which can be calculated at each level; for level 1, for 
instance, σ2 level 1/ (σ2   of  level 1+ σ2 of  level 2). 
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model 2) and country (a country‟s legal system and its cultural factors – Models 3 to 7) 
characteristics, respectively. 
 
To identify the extent to which the indicators of  both firm and country characteristics are 
significantly related to the variability in MRR, Panel A of  Table 9.3 is used. It commences 
with the null Model, which describes the shape of  the firm‟s risk disclosure trajectories and 
determines whether the initial intercept and the random slope of  time vary across firms or 
not. The results indicate that the initial intercept is significant.   
 
Looking at firm risk level variables under Model 1 in Panel A, both firms‟ total and 
unsystematic risks are found to be significantly and positively correlated with MRR 
variations over 2005 to 2009 (t-statistics are 2.4 for both risk types, not tabulated), at 
p<0.05. This result suggests that firms across the USA, the UK and Germany vary their 
MRR subject to variations in their total and unsystematic risk. These results are consistent 
with theory and prior risk reporting research. Relying on capital needs theory; these firms‟ 
managers could have higher incentives to disclose more than the minimum of  risk 
reporting requirements to help their investors reduce uncertainty over their future cash 
flows by providing more risk information than is mandated in their annual report 
narratives. Such result can be interpreted using signalling theory; hence, these firms‟ 
managers could have higher incentives to signal their ability to control their risks related to 
mandated requirements in order to distinguish themselves from those who do not manage 
their risks. These results are consistent with the findings in Chapters Seven and Eight, the 
main theoretical arguments of  Linsley and Shrives (2006) and Dobler (2008), and the 
empirical findings of  Abraham and Cox (2007) and Deumes and Knechel (2008).  
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Additionally, high-liquidity firms are likely to exhibit lower levels of  MRR variations. In 
other words, the results report a significant and negative relation between firm liquidity 
risk, at a p-value of  0.000 (t-statistics = 3.6, not tabulated) and MRR. This result is 
consistent with Chapter Seven‟s findings within a UK context. This result could be 
interpreted either theoretically, based on signalling theory, or empirically, based on prior 
risk reporting research. Firms which have higher current ratios have strong liquidity 
positions (high-liquidity firms) and are more likely to signal strong positions to assure their 
investors about their high quality performance. The result is consistent with Marshall and 
Weetman (2007). Panel B of  Table 9.3 is used in order to analyse how much a firm‟s risk 
levels improve the models‟ ability to explain variations in MRR. 
 
Panel B of  Table 9.3, under Model 1, shows that firm risk levels explain 17% (as R2) of  all 
MRR variations between firms across these countries. At the same time, differences in 
MRR between firms across countries decline considerably, to become 63%, at a p-value of  
0.000 (Wald Z = 12.79, not tabulated). The variations in MRR within firms over 2005 to 
2009, however, significantly increase, to 34%, at a p-value of  0.000 (Wald Z = 14.97, not 
tabulated). These results suggest that considering the variations in a firm‟s risk levels 
reduces the unexplained variations in MRR between firms across the USA, the UK and 
Germany. The significance of  these variations, however, indicates that there are potential 
chances to explain such variations through considering other firm characteristics (as shown 
in Model 2). 
 
 Panel A of  Table 9.3, under Model 2, indicates that, after adding the other firm 
characteristics, firms which have higher and lower variations in their systematic and 
liquidity risks, respectively, are more likely to exhibit higher levels of  MRR variations across 
the USA, the UK and Germany over 2005 to 2009, at p-values of  0.061 and 0.001, 
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respectively. These results are consistent with the current study‟s findings in prior chapters 
and other prior risk reporting research. In addition to these risk levels, the current study 
finds that larger, less profitable firms that pay out fewer dividends are highly likely to be 
more diversifiable in their MRR.  
 
Model 2 in Panel B of  Table 9.3 reports that other firm characteristics improve the model‟s 
ability to predict and express variations in MRR between firms across the USA, the UK 
and Germany due to decreasing the (-2LL) of  the model (significant at p<0.05). 
Specifically, these predictors, along with firm risk levels, significantly and steadily decrease 
the variations in MRR by 4%, compared to variations in MRR under Model 1. In other 
words, the result indicates that around 62% (59% intercept, 3% time) of  MRR variations 
can be attributed to differences between the American, British and German firms. 38% of  
MRR variations are within these firms over 2005 to 2009. All these variations are 
significant at p-values of  0.000, which indicates that there remain variations of  MRR, 
which might be explained by adding country characteristics, as shown in Tables 3 to 7. 
 
Panel A of  Table 9.3 under Models 3 to 7 explains the impact of  both legal systems and 
cultural values on explaining how firms are diversified on their MRR during 2005 to 2009. 
The results show that both the intercept and the linear time component are still significant, 
at p-values of  0.000.  
 
Under all these models, the results indicate that MRR variations across the USA, the UK 
and Germany over 2005 to 2009 are significantly and positively correlated to systematic 
risk variations, at a p-value of  0.000 (t-statistics = 18.4, not tabulated). This result is 
consistent with the current study‟s theoretical arguments based on managers‟ incentive 
theories, as shown Model 1, and based on its empirical findings, as shown in Chapter 
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Seven. This result is consistent with prior risk reporting research, such as the theoretical 
arguments of  Linsley and Shrives (2006) and Vandemaele et al. (2009). The result shows 
non-significant associations between other risk variables and MRR. The current study can 
therefore accept H2 and reject other firm-level hypotheses (H1, H3, H5 and H6).  
 
As shown in the same panel under these models, the results document that large, less 
profitable firms with high growth are more likely to influence MRR variations significantly 
and positively, all at p-values of  0.000. Such results are consistent with signalling theory; 
hence, large firms and high growth firms have greater abilities to exhibit higher compliance 
with risk reporting rules because such firms have a greater ability to collect and prepare 
their risk disclosure at a lower average cost relative to small size or low growth firms. Less 
profitable firms, however, could have incentives to disclose more to justify their 
performance and related risks.   
 
From Models 3 to 7, the researcher finds that legal systems and cultural values have a 
significant influence on MRR variations, at p-values of  0.000. The interpretations of  these 
associations are subject to the combination of  legal system and cultural values. Particularly, 
once the model combines a country‟s legal system and its score of  PD and MAS, the 
current study finds that firms in code law countries (Germany) exhibit significantly higher 
levels of  MRR variations than firms from common law countries (the USA and the UK). 
These results suggest that, given a country‟s legal system, its PD and MAS have an identical 
impact on MRR through either their direct effects or through firm characteristics.  
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Likewise, the results report that a given legal system and a country‟s UA, IND and LTO 
convey the same content, which explains why firms vary in disclosing their MRR.40 
 
A remarkable improvement of  the model‟s ability to explain MRR variations occurs once 
the current study includes, in subsequent models, both legal and cultural exploratory 
variables. Hence, Models 3 to 7 under Panel B of  Table 9.3 show that both country and 
firm characteristics can precisely explain around 73% of  MRR variations between 
American, British and German firms. The model‟s ability to explain MRR variation 
increases markedly, more than two-fold, by adding country factors. One could anticipate 
such influences because these factors might have a direct impact on each country‟s 
regulations, which in turn can be considered a principle determinant of  mandated risk 
indicator statements within each country‟s context, and then an essential driver of  MRR 
variations. The significance of  within and between firms‟ variations at level 1 and 2, 
respectively, expresses potential possibilities for improving these models‟ abilities to 
decrease unexplained MRR variations by expanding these models by some other 
explanatory variables at either firm- or country-level analyses.  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
40  The result indicates that firms from countries with lower PD, UA, IND and LTO scores are more likely to 
provide significantly lower MRR than firms from countries that have high scores of  these cultural values. The 
result of  IND is consistent with pre expectation based on Gray (1988) framework, while the other results are 
consistent with such framework. One main explanation, as one could argue, is that revealing information 
about risk differs from revealing general information (as was theorised and hypothesised in general disclosure 
research, for a review see e.g., Doupnik and Tsakumis, 2004). To specify, disclosing risk information could 
have negative effect on investors especially for those whom do not aware of  these risks. In particular, firms 
from countries which highly assess UA and LTO (Germany is an example of  such a country) are more likely 
to provide more information about risk to avoid any possibility of  increasing their uncertainty. Furthermore, 
firms from countries with lower MAS scores are more likely to be highly motivated to provide more 
mandated risk disclosures in their annual report narratives than those from highly scored MAS countries. 
These results are consistent with the prior empirical findings of  Jaggi and Low (2000) and Hope (2003).     
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Most importantly, the current study finds the interaction between a country‟s legal system 
and its cultural values is more likely to be one of  complements than substitutes.41 The 
researcher thus accepts H7.  
 
This result answers two questions addressed by prior research. The first is Hope‟s (2003) 
question about the extent to which a country‟s legal system and its cultural values are 
substitutes or complements. The second is Doupnik and Tsakumis‟s (2004) question about 
the extent to which the culture of  a country can influence its rules, especially after full 
adaption of  IFRSs in many countries around the world. Hence, this result suggests that 
even under the new approach of  international convergence through IFRSs, a country‟s 
legal system and its cultural values have higher explanatory power to interpret any MRR 
variations within and between firms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
41  Including the legal system without the cultural variable has the following impact (not reported): it was 
found that the legal system is non-significant with variability of  MRR and VRR. The model‟s ability to 
interpret MRR and VRR differences within and between firms across countries decreases. Including the 
cultural values separately has the following impacts, the cultural values are significantly associated with MRR 
rather VRR. Including the model by those dimensions improved the model's ability to explain the variations 
in MRR than it did in VRR. 
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Table 9.3: Repeated measures multilevel analysis of  MRR 
 
Panel A: Estimates of  fixed effects (MRR) 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Null 
Model 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept 104.83*** 
(0.000) 
63.84*** 
(0.000) 
131.45*** 
(0.000) 
188.87*** 
(0.000) 
188.87*** 
(0.000) 
188.87*** 
(0.000) 
-8.93 
(0.537) 
188.87*** 
(0.000) 
TR  21.98** 
(0.016) 
-1.33 
(0.891) 
-14.29 
(0.117) 
-14.29 
(0.117) 
-14.29 
(0.117) 
-14.29 
(0.117) 
-14.29 
(0.117) 
SR  10.68 
(0.139) 
13.57* 
(0.061) 
30.32*** 
(0.000) 
30.32*** 
(0.000) 
30.32*** 
(0.000) 
30.32*** 
(0.000) 
30.32*** 
(0.000) 
USR  24.20** 
(0.016) 
11.11 
(0.271) 
-.11.76 
(0.178) 
-.11.76 
(0.178) 
-.11.76 
(0.178) 
-.11.76 
(0.178) 
-.11.76 
(0.178) 
FR  -8.03 
(0.358) 
-10.57 
(0.229) 
0.95 
(0.905) 
0.95 
(0.905) 
0.95 
(0.905) 
0.95 
(0.905) 
0.95 
(0.905) 
LR  32.27*** 
(0.000) 
28.06*** 
(0.001) 
8.68 
(0.285) 
8.68 
(0.285) 
8.68 
(0.285) 
8.68 
(0.285) 
8.68 
(0.285) 
SE   4.69 
(0.723) 
56.34*** 
(0.000) 
56.34*** 
(0.000) 
56.34*** 
(0.000) 
56.34*** 
(0.000) 
56.34*** 
(0.000) 
PE   -30.05*** 
(0.000) 
-26.38*** 
(0.000) 
-26.38*** 
(0.000) 
-26.38*** 
(0.000) 
-26.38*** 
(0.000) 
-26.38*** 
(0.000) 
GE   11.49** 
(0.018) 
12.97*** 
(0.000) 
12.97*** 
(0.000) 
12.97*** 
(0.000) 
12.97*** 
(0.000) 
12.97*** 
(0.000) 
DE   -66.00*** 
(0.000) 
-6.37 
(0.500) 
-6.37 
(0.500) 
-6.37 
(0.500) 
-6.37 
(0.500) 
-6.37 
(0.500) 
Legal (0)    83.06*** 
(0.000) 
-115.74*** 
(0.000) 
-115.74*** 
(0.000) 
83.06*** 
(0.000) 
-115.74*** 
(0.000) 
PD(35) 
 
   -198.80*** 
(0.000) 
    
UA  (35) 
 
    -198.80*** 
(0.000) 
   
IND (67) 
 
     -198.80*** 
(0.000) 
  
MAS (62) 
 
      198.8*** 
(0.000) 
 
LTO (25) 
 
       -198.80*** 
(0.000) 
Time 10.69*** 
(0.000) 
8.97*** 
(0.000) 
8.15*** 
(0.000) 
7.24*** 
(0.000) 
7.24*** 
(0.000) 
7.24*** 
(0.000) 
7.24*** 
(0.000) 
7.24*** 
(0.000) 
Quadratic 
time 
-0.65 
 (0.348) 
       
N-S 
Ob 
737 
3685 
737 
3685 
737 
3685 
737 
3685 
737 
3685 
737 
3685 
737 
3685 
737 
3685 
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Panel B: Estimates of  covariance (MRR) 
 
This table provides the repeated measures of  two multilevel analyses of  MRR. Panel A provides the estimates 
of  the predictors through seven models. *, **, *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively (all 
one-tailed except when sign is not predicted or mixed). The null Model presents the impact of  both (non-) 
linear component of  time on MRR. The successive models provide how the predictive variables can express 
variation in MRR within and between firms across the USA, the UK and Germany. Therefore, Model 1 
explores the impact of  a firm‟s risk levels on its MRR variations. Model 2 provides the impact of  firm risk 
level and the effects of  four other firm characteristics; namely, size, profitability, growth and dividends, 
respectively. The subsequent models provide the interaction of  firm characteristics with country 
characteristics, combining legal system with a single aspect among five aspects of  the cultural dimensions. T-
statistics are given in parentheses, N-S is the number of  subjects under analysis and Ob is the number of  
observations for firm-years. 
 
Panel B provides estimates of  variance of  each level of  the analysis; the variance of  repeated measures 
(VRM) therefore expresses the variance of  MRR that can be attributed to variation within firms over five 
years (time series). Furthermore, the variance of  intercepts (VI) expresses the variance of  MRR that can be 
attributed to variation between firms across the USA, the UK and Germany, and the variance of  time (VT) 
expresses the variance of  MRR that can be attributed to variation between firms over time. The ICC is the 
intra-class correlation, which can be calculated at each level; for level 1, for instance, σ2 level 1/ (σ2 of  level 
1+ σ2 of  level 2). R2 explains the extent to which the overall model‟s predictors can implicitly explain changes 
of  MRR, which can be calculated as (σ2 M1- σ2 M2/ σ2 M1); hence, M1is the null Model variance component, 
whereas M2 refers to the current model‟s predictors. While change of  -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) is employed 
to assess each model‟s improvements, change chi-square is used to examine such improvements statistically. 
Wald Z values are given in parentheses. The definitions of  all the variables are the same as in previous tables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Null 
Model 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
V RM (within 
firms)/ICC 
4177.62*** 
(0.000) 
4298.51*** 
(0.000) 
4312.81*** 
(0.000) 
4584.51*** 
(0.000) 
4584.51*** 
(0.000) 
4584.51*** 
(0.000) 
4584.51*** 
(0.000) 
4584.51*** 
(0.000) 
V I (between 
firms across 
countries)/ICC 
9731.70*** 
(0.000) 
8056.28*** 
(0.000) 
6875.09*** 
(0.000) 
2675.64*** 
(0.000) 
2675.64*** 
(0.000) 
2675.64*** 
(0.000) 
2675.64*** 
(0.000) 
2675.64*** 
(0.000) 
VT (between 
firms across 
countries)/ICC 
385.81*** 
(0.000) 
388.57*** 
(0.000) 
392.52*** 
(0.000) 
267.13*** 
(0.000) 
267.13*** 
(0.000) 
267.13*** 
(0.000) 
267.13*** 
(0.000) 
267.13*** 
(0.000) 
ICC (VRM) 29% 34% 38% 61% 61% 61% 61% 61% 
ICC (VI) 68% 63% 59% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 
ICC (VT) 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
R2 (VI) --- 17% 29% 72.5% 72.5% 72.5% 72.5% 72.5% 
Change -2LL 
Change chi-
square 
 74.38 
(0.000) 
91.97 
(0.000) 
525.43 
(0.000) 
525.43 
(0.000) 
525.43 
(0.000) 
525.43 
(0.000) 
525.43 
(0.000) 
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Incentives for VRR variations: firm- and country-level analyses 
 
Panel B of  Table 9.4, under the null Model, shows that approximately 67% of  the total 
variations of  VRR are between firms across the USA, the UK and Germany during 2005 
to 2009. Additionally, the rest (33%) of  these variations are within firms across countries 
over the period of  study. All these variations are significant, at p-values of  0.000, which 
suggests that there is significant variation of  VRR at each level to be explained by other 
variables at either level 1 or level 2. 
 
As can be seen from Panel A of Table 9.4 regarding Model 1, total, systematic and 
financing risks are significantly and positively associated with variability of VRR across 
these countries. This result suggests that high variability of firms‟ VRR across countries is 
significantly associated with the high levels of variability of firms‟ returns or the variability 
of firms‟ returns around the market returns (total and systemic risk, respectively). 
Furthermore, firms which have high levels of financing problems are likely to provide 
higher levels of risk disclosure voluntarily in their annual report narratives. 
 
These results are consistent with what the current study anticipates based on managers‟ 
incentive theories. Such results are also consistent with empirical research (e.g., Abraham 
and Cox, 2007; the current study‟s findings in Chapter Seven). The variability of firms‟ 
VRR across the USA, the UK and Germany, however, is significantly and negatively more 
likely to be related to firms‟ idiosyncratic risk. This result, however, is still consistent with 
some theoretical arguments (see, for instance, Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 2006) and 
empirical results (e.g., Marshall and Weetman, 2002; the current study‟s findings in Chapter 
Seven).  
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Model 1 under Panel B of  Table 9.4 suggests the R2 of  firm risk level predictors that 
explain the variability of  the true, or initial, intercept and the growth rate of  VRR between 
firms across the USA, the UK and Germany are 11% and 10%, respectively. The ICC 
suggests that 62.3% of  the variability of  VRR can be attributed to the variability of  VRR 
between firms across the three countries. Most importantly, one could expect that these 
systematic variations can be explained by other firm characteristics (control variables in 
Model 2) which improve the model‟s ability to express VRR deviation between firms across 
the USA, the UK and Germany.  
 
Model 2 contains other firm characteristics and firm risk levels. The researcher finds that 
variations in firms‟ VRR across countries over time are significant and can be attributed to 
differences in both firm size and profitability, at p-values of 0.000 and 0.024, respectively. 
It is apparent from the same panel that firms across these three countries significantly vary 
their VRR as a response to variation in their systemic, unsystematic and financing risks, at 
p-values of 0.011, 0.010 and 0.033. This result shows these VRR variations are positively 
associated with systematic and financing risks, whereas they are negatively related to firms‟ 
unsystematic risks.  
 
Therefore, the variations of  VRR, under Model 2 in Panel B of  Table 9.4, between firms 
across countries over 2005 to 2009, decrease to 57.1%. The remainder (42.9%) is the 
variability of  VRR within American, British and German firms over 2005 to 2009. In other 
words, the firm characteristics (risk and control variables) implicitly explain approximately 
29% of  the variability of  VRR between firms across these three countries. The variations 
of  VRR between firms are more likely to be attributed to variability of  both firm risk levels 
and other characteristics (control variables, especially firm size and profitability) than firm 
risk levels only. Together, the results explain, nevertheless, that there is still significant 
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changeability of  VRR at each level, which can be explained by systematic changes of  
between countries characteristics (provided from Models 3 to 7). 
 
Models 3 to 7 explain the effect of  country-level characteristics on explaining VRR 
variability among and between firms across these three countries. The result shows that 
VRR variations are significantly and positively associated with variability of  firms‟ 
systematic and financing risks (at p<0.000), whereas the researcher finds these VRR 
variations are more likely to be statistically and negatively correlated to firms‟ unsystematic 
risk (at p<0.013). Based on these results, the researcher accepts H2 and H5 and rejects 
H1, H3 and H6. 
  
The current study finds significant and positive (negative) relations between VRR 
variations and a firm‟s size (profitability). The result documents that VRR across countries 
is not statistically associated with both legal system and cultural values. The combination 
of  both legal system with PD or MAS are the only exceptions to such findings. Hence, the 
current study finds that variability of  VRR between firms in code law countries (Germany) 
is higher than the variability of  VRR between firms in common law countries (the USA 
and the UK). 
 
The results, through Model 3 to Model 7 in Panel A of  Table 9.4, nonetheless explain that 
there are slight improvements in these models‟ abilities to explain differences of  VRR 
among firms across the USA, the UK and Germany. Hence, there is still significant 
variation of  VRR, which can be explained by other predictors at either level 1 or level 2 
(Wald Z is significant at a p-value of  0.000). The systematic changes of  country 
characteristics explain 29% of  the total variations of  the random intercept of  VRR 
between firms across these three countries.   
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These results suggest that differences in VRR between firms across the USA, the UK and 
Germany are more likely to be statistically correlated with firm characteristics that are 
derived hypothetically based on managers‟ incentives theories. In essence, the current study 
finds that both legal and cultural factors have less influence in explaining variations in VRR 
within firms across countries. This result, therefore, supports accepting H7.  
                                                
                    
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
236 
 
 
 
Table 9.4: Repeated measures multilevel analysis of  VRR 
 
 Panel A: Estimates of  fixed effects (VRR) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Null 
Model 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept 190.14*** 
(0.000) 
195.73*** 
(0.000) 
127.24*** 
(0.000) 
126.88*** 
(0.000) 
126.88*** 
(0.000) 
126.88*** 
(0.000) 
118.60*** 
(0.000) 
126.88*** 
(0.000) 
TR  15.70* 
(0.07) 
4.87 
(0.603) 
2.09 
(0.825) 
2.09 
(0.000) 
2.09 
(0.000) 
2.09 
(0.825) 
2.09 
(0.000) 
SR  26.36*** 
(0.000) 
17.28** 
(0.011) 
18.47*** 
(0.005) 
18.47*** 
(0.000) 
18.47*** 
(0.000) 
18.47*** 
(0.005) 
18.47*** 
(0.000) 
USR  -38.18*** 
(0.000) 
-23.97*** 
(0.010) 
-23.44** 
(0.013) 
-23.44** 
(0.013) 
-23.44** 
(0.013) 
-23.44** 
(0.013) 
-23.44** 
(0.013) 
FR  31.00*** 
(0.000) 
17.48** 
(0.033) 
17.04** 
(0.038) 
17.04** 
(0.038) 
17.04** 
(0.038) 
17.04** 
(0.038) 
17.04** 
(0.038) 
LR  -10.61 
(0.204) 
-1.94 
(0.813) 
-.3.07 
(0.712) 
-3.07 
(0.712) 
-3.07 
(0.712) 
-.3.07 
(0.712) 
-3.07 
(0.712) 
SE   134.06*** 
(0.000) 
137.58*** 
(0.000) 
137.58*** 
(0.000) 
137.58*** 
(0.000) 
137.58*** 
(0.000) 
137.58*** 
(0.000) 
PE   -15.40** 
(0.024) 
-14.74** 
(0.03) 
-14.74** 
(0.030) 
-14.74** 
(0.030) 
-14.74** 
(0.03) 
-14.74** 
(0.030) 
GE   1.011 
(0.827) 
1.35 
(0.770) 
1.35 
(0.770) 
1.35 
(0.770) 
1.35 
(0.770) 
1.35 
(0.770) 
DE   2.43 
(0.0792) 
3.90 
(0.686) 
3.90 
(0.686) 
3.90 
(0.686) 
3.90 
(0.686) 
3.90 
(0.686) 
Legal (0)    14.13* 
(0.092) 
5.85 
(0.491) 
5.85 
(0.491) 
14.13* 
(0.092) 
5.85 
(0.491) 
PD (35) 
 
   -8.28 
(0.353 
    
UA  (35) 
 
    -8.28 
(0.353) 
   
IND (76) 
 
     -8.28 
(0.353) 
  
MAS (62) 
 
      8.28 
(0.353) 
 
LTO (25) 
 
       -8.28 
(0.353) 
Time 25.18*** 
(0.000) 
23.35*** 
(0.000) 
22.28*** 
(0.000) 
21.91*** 
(0.000) 
21.91*** 
(0.000) 
21.91*** 
(0.000) 
21.91*** 
(0.000) 
21.91*** 
(0.000) 
Quadratic time -3.24*** 
(0.000) 
-3.04**** 
(0.000) 
-3.13*** 
(0.000) 
-3.06*** 
(0.000) 
-3.06*** 
(0.000) 
-3.06*** 
(0.000) 
-3.06*** 
(0.000) 
-3.06*** 
(0.000) 
N-S 
Ob 
737 
3685 
737 
3685 
737 
3685 
737 
3685 
737 
3685 
737 
3685 
737 
3685 
737 
3685 
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Panel B: Estimates of  covariance (VRR) 
This table provides the repeated measures of  two multilevel analyses of  voluntary risk reporting (VRR) 
across the USA, the UK and Germany. All other variables‟ interpretations as introduced in the previous table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Null Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
 
Model 7 
 
V RM (within 
firms) 
3718.97*** 
(0.000) 
3886.98*** 
(0.000) 
3994.45*** 
(0.000) 
3951.31*** 
(0.000) 
3951.31*** 
(0.000) 
3951.31*** 
(0.000) 
3951.31*** 
(0.000) 
3951.31*** 
(0.000) 
V I (between 
firms across 
countries) 
7212.12*** 
(0.000) 
6386.18*** 
(0.000) 
5136.33*** 
(0.000) 
5123.92*** 
(0.000) 
5123.92*** 
(0.000) 
5123.92*** 
(0.000) 
5123.92*** 
(0.000) 
5123.92*** 
(0.000) 
VT (between 
firms across 
countries) 
277.89*** 
(0.000) 
250.19*** 
(0.000) 
203.21*** 
(0.000) 
214.76*** 
(0.000) 
214.76*** 
(0.000) 
214.76*** 
(0.000) 
214.76*** 
(0.000) 
214.76*** 
(0.000) 
ICC (VRM)   36.7% 42.9% 42% 42% 42% 42% 42% 
ICC (VI) 65% 60% 55% 55% 55% 55% 55% 55% 
ICC (VT) 2.4% 2.3% 2.1% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
R2 (VI) --- 11% 29% 29% 29% 29% 29% 29% 
Change -2LL 
Change chi-
square 
 94.44 
(0.000) 
147.25 
(0.000) 
14.75 
(0.000) 
14.75 
(0.000) 
14.75 
(0.000) 
14.75 
(0.000) 
14.75 
(0.000) 
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Overall, after comparing MRR and VRR variations, the current study reports that country 
factors have a higher ability to express MRR variations than those of  VRR. To investigate 
this conclusion further, the current study analyses the impact of  both legal and cultural 
values on MRR_T‟s components, which are MRR_I and MRR_V in the USA and 
Germany. The result (not tabulated)42 confirms the significant impact of  legal system on 
MRR_I rather than MRR_V, which in turn supports that providing even more information 
about mandated risk is more likely to be associated with firms‟ managers‟ incentives. The 
result then shows the importance of  differentiating mandatory from voluntary disclosure 
to adequately estimate the impact of  both legal systems and cultural values on each risk 
disclosure type. Based on this, the current study accepts H8. Table 5 summarises all results 
under Model 7. 
               
        
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
42  The results are available from the author upon request. 
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Table 9.5: Summary of  hypotheses results of  MRR and VRR under Model 7; firm and 
country characteristics. 
 
 
All variables have the same definitions as provided in previous tables. ES is the excepted direction, S means 
significant, + or – means positive or negative associations, respectively. A means accepted hypothesis, R 
means rejected hypothesis. 
 ES MRR VRR 
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TR 
 
H1 + NS    R NS   R 
SR 
 
H2 + S (+) A S (+)  A 
UNR H3 ? NS  R S (-)  A 
FR H5 + NS R S (+) A 
LR H6 + NS 
 
R NS  R 
C
o
n
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l 
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ri
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le
s 
SE + S(+) S(+) 
PE + S(-) S(-) 
GE + S(+) NS 
DE + NS NS 
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CL 
H
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PD  S(+) relative to CM-L S(+)  
 
UA S(-) relative to CM-L NS 
 
A 
IND S(-) relative to CM-L 
 
NS 
MAS  S(+) relative to CM-L S(+) 
 
LTO  S(-) relative to CM-L NS 
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9.4. Robustness tests 
 
 
The researcher checked the MRR and VRR variations either across the USA, the UK and 
Germany or individually in each country in many different ways. First, the study examines 
the extent to which the results using repeated measures multilevel analysis are sensitive to 
change as a response to specific changes in both dependent and independent variables. The 
study, therefore, raises some risk level variables (specifically, the researcher increases 
volatility and beta) and both MRR and VRR by 10%. The researcher then recalculates all 
the transformed scores and re-runs the analysis. The results of  the MRR and VRR 
variations within and between the US, UK and German firms were identical. 
 
Second, original data without any transformation were utilised; the results are very similar 
to what the researcher obtained with ranked transformations. 
 
 Third, the researcher used some other proxies of  some of  these variables; in particular, 
market capitalisations in US dollars, return on assets (ROA) and dividend per share instead 
of  total assets in US dollars, return on equity and dividend payout as a proxy of  firm‟s size, 
profitability and dividend, respectively. The researcher draws the same conclusions under 
these new proxies. 
 
Fourth, the researcher divided each country sample randomly into two sub-samples, 
recalculating the transformed scores of  these new samples and then re-running the 
analysis. The results of  these sub-samples are similar either to each other or to each 
country‟s whole sample.  
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9.5. Concluding remarks 
 
 
This chapter uses repeated measures multilevel analysis to empirically investigate the 
following questions: Are there any variations in both mandatory and voluntary risk 
reporting within and between firms across these countries from 2005 to 2009? If  yes, to 
what extent can characteristics at both firm and country level explain such variations, 
concerning risk factors at the former level? 
 
The results document significant MRR and VRR variations within and between US, UK 
and German firms. The researcher finds that the legal systems and cultural values have 
significantly high abilities to express MRR variations. The current study in this regard 
contributes to prior research (see Doupnik and Tsakumis, 2004) that questions the extent 
to which the cultural values of  a country can influence its rules, especially after the full 
adoption of  IFRSs in many countries around the world. The results report that even under 
the new approach of  international convergence, the national culture and legal system of  a 
country are still significant factors in expressing MRR variation. 
 
Conversely, both legal and cultural factors are found to be less important in explaining 
VRR variations among firms across countries. These results suggest that differences in 
VRR among firms across the USA, the UK and Germany are more likely to be statistically 
correlated with firm characteristics that are derived hypothetically based on managers‟ 
incentives theories.  
 
These results have theoretical and practical implications. First, the significant variations of  
MRR and VRR within and between firms across the USA, the UK and Germany over 2005 
to 2009 express that there are other chances to expand the current design either at firm or 
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country level by involving other explanatory variables to reduce the unexplained variations 
in risk reporting. Hence, these variables significantly improved the interpretations of  the 
observed variations between firms, known as level 2 variations, than those occurring within 
firms, known as level 1 variations. In this regard, the current study suggests more attention 
should be paid to those variables that may express variations in MRR and/or VRR within 
firms over 2005 to 2009. There is a recent trend in accounting literature (e.g., Bamber, 
Jiang and Wang, 2010) that looks more deeply at the demographic characteristics of  
managers (e.g., educational background, such as managers who come from finance, 
accounting or legal backgrounds; distinguishing managers who have military experience 
from those who do not) in this kind of  research. Bamber et al. (2010) find personal 
managerial styles play a significant role in explaining cross-sectional variation in voluntary 
financial disclosure. 
 
The second theoretical implication the current study provides is a new empirical model 
concerning how to interact both the cross-sectional and time series effects simultaneously 
with correcting for the residual dependency. The current study can be expanded through 
adding one or more levels to its two levels. Future research may examine a different set of  
countries, or consider the sector effect. In such cases, the potential design will rely on firms 
nested within sectors, which are in turn nested within countries over years, leading to three 
levels of  analysis.  
 
The practical implication of  the previous results is providing empirical evidence for the 
current international convergence efforts by either considering each country‟s legal system 
and its cultural values as essential to minimise diversifications of  the mandatory efforts, or 
considering managerial incentives within each country to minimise variation in their 
voluntary disclosure. 
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Chapter Ten: Summary, theoretical and practical implications, limitations and 
suggestions for future research 
 
10.1. Overview 
 
The main aim of  the current study was to identify the main incentives for risk reporting 
across three different country settings, each of  which exhibits a distinctive approach to risk 
reporting. The first, the UK approach, encourages voluntary risk reporting rather than 
mandatory regulations; the second, the German approach, mandates the provision of  risk 
information in annual report narratives. The third, the US approach, is a compromise 
between enforcement and encouragement to provide risk information mandatorily and/or 
voluntarily. Investigating the incentives for risk reporting within this group of  countries 
answers the calls of  some prior research (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Dobler, 2008) to 
deepen our understanding of  what motivates firms‟ risk disclosure.  
 
The current study considered how and the extent to which firms in these three countries 
respond to their significant underlying risk by disclosing more or less risk information 
either mandatorily and/or voluntarily. Observing such response(s) gives signals to 
regulators within each country, practically, of  whether a firm responds properly to 
significant exposure to specific underlying risks by disclosing and explaining more (based 
on theory with mixed results from prior research) about these risks mainly mandatorily 
(highly expected within US and German contexts) and/or voluntarily (highly expected 
within a UK context). 
 
 This chapter summarises the main empirical findings set out in Chapters Six, Seven, Eight 
and Nine. Then, the main theoretical and practical implications are highlighted, followed by 
discussing the limitations of  the current study and providing suggestions for future 
research. 
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10.2. Summary  
 
To investigate the main incentives for risk reporting across the USA, the UK and Germany, 
firm- and country-level analyses were performed. In both levels, risk reporting was the 
main variable (the dependent variables), compromising either mandatory or voluntary risk 
reporting (MRR or VRR), which was measured using automated content analysis. Three 
main steps were performed to capture the levels of  MRR and VRR in each country. 
 
In the first step, generating a final risk word list was achieved through relying on analysing 
prior research, using possible synonyms from previous sources and using annual reports 
narratives to identify any other words related to those identified based on the other two 
sources. 
 
In the second step, a command file was created based on the final risk word list to text-
search annual reports narratives for all statements containing at least one word from this 
final list of  risk words. Before commencing the second step, however, annual reports in 
each country were further prepared by either converting them to texts so as be readable by 
N6, or eliminating specific sections which reflected mandated requirements within the US 
(item 1.a for Risk Factor; 7.a for Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosure about Market 
Risk) and German (the Risk and Opportunity or Outlook sections) contexts. For the UK 
context, text-searching was undertaken without eliminating any annual reports narrative 
sections because there are no existing requirements for disclosing risk information in 
specific sections.  
 
The last step was aggregating scores from these sections with other sections (the rest of  
the annual report narratives) to obtain scores that proxied MRR and VRR by distinguishing 
between scores that provide mandatory risk disclosure (in either specific sections or 
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according to some requirements in accounting standards, as discussed in Chapter Three) 
and aggregating risk disclosure scores (based on the final list of  risk words, as discussed in 
Chapter Five). 
 
Firm-level analysis variables are mainly a firm‟s risk levels and other firm characteristics. A 
firm‟s risk level variables are proxied by two main measures: market- and accounting-risk 
measures. While the market-measures contain volatility, market beta and volatility of  
standard error of  CAPM to measure total, systematic and unsystematic risks, respectively, 
the accounting-measures contain current ratio and leverage to measure liquidity and 
financing risks. Other firm characteristics include some control variables: a firm‟s size, 
profitability, growth and dividends.   
 
To identify the extent to which there are significant differences in a firm‟s risk levels and its 
risk reporting levels, multivariate analysis of  variance (MANOVA) was preformed, as 
shown in Chapter Six. The results indicate that there are significant differences between 
firms across the USA, the UK and Germany in their risk and risk reporting levels. 
Correlation analysis was utilised to associate differences in risk levels with differences in 
risk disclosures. The results identified significant associations between risk and risk 
reporting levels, as expected based on the theoretical argument (as discussed in Section 2.4) 
in which one could expect that firms respond significantly to their underlying risks by 
disclosing risk information in their annual reports narratives. These results are also 
consistent with most prior research (as discussed in Section 3.3 and Section 4.3).  
 
Based on UK data, and by regressing market- and accounting-risk measures on aggregated, 
voluntary and mandatory risk disclosures, linear mixed model (LMM) was performed 
against two other models widely used by prior research, specifically, ordinary least squares 
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(OLS) and fixed effect model (FEM), as shown in Chapter Seven. The results revealed that 
managers that exhibit high compliance with risk reporting requirements are more likely to 
reveal more risk information voluntarily in their annual report narratives than managers 
that exhibit low levels of  compliance with risk regulation. This result is consistent with 
Dye (1986). The results explain that the observed trend of  mandatory risk disclosure is 
different from voluntary risk reporting trends relative to these firms‟ underlying risks. 
Voluntary risk disclosure is more sensitive to underlying risks than mandatory risk 
disclosure. Specifically, the results demonstrate that both aggregated and voluntary risk 
disclosure are significantly and positively associated with risk-adjusted return and both 
systematic and financing risks. These results are consistent with managers‟ incentives 
theories, suggesting that managers are motivated to provide higher levels of  risk 
information voluntarily to reduce both information asymmetry and agency costs, as well as 
some prior empirical literature (e.g., Abraham and Cox, 2007; Kothari et al., 2009).  
 
There were, however, significant negative associations between aggregated and voluntary 
risk disclosures and total and liquidity risks, suggesting that firms with higher total risk or 
lower liquidity levels are less likely to provide risk information in their annual report 
narratives. Whilst this result conflicts with prior theory, it is consistent with some empirical 
literature (e.g., Marshall and Weetman, 2002, 2007). This chapter also found significant and 
positive associations between aggregated and voluntary risk reporting and firm size and 
profitability. These results are consistent both with agency theory and prior empirical 
research (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007). In contrast with both 
aggregated and voluntary risk disclosure, mandatory risk disclosure is found to be 
unrelated to firm risk levels. The results suggest that mandatory risk disclosure is 
significantly and positively responsive to firm size.  
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To associate variations in firm risk levels to variations in MRR and VRR within and 
between firms in the USA, the UK and Germany over 2005 to 2009, repeated measures 
multilevel analysis (RMMLA) was performed, as shown in Chapter Eight. 
 
For the USA, the results indicate that firms are more sensitive to providing their MRR and 
VRR as a function of  their risk levels, along with other firm characteristics. Specifically, in 
large, less profitable US firms, variations in VRR were significantly influenced by volatility 
and current ratio. Furthermore, the results report that in large, less profitable and high 
growth US firms, variations in MRR were significantly associated with volatility, beta and 
current ratio. The result indicates that firm risk levels, along with other firm characteristics, 
have significantly higher abilities to reduce systematic unexplained variations between 
firms‟ MRR than VRR. The results suggest that the US firms pays close attention to 
volatility, beta and current ratio as proxies for total, systematic and liquidity risks by 
disclosing significantly more risk information mandatorily and/or voluntarily, with an 
exception in the latter case of  liquidity risk. 
 
For the UK firms, variations in VRR were significantly subject to firm risk levels, 
specifically systematic and liquidity risks rather than other firm risk types. Significantly, in 
those firms, variations in MRR were only determined by firm size.  
 
The results also indicate that firm risk levels, along with other firm characteristics, have 
significantly higher abilities to reduce systematic unexplained variations in either MRR or 
VRR. The results suggest that UK firms pay closer attention to beta and current ratio as 
proxies for systematic and liquidity risks than they pay to other risks, by disclosing 
significantly high levels of  risk information voluntarily. The UK firms, however, did not 
pay any attention to their risks when providing mandated risk reporting.  
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For German firms, providing risk information mandatorily and/or voluntarily was a 
function of  their risks. This result supports the fact that even in highly mandated risk 
reporting markets, there are still managerial incentives to voluntarily disclose further risk 
information. 
 
The results indicate that firm risk levels, along with other firm characteristics, have 
significantly higher abilities to reduce systematic unexplained variations in either MRR or 
VRR. The results suggest that German firms pay closer attention to volatility, beta and 
current ratio as proxies for systematic and liquidity risks than they pay to other risks, by 
disclosing significantly higher levels of  risk information mandatorily. These firms, however, 
pay closer attention to all their risks (except liquidity risk) when providing VRR. 
  
Based on Chapter Eight‟s data and analysis, Chapter Nine concerned the pooled 
associations across these countries rather than considering these associations in each 
country. The analysis, therefore, integrated firm-level analysis, which was utilised in all 
previous chapters, with country-level analysis, which was produced in Chapter Nine. The 
results indicate that the legal systems and cultural values have significantly high abilities to 
express MRR variations. This result answered Doupnik and Tsakumis‟s (2004) question 
regarding the extent to which a country‟s culture can influence its rules, especially after the 
full adoption of  IFRSs in many countries around the world. The result reports, therefore, 
that even under the new approach of  international convergence, the national culture and 
legal system of  a country are still significant factors in expressing any variations in MRR. 
 
Conversely, both legal and cultural factors were found to be less important in explaining 
VRR variations among firms across countries. These results suggest that variations in VRR 
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between firms across the USA, the UK and Germany were likely to be statistically 
correlated with firm characteristics that were derived hypothetically based on managers‟ 
incentives theories.  
 
10.3. Theoretical and practical implications 
 
 
10.3.1. Theoretical implications 
 
The results summarised in the previous section have some distinctive theoretical 
implications. First, it is suggested that distinguishing between the observed trend of  
mandatory and voluntary risk reporting is essential, supporting the main argument of  the 
current study, which is that each risk disclosure type has its own drivers. This result, 
therefore, does not support those studies that do not distinguish voluntary from 
mandatory risk reporting (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2000, 2005, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 
2007) while studying the incentives for risk reporting. Therefore, the current study 
documented different conjectures between the observed trend of  MRR and firm risk levels 
compared to the observed trend of  VRR. The results also suggest that the trend of  
aggregated risk disclosure is consistent with the trend of  voluntary risk disclosure relative 
to a firm‟s characteristics, such as its risk levels and other characteristics (e.g., firm size, 
profitability, growth, dividends and corporate governance mechanisms, such as board 
characteristics). This result suggests that aggregated risk disclosure can be used as a proxy 
for voluntary risk disclosure and in both cases should be differentiated from mandatory 
risk reporting.    
 
Second, previous results support Dobler‟s (2008) theoretical argument that studying risk 
reporting incentives is crucial even within highly regulated countries like the USA and 
Germany. The results suggest that managers still have incentives to disclose additional 
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information above these requirements. This could significantly add to compliance 
disclosure literature (e.g., Li, 2010) by emphasising the importance of  widening this 
research scope to pay more attention to variations above the mandated requirements (e.g., 
IFRS adoption), which provide a minimum of  information to investors, as argued through 
regulatory theory (e.g., Leftwich, 1980; Cooper and Keim, 1983; Fields et al., 2001; Ogus, 
2001).  
 
The third theoretical implication of  the previous results was utilising a new empirical 
model (MLA) that was introduced through either using the linear mixed model, shown in 
Chapter Seven, or RMMLA, shown in Chapters Eight and Nine, concerning how to 
interact both the cross-sectional and time series effects simultaneously with correcting for 
the residual dependency. 
 
Fourth, the significant variations of  MRR and VRR within and between firms either in or 
across the USA, the UK and Germany over 2005 to 2009 expressed that there are other 
chances to expand the current design either at firm- or country-level analysis by involving 
other explanatory variables to reduce the unexplained variations in risk reporting. Hence, 
all explanatory variables used by the current study significantly improved the 
interpretations of  the observed variations between firms, which were known as level 2 
variations, more than those occurring within firms, which were known as level 1 variations. 
In this regard, the current study suggests more attention should be paid to those variables 
that may express variations in MRR and/or VRR within firms over 2005 to 2009. All these 
expansions are discussed in the section on limitations and suggestions for future research. 
 
 
 
  
251 
 
10.3.2. Practical implications  
 
These previous results have some distinctive implications for regulators in the USA, the 
UK and Germany. First, the results support the regulatory trend within the USA; the 
results indicate that firms providing more risk information either mandatorily and/or 
voluntarily are subject to significant underlying risks. This result could be interpreted as US 
firms trusting the market‟s ability to correct any overestimations of  these firms‟ 
uncertainties by disclosing more risk information. The theoretical expansion for this 
argument was the extent to which investors can understand risk information in annual 
report narratives, as was addressed within the US market by Li (2008), who used a text 
search for the words risk and uncertainty in 10-K annual filings as a direct measure of  risk 
information content. Li‟s (2008) findings support investors becoming more familiar with 
risk information as time passes (one-year period).  
 
Second, within the UK context, the practical implications stem from supporting the 
current trend of  UK regulation, which encourages firms to voluntarily disclose 
information about their risks rather than making such disclosure compulsory. In general 
terms, the results reinforce support for encouraging (by means of  non-mandatory 
initiatives, such as those of  the ICAEW) UK firms to provide risk information voluntarily 
rather than mandatorily. The evidence, however, also signals that firms may provide less 
risk information than what would constitute an appropriate response to their underlying 
risk levels.  
 
Third, consistent with discussion within the US context, the results in the German context 
signal that organising risk reporting by formally implementing an accounting standard 
significantly improves the disclosure environment by encouraging the provision of  more 
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risk information either mandatorily or voluntarily, most importantly as a response to firm 
risk levels.  
 
Fourth, the practical implication in an international context was considering each country‟s 
legal system and its cultural values as essential to minimising variations in the mandatory 
efforts.  
 
10.4. Limitations and suggestions for future research  
 
By utilising computerised content analysis and multilevel analysis (LMM and RMMLA), the 
current study identified risk reporting incentives across the USA, the UK and Germany. 
The current study, therefore, extends the empirical knowledge and contributes to risk 
disclosure literature. The current study, however, has some limitations, either in firm- or 
country-level analyses or in its research methodology, which have to be considered as 
potential avenues for future research. 
 
First, in firm-level analysis, the current study emphasised firm risk levels as main incentives 
and controlled for some other effects (other firm characteristics and corporate governance 
mechanisms). The limitations in this level are related to using just these variables; some 
other variables could be used. In terms of  measuring firm risk levels, the current study 
relies on extended literature that has utilised market and accounting risk measures. Using 
some other techniques to measure a firm‟s risk levels, such as value at risk, could be one 
area of  interest for future research. 
 
For the control variables, the current study accounted for four effects; namely, size, 
profitability, growth and dividends effects. Some other effects have been suggested in 
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general disclosure studies, such as analyst following, audit firm size and multi-nationality 
(e.g., Khlif  and Souissi, 2010).   
 
The current study accounts for CG effects within the UK based on the availability of  data, 
and only considers board characteristics as a main mechanism. Not considering other CG 
mechanisms (such as ownership structure, e.g., Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) in either the 
UK or in the other two countries could be a limitation of  the current study, and also may 
be an area of  interest for future research.  
 
Further research could be useful by including some other explanatory variables in the 
model, which might decrease the unsystematic (idiosyncratic) unexplained variations in 
MRR and VRR within firms between 2005 and 2009. It could be useful to consider some 
recent trends in disclosure literature that look at unsystematic (idiosyncratic) demographic 
characteristics of  managers as an essential driver for idiosyncratic voluntary disclosure 
variations (Bamber et al., 2010).  
 
Second, in country-level analysis, the current study acknowledged the main criteria of  
choosing these three countries. Other countries, however, could have different and 
attractive approaches to risk reporting. Investigating risk reporting incentives in other 
countries could be useful to understand the main drivers of  risk reporting. Using other 
variables to proxy the country effects could be useful to extend the current study‟s design, 
which is based mainly on legal and cultural values. Other variables, such as inflation 
exchange rate, financing types (internal versus external finance), and country level of  risk 
could have a significant impact on risk reporting; most importantly, they could react 
differently with firm characteristics in interpreting risk reporting incentives. These three 
countries, even on this large scale, could be extended by involving other countries. Thus, 
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observing how country variables could vary becomes achievable. In other words, the 
current design is limited by these three countries to observe the impact of  all country 
variables on variations in MRR and/or VRR because of  many of  these variables (cultural 
dimensions, legal systems) are involved as dummy variables, as a subsequent; involving 
other dummies could not be reasonably acceptable statistically within only three countries. 
Extending the current design to include other countries is essential to observe the impact 
of  some other factors (e.g., the sources of  finance; political factors) on risk reporting 
variations.    
 
    
Third, in terms of  methodology, the current study relied on annual reports and automated 
content analysis using Nudist 6. Annual reports are one way for firms to convey 
information; however, there are other sources, such as financial releases and financial 
newspapers; see e.g., Kothari et al., 2009, which could be utilised to measure a firm‟s risk 
reporting levels. Other software could be utilised to capture risk reporting levels. Further 
research could usefully implement some of  those techniques (e.g., Kothari et al., 2009; Li, 
2010; Gruning, 2011).     
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Examples of  risk statements captured by Nudist 6  
 
 
Sentence Firm and (year of  
annual report)  
   „Foreign  currency  exchange  risk: Derivatives  are  entered  into  in  order  to  hedge  
exposure  to  foreign  currency  exchange  risk‟.    
      
   „Short term investment in financial instruments is partially undertaken on behalf  of  the 
group by substantial external fund managers  who are limited to dealing in debt 
instruments and certain defined derivative instruments and are given strict guidelines on 
credit,  diversification and maturity profiles‟.        
 
Arriva PLC (2007) 
 
 
 
   „New wave  revenue in this segment increased by 24% to £677 million  driven mainly 
by the 20% growth during the year in the number  of  BT Business Broadband customers 
to 579,000 at 31 March 2007‟.   
 
   „TREASURY POLICY: The group has a centralised treasury operation whose primary  
role is to manage liquidity, funding, investment and the group‟s  financial risk, including 
risk from volatility in currency and  interest rates and counterparty credit risk‟.               
 
BT Group PLC 
(2007) 
 
 
 
 
   „The different service areas of  our business offer different opportunities for growth 
and returns on our investment‟.              
         
   „We believe that attractive returns can be  delivered from investment in bolt-on 
acquisitions  where we can leverage our market leading  position and scale to deliver 
higher levels of   operational efficiency to the acquisitions that  we have made‟.     
 
Davis Service Group 
PLC(2007) 
 
 
     „Capital Investment: A wrong decision in respect of  the Company‟s planned fleet 
growth, in terms of  timing, aircraft numbers or fleet type, could have a material adverse 
impact on the Group‟s future performance.           934       Foreign Currency Risk   The 
Group generates a surplus in most of  the currencies in which it does businesses‟.         
                                                  
     „Gains and losses on derivatives designated as cash flow hedges  and assessed as 
effective for the period, are taken to equity in  accordance with the requirements of  IAS 
39‟.                 
 
British Airways PLC 
(2007) 
 
 
 
 
    „The Company‟s operations are also  subject to a variety of  other risks and 
uncertainties relating to trading  in numerous foreign countries, including the imposition 
of  any import  or investment restrictions, including tariffs and import quotas or any  
restrictions on the repatriation of  earnings and capital, and changes  in tax regulations 
and international tax treaties‟.     
  
   „Sensitivity to interest rate risk: The Group‟s profit is not sensitive to changes in the fair 
values of  the interest rate swaps and the intrinsic values of  the interest rate collars since 
these achieve hedge accounting‟.       
                     
                           
 Bunzl PLC (2007) 
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